Archive for the ‘Politicos’ Category

SWISS: BEN ALI SON-IN-LAW WANTED RESIDENCY

Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011
ID 08TUNIS299
SUBJECT SWISS: BEN ALI SON-IN-LAW WANTED RESIDENCY
DATE 2008-03-24 14:02:00
CLASSIFICATION SECRET//NOFORN
ORIGIN Embassy Tunis
TEXT S E C R E T TUNIS 000299 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG (HARRIS AND HOPKINS) AND INR (SWEET)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV KCOR KDEM PREL TS
SUBJECT: SWISS: BEN ALI SON-IN-LAW WANTED RESIDENCY

Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary. XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador on March 21 that President Ben Ali’s son-in-law Sakher Matri had requested a residency permit for Geneva, apparently to facilitate his business interests in Europe. Faessler said that the SWISS denied Matri’s request to send a signal about their frustration over a former employee’s ongoing sit-in outside the Chancery. Matri, who is married to Ben Ali’s daughter, quickly brought an end to the sit-in, with the MFA telling XXXXXXXXXXXX that Ben Ali was “sorry” for the inconvenience. End Summary.

¶2. (S/NF) On March 21, XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador that prominent Tunisian businessman and Presidential son-in-law Sakher Matri (bio data para 5) had recently requested a residency permit for Geneva. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Geneva had declined Matri’s request after consulting with Bern, where Foreign Ministry officials sought to send a message to the GOT about their frustration with a disgruntled former employee protesting at the SWISS Embassy in Tunis. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX was reportedly fired in 2001 for refusing to translate an article published in an opposition newspaper, which he said “would be used to harm Tunisia’s reputation.” XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador XXXXXXXXXXXX was fired for being dishonest, but received all appropriate compensation. Following his dismissal, he began a sit-in outside the SWISS Embassy which had continued for over a year.) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Matri’s lawyers had applied for the residency permit, apparently to facilitate his business interests, including with the rising number of Gulf nationals in Switzerland. XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador that there is some evidence that the Ben Ali family was moving more money into Switzerland, but perhaps less than into other European countries.

¶3. (C/NF) When Matri’s residency request was declined, he approached XXXXXXXXXXXX to obtain a visitor visa. While he initially asked for an appointment outside of business hours, Matri eventually came in person to apply for the visa on February 29. XXXXXXXXXXXX turned him down, on the grounds that XXXXXXXXXXXX’s presence impeded the Embassy’s ability to conduct normal business. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that when Matri left the Embassy, he placed several of XXXXXXXXXXXX’s protest signs in his trunk. Not a half hour later, Hatem Ben Salem, the MFA Secretary of State for European Affairs (deputy-Secretary

SIPDIS
equivalent) convoked XXXXXXXXXXXX. Ben Salem toldXXXXXXXXXXXX that President Ben Ali had called to say he was not aware of XXXXXXXXXXXX’s protest and was very sorry for any inconvenience. When XXXXXXXXXXXX returned to the Embassy, XXXXXXXXXXXX shouted at him, “You’ve won the battle, but not the war.” The following Monday, March 3, XXXXXXXXXXXX appeared briefly at the Embassy with some family members, but the police quickly removed him and he has not returned since.

¶4. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador that he had attributed XXXXXXXXXXXX’s continued presence to GOT annoyance over SWISS criticism at the 2005 UN World Summit on the Information Society and meetings between the SWISS Foreign Minister and Tunisian opposition. He opined that the GOT had subsequently increased its pressure on the SWISS, through allowing XXXXXXXXXXXX’s protest and pressuring XXXXXXXXXXXX to abandon his residence, which sits practically in the middle of the Presidential Palace in Carthage (the palace walls have been built around it). Following Matri’s visit, Ben Salem told
XXXXXXXXXXXX that there was “no pressure” for him to move from his residence. XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador that he had once
complained about XXXXXXXXXXXX’s presence with Minister of Defense Kamel Morjane, who said he could not raise the issue with Ben
Ali, since you could never tell in what mood the President might be.

¶5. (C/NF) Comment. The SWISS experience with the GOT cold shoulder and the Matri-induced thaw in relations is not surprising. However, Matri’s interest in obtaining European residency is an interesting sign of Ben Ali family intentions. While Matri may have only been seeking to expand his business interests, many Ben Ali critics remain on the lookout for signs he and his family are planning their ultimate — and profitable — departure from Tunisia. End Comment.

¶6. (C/NF) Bio Data: Fahed Mohamed Sakher Matri (DPOB: Dec. 2, 1981, Tunis) is married to Ben Ali’s oldest daughter with second wife Leila Trabelsi, Nesrine. A prominent businessman, Matri is the owner of the formerly state-owned Ennaql (Transportation) company, which is the sole distributor of Volkswagen and Porsche in Tunisia. The company was rumored to be a wedding present for Matri, although it was reported that he paid over USD 10 million for the purchase. He is also the owner of Princess El Materi Holding, which includes Goulette Shipping Cruise. The company, which has significant holding in the health, tourism and agribusiness sectors, recently won a contract to expand the Port of Tunis into a cruise ship marina. In 2007, he was granted authorization to launch a Koranic radio station, Zitouna, which broadcasts moderate Islamic teachings. His father, Moncef El Materi, is a former army officer and a member of the Chamber of Advisors.
Please visit Embassy Tunis’ Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm
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http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08TUNIS299.html

LIBYA’S SUCCESSION MUDDLED AS THE AL-QADHAFI CHILDREN CONDUCT INTERNECINE WARFARE

Tuesday, February 22nd, 2011

ID 09TRIPOLI208
SUBJECT LIBYA’S SUCCESSION MUDDLED AS THE AL-QADHAFI CHILDREN
DATE 2009-03-09 16:04:00
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGIN Embassy Tripoli
TEXT 2009-03-09 16:08:00 09TRIPOLI208 Embassy Tripoli CONFIDENTIAL 08TRIPOLI494| 08TRIPOLI564| 08TRIPOLI592| 08TRIPOLI679| 08TRIPOLI870| 09TRIPOLI134| 09TRIPOLI196| 09TRIPOLI198| 09TRIPOLI227 VZCZCXRO4734
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DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, INR/NESA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/4/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR ECON MARR MASS PHUM PINR LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA’S SUCCESSION MUDDLED AS THE AL-QADHAFI CHILDREN CONDUCT INTERNECINE WARFARE

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 564, B) 08 TRIPOLI 592, C) TRIPOLI 198, D) 08 TRIPOLI 870, E) 08 TRIPOLI 679, F) 08 TRIPOLI 494, G) TRIPOLI 196, H) TRIPOLI 134, I) 08 TRIPOLI 227

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy – Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: A series of events since last summer suggest that tension between various children of Muammar al-Qadhafi has increased, and that heir-apparent Saif al-Islam is arrayed against Muatassim, Aisha, Hannibal, Saadi and perhaps even his own mother. Much of the tension appears to stem from resentment of Saif al-Islam’s high-profile as the public face of the regime; however, deeper tension about contradictions between Saif al-Islam’s proposed political-economic reforms, which would hurt his siblings’ economic interests, and the old school manner by which he has tried to monopolize the most lucrative economic sectors, also play an important role. The arrest and intimidation of a number of Saif al-Islam allies since last summer, on the one hand, and moves to circumscribe Muatassim’s role in military equipment procurement, on the other, suggest that the current level of discord among al-Qadhafi’s children is acute. While internecine strife is nothing new for the famously fractious al-Qadhafi family, the recent escalation of tension comes during a particularly momentous period. Amid turmoil related to the 40th anniversary of the revolution, Muammar al-Qadhafi’s recent election as African Union chairman, proposed political-economic reforms and persistent rumors about al-Qadhafi’s health and the absence of a viable mechanism to orchestrate a succession, the sharp rivalry between the al-Qadhafi children could play an important, if not determinative role, in whether the family is able to hold on to power after the author of the revolution exits the political scene. End summary.

GREED AND BAD BEHAVIOR …

¶2. (C) As reported ref A, National Oil Corporation Chairman Shukhr Ghanem was approached by National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, in late June 2008 with a request for USD 1.2 billion, reportedly to establish a military/security unit akin to that of his younger brother, Khamis, and to make unspecified security upgrades. In early July, Ghanem informed Muammar al-Qadhafi; however, he laughingly dismissed it. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Ghanem subsequently submitted a letter of resignation in mid-August, believing that Muatassim or his confederates would seek revenge against Ghanem and/or his family for having denied the request for funds. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX End note.)

¶3. (C) Ghanem’s attempt to resign roughly coincided with two other disturbances of al-Qadhafi family comity: the arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, in Geneva in mid-July (ref B subsequent) and a visit to Rome by Saadi al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, against his father’s express wishes in early August. Hannibal and Saadi both have checkered histories of unseemly behavior and public scuffles with authorities in Europe and elsewhere. Although Muammar al-Qadhafi was reportedly fed a carefully vetted version of the events attendant to Hannibal’s arrest to help minimize the perception that Hannibal was to blame, the elder al-Qadhafi was reportedly vexed that Libya, for reasons of protecting the first family’s pride, had to engage in a bilateral spat with Switzerland at a time when it was trying to move ahead with negotiations for a framework agreement with the European Union.

With respect to Saadi’s trip, Muammar al-Qadhafi was reportedly livid that Libyan officials had permitted him to exit the country when it was known that he was not supposed to travel.
Al-Qadhafi was particularly upset that Abdullah Sanussi, a former director of military intelligence and senior regime figure who had played a role as minder of the more troublesome al-Qadhafi offspring, had not done a better job of keeping track of Saadi. (Note: Sanussi is related by marriage to al-Qadhafi and is a trusted figure. He is usually in physical proximity to the tent in which al-Qadhafi holds meetings with visiting foreign dignitaries and, according to members of al-Qadhafi’s protocol office, personally oversees al-Qadhafis’ close protection detail. End note.)

… PROMPT AN AL-QADHAFI FAMILY MEETING

¶4. (C) The upshot of Muatassim’s solicitation of funds, Hannibal’s arrest and Saadi’s jaunt was an al-Qadhafi family meeting in mid-August. Al-Qadhafi reportedly decided to reduce Sanussi’s role as a minder for the most troublesome children (he is still a key adviser to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi) and to instead assign his daughter, Aisha al-Qadhafi, the task of monitoring the activities of ne’er-do-wells Saadi, Hannibal and Saif al-Arab. (Note: The latter is the least publicly know of al-Qadhafi’s children; he lives in Munich, where he pursues ill-defined business interests and spends much time partying. The German Ambassador has expressed concern to us that it is only a matter of time before there is an incident involving him. End note.)

At the meeting, Saadi reportedly criticized his father for having ignored him, and specifically cited the fact that his (Saadi’s) efforts to establish an Export Free Trade Zone near the western Libyan town of Zuwara had not enjoyed the kind of support that Muatassim’s activities as National Security Adviser or Saif al-Islam’s high-profile efforts under the Qadhafi Development Foundation and Libya Youth Forum. As reported ref C, Muammar al-Qadhafi subsequently made an unusual visit to Zuwara last September and significant work on the development project began within a few days of his visit. Although the Zuwara Free Trade Zone is an ambitious and expensive project, Muammar al-Qadhafi likely views it as a relatively small price to pay if it helps occupy the notoriously ill-behaved Saadi and lends a patina of useful engagement to his otherwise less than sterling reputation.

¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX, have told us that Aisha played a strong role in urging a hardline Libyan position with respect to the Swiss-Libyan contretemps over Hannibal’s arrest. Separately, the Swiss Ambassador told us that Aisha’s less than accurate rendering to her father of the events surrounding Hannibal’s arrest and treatment by Swiss authorities helped stoke Muammar al-Qadhafi’s anger, limiting the extent to which Libyan and Swiss officials could maneuver to find an acceptable compromise. The Swiss have told us that in the most recent effort between the two sides to resolve the issue in Davos, Saif had approved an agreement that had the Swiss literally bending over backwards to assuage Libyan demands. After making a phone call (to either Aisha or the leader), Saif returned somewhat chastened after several minutes to rescind the aproval. The Swiss crisis, together with other points of intra-family tension, has reportedly brought Aisha, who enjoys closer relations with Hannibal than with her other brothers, together with Hannibal, Saadi and, to a lesser extent, Saif al-Arab. Muatassim reportedly agreed with the hardline approach vis a vis the Swiss and has been closer to Aisha’s end of the spectrum than to that of Saif al-Islam, who urged a more moderate approach. Muhammad al-Qadhafi (the eldest son, but by al-Qadhafis’ first wife) and Khamis al-Qadhafi (fifth son by al-Qadhafi’s second wife and the well-respected commander of a special forces unit that effectively serves as a regime protection unit) have remained neutral. Exacerbating family tensions is the fact that Saif al-Islam and his mother, Safia, have been on the outs since Saif al-Islam declined to accept as his bride the young woman his mother picked for him some two years ago. Safia al-Qadhafi expressed frustration XXXXXXXXXXXX that Saif al-Islam had not only spurned her choice, but had persisted in his hard-partying, womanizing ways, a source of concern in a socially conservative country like Libya.

INCREASED TENSION BETWEEN SAIF AL-ISLAM AND MUATASSIM

¶6. (C) Against that backdrop of tension, competition between Saif al-Islam, whom most still regard as the heir-apparent, and Muatassim, whose viability as a potential alternative successor has risen since his appointment as National Security Adviser, has increased since last fall. Several well-informed contacts with ties to family circles have reported that Saif al-Islam and Muatassim have not spoken in over three months. Saif reportedly bridled at the fact that Muatassim accompanied Muammar al-Qadhafi on the latter’s visit to Moscow, Minsk and Kiev last year (ref D), and played a key role in negotiating potential weapons contracts. Muatassim (who flew back early) and his older brother Muhammad greeted Muammar al-Qadhafi at the airport upon the latter’s return to Tripoli; Saif, who was in town, was pointedly absent. The Serbian Ambassador, citing conversations with National Security Council staff and members of al-Qadhafi’s entourage, recently told us that Muatassim had presented a number of proposed contracts for weapons, equipment and training to the Secretary of the Temporary Interim Defense Committee (MOD-equivalent), Abu Bakr Yunis shortly after his return from Moscow. Yunis rejected them, arguing that the terms Muatassim had negotiated were not favorable and that Libya did not need much of the equipment Muatassim had proposed buying. Muatassim interpreted Yunis’s response as an attempt to freeze him out of military procurement affairs; there was a heated meeting late last December between Muatassim and Yunis, at which there was sharp disagreement about who had the lead on military procurement. Muatassim reportedly argued that he alone should make such decisions. According to the Serbian Ambassador’s contacts, Muammar al-Qadhafi called a rump session of the Security Committee in December to mediate the conflict. It was reportedly decided that while Muatassim would have the clear lead in non-military security equipment procurement, Yunis and the MOD-equivalent would continue to play a role in military procurement. It was further determined that Khamis al-Qadhafi would play a larger role in military procurement, since his Khamis Regiment (the 32nd Brigade) had demonstrated some success in procurement. Muatassim, whom the Serbian Ambassador described as “a bloody man” and “not terribly bright”, reportedly believed that Saif al-Islam was behind some of the pushback against his having a clear lead on military procurement, worsening the tension between them.

¶7. (C) Saif al-Islam’s highly-publicized visit to the U.S. last November-December exacerbated tension with his siblings, particularly Muatassim, who viewed it as grandstanding. Saif al-Islam’s high-profile role as the public face of the regime to the West has been a mixed blessing for him. While it has bolstered his image (he is probably the most publicly-recognized figure in Libya other than Muammar al-Qadhafi), many Libyans view him as self-aggrandizing and too eager to please foreigners at the expense of Libyans’ interest. His role in the denouement of the Bulgarian nurses’ case, in which he acknowledged in media interviews that the nurses had been tortured and the investigation into their alleged injection of the AIDS virus into Libyan children bungled, badly damaged his reputation. The fact that his recent visit to the U.S. came not long after his August 2008 Youth Forum address – in which he strongly criticized the existing Jamahiriya system of governance, (disingenuously) said that most of his proposed reforms had already been achieved, and declared his intention to withdraw from political life to focus solely on civil society issues (ref E) – reportedly irritated his siblings. Senior GOL contacts have suggested to us that Muatassim’s desire to visit Washington this spring and his seemingly overweaning focus on having meetings with senior USG officials and signing a number of agreements are driven at least in part by a strong sense of competition with Saif al-Islam.

THE KNIVES COME OUT

¶8. (C) Recent events have fueled speculation that inter-sibling rivalries, and those of the more conservative regime elements they represent, have been increasing. In what was viewed as a warning to Saif al-Islam against pressing his reform agenda too hard, regime critic Dhaw al-Mansuri was severely beaten on the street early last summer by men variously described as members of the Revolutionary Committees or security elements. The Executive Director of the QDF-affiliated Human Rights Society of Libya, Muhammad Tarnesh, was detained in late April in connection with an editorial he had written criticizing the government’s poorly coordinated campaign of housing and infrastructure development that featured as its primary accomplishment the seemingly random destruction of large numbers of residences and businesses. Tarnesh told us the investigation was orchestrated by Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, who had taken umbrage at the column and who has been engaged in a quiet struggle with Saif al-Islam over the latter’s political-reform agenda. (Note: Al-Mahmoudi was appointed as a sop to conservative regime elements in 2006 after Shukhri Ghanem, former PM and a pro-reform protigi of Saif al-Islam, was sacked. End note.) More recently, the detention in early February of Juma’a Atiaga on charges that he was involved in a banned political organization and had a hand in the 1984 assassination of Libya’s former Ambassador to Rome, Ammar Daw, has been widely interpreted by informed observers here as a run against Saif al-Islam by conservative regime elements (ref G).

In interviews with al-Sharq al-Awsat at the time, Saif al-Islam decried the arrest as “ridiculous” and the QDF issued a statement calling for Atiaga’s release and criticizing GOL authorities for having arrested Atiaga while ignoring other cases involving allegations of human rights abuses that the QDF had brought to the attention of authorities. Reports suggest that National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi orchestrated the arrest through the Prime Minister’s office in retaliation for Saif al-Islam’s recent encroachment on a business deal Muatassim was trying to broker.
¶9. (C) Perhaps most tellingly, Saif al-Islam’s longtime business partner and financial adviser, Abdulrahman Karfakh, left Tripoli under duress in January, ostensibly to study English in Australia. The shadowy Karfakh ran the National Engineering Supply and Services Company (NESSCO), a large holding company through which Saif al-Islam holds quiet partnerships in a number of foreign entities whose entry into the Libyan market he helped facilitate. Established as an oil field services companies in the late 1990’s, NESSCO now owns large stakes in over 20 major joint-venture projects and runs a profitable business in providing “facilitation” (usually visas and meetings with key GOL officials) for foreign companies seeking to enter the market. Together with Saif al-Islam’s quiet allotment of oil lifts from an offshore mooring point near the western Libyan area of al-Jurf, NESSCO represents his primary source of revenue and the principal means by which he finances his many activities. As reported ref H, we were told last May that Muatassim appeared to be moving to play a larger role in commercial contracts with foreign companies, a bailiwick that had largely been reserved to that point for Saif al-Islam. Karfakh was arrested last spring on corruption charges, supposedly at Muatassim’s behest, and was only released after an impassioned plea by Saif al-Islam to his father. Housing and Infrastructure Board Chairman Abuzeid Dorda told a contact of ours that Saif al-Islam had told Muammar al-Qadhafi that if he insisted on keeping Karfakh in prison, he might as well jail him (Saif al-Islam), too. In the latest evolution, Muatassim’s confederates approached Karfakh in late December early January and warned him against interfering in Muatassim’s business interests, threatening to kill him if he did not. Saif al-Islam reportedly assessed that he could no longer guarantee Karfakh’s safety or protect him from arrest, and arranged for him to quietly leave Tripoli for Australia for an indeterminate period to let things settle.
\
¶10. (C) The contretemps over Karfakh coincided with a sharp denial by Saif al-Islam of (incorrect) western media reports that he had paid USD one million to pop singer Mariah Carey for a four song set she sang at a New Year’s Eve bash on the Caribbean island of St. Bart’s. Saif al-Islam was in the UAE and Thailand for New Year’s. Saif’s “Oea” newspaper hotly denied that their boss had been the financier and corrections were printed in western media noting that Muatassim, not Saif al-Islam, was the organizer of the party in question. (Note: A well-informed contact, who helped bring Lionel Ritchie to Libya several years ago to sing at Aicha’s al-Qadhafi’s birthday party, recently confirmed that he had helped put Muatassim’s people in touch with Carey’s manager. End note.)

¶11. (C) Comment: While internecine strife is nothing new for the famously fractious al-Qadhafi family, the recent escalation of tension between Saif al-Islam and Muatassim, Aisha, Hannibal and Saadi, comes during a particularly momentous period in the Jamahiriya’s history. The 40th anniversary of the revolution on September 1, 2009, together with Muammar al-Qadhafi’s recent election as Chairman of the AU (ref H), proposed political-economic reforms, consideration of a constitution, and rumored elections, have contributed to a sense that Libya is in the midst of a period of particular political turbulence. The Executive Director of the QDF recently told the DCM that a draft constitution had been finished and submitted to the General People’s Committee (cabinet-equivalent) for approval, and that it could be submitted to the General People’s Congress for ratification sometime this year. The UN Resident Representative recently told the Ambassador that Saif al-Islam had established a super-committee under the auspices of the Economic and Development Board to draw up plans to implement wealth distribution and privatization/government restructuring advocated by Muammar al-Qadhafi last March (ref I). In addition to the fact that Saif al-Islam’s public calls for political-economic reforms are seemingly at odds with the old school manner in which he has attempted to monopolize the most lucrative sectors of the economy – a source of irritation for his siblings – the changes he has called for would directly and adversely impact their economic interests and those of other conservative regime elements who have few fungible skills other than political loyalty. Saif al-Islam’s recent announcement of a regional organization that would publicly identify specific individuals who perpetrate human rights abuses and target them for sanctions has been interpreted by some local observers as a manifestation of his frustration with the slow pace of reforms and as a threat to conservative regime elements, many of whom personally played a part in the most serious transgressions of  the late 1970’s and 1980’s.
¶12. (C) Comment (continued): Persistent rumors about Muammar al-Qadhafi’s declining health have lent particular urgency to questions about succession scenarios, throwing into stark relief the fact that, absent a constitution, there is no legal mechanism by which to orchestrate such an endeavor and seemingly increasing the stakes for the sibling rivalry. Adding to the current tension is the fact that some of al-Qadhafi’s children control military and security assets (Muatassim and Khamis – notably, Saif al-Islam does not). Harking back to the bloody feuds between members of the ruling Karamanli family during the Ottoman period, a well-informed contact recently noted that it is historically not a good thing when rival Libyan siblings have armed militias at their disposal. As Libya lurches forward with the effort to balance badly needed economic reform with the appearance of some political re-structuring – all against the backdrop of looming succession issues – the sharp rivalry between the al-Qadhafi children could play an important, if not determinative role, in whether the al-Qadhafi family is able to hold on to power after Muammar al-Qadhafi exits (one way or another) the political scene. End comment.
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http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI208.html

TASHKENT TIDBITS OCTOBER 20, 2008

Tuesday, February 22nd, 2011
ID 08TASHKENT1201
SUBJECT TASHKENT TIDBITS OCTOBER 20, 2008 \
DATE 2008-10-20 12:12:00
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1128

RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 4621

RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 2912

RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1571

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001201

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2018

TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON UZSUBJECT: TASHKENT TIDBITS OCTOBER 20, 2008

Classified By: POL-ECON Chief Nicholas Berliner for reasons 1.4 b and d.

UNDP and Uzbek Customs Launch New Web Site

——————————————

¶1. (C) The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Uzbekistan’s State Customs Committee have launched a new website (www.customsreform.uz), which will include updates on the latest changes in Customs regulation and discussions of the new Customs Code. An English-language version is in the works.

Non-Stop Service to Switzerland

——————————-

¶2. (C) Uzbekistan Airlines last week announced the expansion of its route network to include a new non-stop flight linking Tashkent and Geneva. At first glance this seems like an unusual choice since the airline already serves several major European hubs and Geneva is not a particularly large city; ZURICH is also a more of a gateway airport. We can’t even convince the Government of Uzbekistan to extend prison visit agreements with the Geneva-based International Committee of the Red Cross. The main reason may be that the new Uzbek Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva happens to be President Karimov’s daughter, Gulnora Karimova, who would otherwise be subjected to time-consuming layovers in Paris, Frankfurt, or Milan on her commutes. The direct flight may also prove popular with Uzbek “biznessmen” seeking to do anonymous banking.

Russian Ambassador Moving On

—————————-

¶3. (U) The Russian MFA reported on its website that the Russian Ambassador to Tashkent, Farit Muhametshin, has been appointed the head of the Federal Agency for Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Affairs, Citizens Living Abroad, and \International Humanitarian Cooperation. The Charge d’Affaires will be Vazyh Ibragimovich Serazaev until a new envoy is named. In an October 18 article the Uzbek website uzmetronom.com credited Muhametshin, an ethnic Tatar, with the “restoration of friendly and allied relations between the states.”

Russia’s Economy and Uzbek Migrants

———————————–

¶4. (C) The effect of the world economic crisis on Uzbekistan was the topic of discussion at a meeting of embassy and IFI economists hosted last week by the Tashkent office of the EBRD. A significant portion of the discussion was devoted to the effect a downturn in the Russian economy would have on the up to 5 million Uzbek migrant laborers in Russia. A representative of the Russian trade mission assured us that the Russian migration service would be ruthless and efficient in deporting undocumented laborers, but his assertion was met with raised eyebrows. Other participants posited the more believable notion that highly qualified Uzbeks working in Russia will always find work and will remain through any recession, whereas unskilled laborers employed mainly in the construction industry may flood back to their family bases in Uzbekistan. Given that officially acknowledged remittances amounted to USD 1.6 billion in 2007 (nearly 9% of the Uzbek GDP), a mass return of unskilled laborers could be the most significant manifestation of the world economic crisis in Uzbekistan.

Iranian Ambassador Takes Four Months to Present Credentials

——————————————— ————-

¶5. (C) Iran’s new ambassador to Uzbekistan Muhammad Keshovarzoda was in Tashkent for four months before presenting his credentials to President Karimov on October

¶15. That Karimov was clearly in no hurry to receive Keshovarzoda can be seen as a reflection of GOU attitudes about Iran generally and suspicions about Tehran’s motives in the region.

NORLAND

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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1128
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XTAGS: XTAGPREL, XTAGPGOV, XTAGECON, XTAGUZ 08TASHKENT1201

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ADDED 2011-02-22 00:12:00
STAMP 2011-03-21 11:30:46
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http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08TASHKENT1201.html

 

FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND “DIPLOMATIC ENGINEERING” ARE CHIEF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS

Friday, February 18th, 2011

ID 08BERN443
SUBJECT FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND “DIPLOMATIC \
DATE 2008-08-28 15:03:00
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGIN Embassy Bern
TEXT 167757 2008-08-28 15:09:00 167757 2008-08-28 15:09:00 08BERN443 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO4059\
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR\
DE RUEHSW #0443/01 2411509\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK\
O 281509Z AUG 08\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5286\
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0575\
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0049\
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1226\
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0112\
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0014\
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1136 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERN 000443 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
DEPT FOR P (R.RANGASWAMY), EUR/CE (Y.SAINT-ANDRE), EB, AND \
NEA/IR (H.WOOSTER) \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018 \
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP PTER SZ
SUBJECT: FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND “DIPLOMATIC \
ENGINEERING” ARE CHIEF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS \
\
BERN 00000443 001.2 OF 003 \
\
\
Classified By: POL/E Counselor Richard A. Rorvig; reason 1.4(d). \
\
¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 25 address to senior SWISS \
diplomats, FM Calmy-Rey extolled dialogue and facilitation as \
chief SWISS foreign policy instruments. She used the term \
“diplomatic engineering” in describing her vision of \
Switzerland facilitating dialogue on difficult subjects. A \
rhetorical question Calmy-Rey posed in the course of her \
speech was incorrectly spun in some international and SWISS \
press as allegedly advocating dialogue with Usama bin Laden. \
In response to these reports, the Department of Foreign \
Affairs (DFA) released a press statement emphasizing that \
Calmy-Rey did not propose or support such a dialogue. At \
several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey sought to \
justify the approach she has taken to the Iran nuclear \
problem. She claimed that the “freeze for freeze” concept \
was a suggestion made by Switzerland to “find a way to get \
the blocked talks between Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear \
and into substantive political negotiations.” She once again \
argued that the EGL gas deal is in Switzerland’s national \
interest and said that it “hardly would have been possible” \
without the diplomatic contacts the DFA had developed with \
Iran in the course of its “dialogue” on the nuclear issue. \
Though she remains very popular with the SWISS Left, \
Calmy-Rey has faced a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of \
the SWISS press this year, not least because of her very \
damaging trip to Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. \
Calmy-Rey also has felt pressure to clarify her stance on the \
Iran/nuclear issue in the wake of an August 20 press \
conference in which SWISS President Couchepin stated that the \
Federal Council supports the P5 1 initiative and had decided \
that Switzerland will not undertake its own initiatives in \
this area. End Summary. \
\
—————————————— \
Annual Gathering of Senior SWISS Diplomats \
—————————————— \
\
¶2. (SBU) In an August 25 address to 170 senior SWISS \
diplomats gathered in Bern for the Department of Foreign \
Affairs (DFA) annual ambassadors/CGs conference, FM Calmy-Rey \
extolled dialogue and facilitation (“diplomatic engineering”) \
as chief SWISS foreign policy instruments. Calmy-Rey \
appeared to use the occasion to rebut continuing criticism — \
primarily from SWISS conservatives — of her often \
high-profile approach to sensitive issues. While conceding \
some limits to the prospects for dialogue, she argued that \
Switzerland’s willingness to talk, for example, with \
Hizballah, Hamas, FARC, and the LTTE, was intended to draw \
them into political solutions without legitimizing such \
groups’ terrorist methods that Switzerland condemns. \
\
——————————————– \
Press Flap over Reference to Usama bin Laden \
——————————————– \
\
¶3. (U) In her opening remarks, Calmy-Rey asserted that SWISS \
domestic press commentary seems dominated by “moralists” \
advocating strict isolation of problematic state and \
non-state actors. She asked rhetorically, “should we listen \
to these moralists? And, if not, should we seek dialogue \
without discrimination, even if that means sitting at a table \
with Usama bin Laden?” Calmy-Rey did not answer the question \
explicitly in the course of her speech, but instead argued \
that in each case the prospects for dialogue need to be \
carefully reviewed. She maintained that dialogue most of the \
time is better than isolation, but does not mean “accepting \
the unacceptable.” \
\
¶4. (U) French daily “Le Monde” subsequently incorrectly \
reported that Calmy-Rey had advocated dialogue with Usama bin \
Laden, prompting a brief frenzy of criticism in the SWISS \
media and an August 26 press release by the DFA emphasizing \
that Calmy-Rey’s question was rhetorical, that she had not \
promoted nor proposed dialogue with bin Laden, and that “in \
practice there is no question of the DFA proposing a dialogue \
with Usama bin Laden.” SWISS press commentators generally \
accepted the clarification, but some argued that the Foreign \
Minister unnecessarily had risked creating misunderstanding \
on a very sensitive topic. \
\
———————- \
\
BERN 00000443 002 OF 003 \
\
\
Diplomatic Engineering \
———————- \
\
¶5. (SBU) Calmy-Rey used the term “diplomatic engineering” in \
describing her vision of Switzerland facilitating dialogue on \
difficult subjects with ideas, in addition to logistical and \
other material support. She claimed that the “freeze for \
freeze” concept in the context of the P5 1 offer to Iran was \
a result of just this kind of engagement. Even while lauding \
SWISS diplomacy, Calmy-Rey said more needs to be done to \
develop SWISS competencies with a view to making and managing \
“diplomatic engineering” as a SWISS “trademark.” At the same \
time, she assessed that Switzerland’s lack of EU membership \
and the SWISS form of government — which lacks a unitary \
Executive — make SWISS international engagement more \
difficult. \
\
——————————– \
Iran, P5 1, and the EGL Gas Deal \
——————————– \
\
¶6. (C) At several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey \
sought to justify the approach she has taken to the Iran \
nuclear problem. In this context, she said that Switzerland \
“is in close contact with the P5 1 and other important actors \
and had calibrated suggestions that made possible for all \
sides to come closer together and to save face.” She claimed \
that the “freeze for freeze” concept was a suggestion made by \
Switzerland to “find a way to get the blocked talks between \
Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear and into substantive \
political negotiations.” Calmy-Rey claimed that “we were \
always transparent with all partners and have in no case \
undermined agreed international measures — to the contrary.” \
\
¶7. (C) Calmy-Rey also used this opportunity to seek to defend \
her support for the SWISS firm EGL’s billion dollar gas deal \
with Iran. She once again argued that the deal is in \
Switzerland’s national interest and something that “hardly \
would have been possible” without the diplomatic contacts the \
DFA had developed with Iran in the course of its “dialogue” \
on the nuclear issue. Referring to criticism that her \
support for the deal had damaged SWISS-U.S. relations, \
Calmy-Rey said that “the United States questioned our support \
for the gas delivery agreement signed by EGL, but we have \
good and constructive relations with the United States — \
contacts were never so numerous as now.” \
\
——————– \
Calmy-Rey on Defense \
——————– \
\
¶8. (C) Though she remains very popular in her SWISS Socialist \
Party and with others on the SWISS Left, Calmy-Rey has faced \
a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of the SWISS press \
this year, not least because of her very damaging trip to \
Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. More recently, \
allegations by Colombian officials that a DFA envoy acted \
sympathetically to the FARC have kept her on the defensive, \
as has, to a lesser degree, criticism that the ongoing crisis \
in Georgia is a “boomerang effect” of recognizing Kosovo \
independence, which Calmy-Rey strongly advocated. The \
rightist SWISS People’s Party (SVP), having gone into \
parliamentary opposition and no longer feeling bound by SWISS \
government tradition of “collegiality”, has maintained the \
most vociferous criticism. That said, the SVP is by no means \
alone, with commentators from the SWISS political middle \
frequently lamenting Calmy-Rey’s often high-profile approach \
to sensitive issues. Responding to such critics, Calmy-Rey \
asserted in her August 25 speech that “we were never a land \
of courtly secret diplomacy — transparency and \
predictability of our foreign policy are the core of our \
credibility.” \
\
¶9. (C) Regarding the Iran/nuclear issue, Calmy-Rey also has \
felt renewed pressure to clarify her stance in the wake of an \
August 20 press conference in which SWISS President Couchepin \
said that Switzerland supports the P5 1 initiative and added \
that the Federal Council had decided that Switzerland will \
not undertake its own initiatives in this area. In an \
interview with the “Neue Zuercher Zeitung” published August \
23, Calmy-Rey was asked about Couchepin’s comments and \
responded that Switzerland had not launched its own \
\
BERN 00000443 003.2 OF 003 \
\
\
initiative, but had offered “diplomatic engineering” \
(including the idea of “freeze for freeze”) that had resulted \
in the July “Geneva Talks” that the P5 1 and Iran had asked \
the SWISS to host. She further said that the Federal Council \
“had good reason to be cautious,” since Switzerland seldom is \
engaged in international security policy matters of such high \
importance. Calmy-Rey added that the Federal Council had \
feared that SWISS involvement in the issue could damage SWISS \
relations with other states, but argued that the “Geneva \
Talks” had “shown that not to be the case.” \
CARTER \ Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO4059\
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR\
DE RUEHSW #0443/01 2411509\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK\
O 281509Z AUG 08\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5286\
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0575\
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0049\
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1226\
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0112\
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0014\
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1136 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERN 000443 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
DEPT FOR P (R.RANGASWAMY), EUR/CE (Y.SAINT-ANDRE), EB, AND \
NEA/IR (H.WOOSTER) \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018 \
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP PTER SZ
SUBJECT: FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND “DIPLOMATIC \
ENGINEERING” ARE CHIEF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS \
\
BERN 00000443 001.2 OF 003 \
\
\
Classified By: POL/E Counselor Richard A. Rorvig; reason 1.4(d). \
\
¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 25 address to senior SWISS \
diplomats, FM Calmy-Rey extolled dialogue and facilitation as \
chief SWISS foreign policy instruments. She used the term \
“diplomatic engineering” in describing her vision of \
Switzerland facilitating dialogue on difficult subjects. A \
rhetorical question Calmy-Rey posed in the course of her \
speech was incorrectly spun in some international and SWISS \
press as allegedly advocating dialogue with Usama bin Laden. \
In response to these reports, the Department of Foreign \
Affairs (DFA) released a press statement emphasizing that \
Calmy-Rey did not propose or support such a dialogue. At \
several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey sought to \
justify the approach she has taken to the Iran nuclear \
problem. She claimed that the “freeze for freeze” concept \
was a suggestion made by Switzerland to “find a way to get \
the blocked talks between Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear \
and into substantive political negotiations.” She once again \
argued that the EGL gas deal is in Switzerland’s national \
interest and said that it “hardly would have been possible” \
without the diplomatic contacts the DFA had developed with \
Iran in the course of its “dialogue” on the nuclear issue. \
Though she remains very popular with the SWISS Left, \
Calmy-Rey has faced a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of \
the SWISS press this year, not least because of her very \
damaging trip to Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. \
Calmy-Rey also has felt pressure to clarify her stance on the \
Iran/nuclear issue in the wake of an August 20 press \
conference in which SWISS President Couchepin stated that the \
Federal Council supports the P5 1 initiative and had decided \
that Switzerland will not undertake its own initiatives in \
this area. End Summary. \
\
—————————————— \
Annual Gathering of Senior SWISS Diplomats \
—————————————— \
\
¶2. (SBU) In an August 25 address to 170 senior SWISS \
diplomats gathered in Bern for the Department of Foreign \
Affairs (DFA) annual ambassadors/CGs conference, FM Calmy-Rey \
extolled dialogue and facilitation (“diplomatic engineering”) \
as chief SWISS foreign policy instruments. Calmy-Rey \
appeared to use the occasion to rebut continuing criticism — \
primarily from SWISS conservatives — of her often \
high-profile approach to sensitive issues. While conceding \
some limits to the prospects for dialogue, she argued that \
Switzerland’s willingness to talk, for example, with \
Hizballah, Hamas, FARC, and the LTTE, was intended to draw \
them into political solutions without legitimizing such \
groups’ terrorist methods that Switzerland condemns. \
\
——————————————– \
Press Flap over Reference to Usama bin Laden \
——————————————– \
\
¶3. (U) In her opening remarks, Calmy-Rey asserted that SWISS \
domestic press commentary seems dominated by “moralists” \
advocating strict isolation of problematic state and \
non-state actors. She asked rhetorically, “should we listen \
to these moralists? And, if not, should we seek dialogue \
without discrimination, even if that means sitting at a table \
with Usama bin Laden?” Calmy-Rey did not answer the question \
explicitly in the course of her speech, but instead argued \
that in each case the prospects for dialogue need to be \
carefully reviewed. She maintained that dialogue most of the \
time is better than isolation, but does not mean “accepting \
the unacceptable.” \
\
¶4. (U) French daily “Le Monde” subsequently incorrectly \
reported that Calmy-Rey had advocated dialogue with Usama bin \
Laden, prompting a brief frenzy of criticism in the SWISS \
media and an August 26 press release by the DFA emphasizing \
that Calmy-Rey’s question was rhetorical, that she had not \
promoted nor proposed dialogue with bin Laden, and that “in \
practice there is no question of the DFA proposing a dialogue \
with Usama bin Laden.” SWISS press commentators generally \
accepted the clarification, but some argued that the Foreign \
Minister unnecessarily had risked creating misunderstanding \
on a very sensitive topic. \
\
———————- \
\
BERN 00000443 002 OF 003 \
\
\
Diplomatic Engineering \
———————- \
\
¶5. (SBU) Calmy-Rey used the term “diplomatic engineering” in \
describing her vision of Switzerland facilitating dialogue on \
difficult subjects with ideas, in addition to logistical and \
other material support. She claimed that the “freeze for \
freeze” concept in the context of the P5 1 offer to Iran was \
a result of just this kind of engagement. Even while lauding \
SWISS diplomacy, Calmy-Rey said more needs to be done to \
develop SWISS competencies with a view to making and managing \
“diplomatic engineering” as a SWISS “trademark.” At the same \
time, she assessed that Switzerland’s lack of EU membership \
and the SWISS form of government — which lacks a unitary \
Executive — make SWISS international engagement more \
difficult. \
\
——————————– \
Iran, P5 1, and the EGL Gas Deal \
——————————– \
\
¶6. (C) At several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey \
sought to justify the approach she has taken to the Iran \
nuclear problem. In this context, she said that Switzerland \
“is in close contact with the P5 1 and other important actors \
and had calibrated suggestions that made possible for all \
sides to come closer together and to save face.” She claimed \
that the “freeze for freeze” concept was a suggestion made by \
Switzerland to “find a way to get the blocked talks between \
Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear and into substantive \
political negotiations.” Calmy-Rey claimed that “we were \
always transparent with all partners and have in no case \
undermined agreed international measures — to the contrary.” \
\
¶7. (C) Calmy-Rey also used this opportunity to seek to defend \
her support for the SWISS firm EGL’s billion dollar gas deal \
with Iran. She once again argued that the deal is in \
Switzerland’s national interest and something that “hardly \
would have been possible” without the diplomatic contacts the \
DFA had developed with Iran in the course of its “dialogue” \
on the nuclear issue. Referring to criticism that her \
support for the deal had damaged SWISS-U.S. relations, \
Calmy-Rey said that “the United States questioned our support \
for the gas delivery agreement signed by EGL, but we have \
good and constructive relations with the United States — \
contacts were never so numerous as now.” \
\
——————– \
Calmy-Rey on Defense \
——————– \
\
¶8. (C) Though she remains very popular in her SWISS Socialist \
Party and with others on the SWISS Left, Calmy-Rey has faced \
a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of the SWISS press \
this year, not least because of her very damaging trip to \
Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. More recently, \
allegations by Colombian officials that a DFA envoy acted \
sympathetically to the FARC have kept her on the defensive, \
as has, to a lesser degree, criticism that the ongoing crisis \
in Georgia is a “boomerang effect” of recognizing Kosovo \
independence, which Calmy-Rey strongly advocated. The \
rightist SWISS People’s Party (SVP), having gone into \
parliamentary opposition and no longer feeling bound by SWISS \
government tradition of “collegiality”, has maintained the \
most vociferous criticism. That said, the SVP is by no means \
alone, with commentators from the SWISS political middle \
frequently lamenting Calmy-Rey’s often high-profile approach \
to sensitive issues. Responding to such critics, Calmy-Rey \
asserted in her August 25 speech that “we were never a land \
of courtly secret diplomacy — transparency and \
predictability of our foreign policy are the core of our \
credibility.” \
\
¶9. (C) Regarding the Iran/nuclear issue, Calmy-Rey also has \
felt renewed pressure to clarify her stance in the wake of an \
August 20 press conference in which SWISS President Couchepin \
said that Switzerland supports the P5 1 initiative and added \
that the Federal Council had decided that Switzerland will \
not undertake its own initiatives in this area. In an \
interview with the “Neue Zuercher Zeitung” published August \
23, Calmy-Rey was asked about Couchepin’s comments and \
responded that Switzerland had not launched its own \
\
BERN 00000443 003.2 OF 003 \
\
\
initiative, but had offered “diplomatic engineering” \
(including the idea of “freeze for freeze”) that had resulted \
in the July “Geneva Talks” that the P5 1 and Iran had asked \
the SWISS to host. She further said that the Federal Council \
“had good reason to be cautious,” since Switzerland seldom is \
engaged in international security policy matters of such high \
importance. Calmy-Rey added that the Federal Council had \
feared that SWISS involvement in the issue could damage SWISS \
relations with other states, but argued that the “Geneva \
Talks” had “shown that not to be the case.” \
CARTER \
HEADER VZCZCXRO4059
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSW #0443/01 2411509
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RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0112
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0014
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1136

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TAGS PREL PGOV KNNP PTER SZ PREL PGOV KNNP PTER SZ
ADDED 2011-02-18 21:09:00
STAMP 2011-02-18 23:22:44
VOTE_POINTS 0
VOTE_COUNT 0
VOTE_RATING 0
PRIORITY OO
TWEETS 0
MANUAL N
SITELINK
ISNEW N
FINGERPRINT1 d4f2c02818bdb555dffc5486612ecce6

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/08/08BERN443.html

COLOMBIAN FORCES KILL FARC’S KEY LEADER, SPURRING REGIONAL TENSIONS

Friday, February 18th, 2011

ID 08BOGOTA800
SUBJECT COLOMBIAN FORCES KILL FARC’S KEY LEADER, SPURRING \
DATE 2008-03-04 00:12:00
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGIN Embassy Bogota
TEXT 144052 2008-03-04 00:29:00 08BOGOTA800 Embassy Bogota CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXYZ0124\
PP RUEHWEB\
\
DE RUEHBO #0800/01 0640029\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
P 040029Z MAR 08\
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1644\
INFO RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 1336\
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR 9268\
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8067\
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0040\
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 6613\
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1224\
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\
SIPDIS \
\
SIPDIS \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018 \
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL PTER CASC SP PM FR VZ SZ CO
CI, AR, EC, BR \
SUBJECT: COLOMBIAN FORCES KILL FARC’S KEY LEADER, SPURRING \
REGIONAL TENSIONS \
\
Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer. Reason: 1.4(b,d) \
\
——- \
Summary \
——- \
\
¶1. (U) Summary: The GOC announced March 1 that its military \
forces killed Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) \
Secretariat member Raul Reyes in a cross-border operation in \
Ecuador. Reyes’ death shattered the FARC’s myth of \
invincibility, and boosted popular support for President \
Uribe’s democratic security strategy. Venezuela and Ecuador \
accused Colombia of violating international law, with both \
deploying troops to their borders. Latin countries urged a \
diplomatic solution to the rising tensions. The GOC made \
public evidence from computer files found at Reyes’ camp \
revealing Venezuelan and Ecuadorian government ties to the \
FARC. The GOC plans to provide the evidence to the OAS which \
will hold an emergency meeting on March 4. France voiced \
concern that Reyes’ death would harm prospects for a \
humanitarian exchange, but local media reported the FARC \
issued a statement saying it would continue efforts to \
achieve a humanitarian accord. End Summary. \
\
————————————- \
Reyes Death a Blow to FARC Leadership \
————————————- \
\
¶2. (U) On March 1, Colombian forces killed Luis Edgar Devia \
Silva (aka Raul Reyes), a leading FARC Secretariat member, in \
an air and ground strike against a FARC camp located 1.8 \
kilometers inside Ecuador. Reyes had often traveled abroad \
to garner political support and was a likely successor to the \
FARC’s octogenarian leader, Manuel Marulanda. His death is \
viewed as a significant blow to the leadership and morale of \
the FARC. Seventeen FARC members and one Colombian solder \
were also reportedly killed in the operation. The GOC said \
Reyes was wanted in connection with 57 murders, four \
kidnappings, and 26 counts of terrorism and rebellion. \
\
—————————— \
Positive but Cautious Reaction \
—————————— \
\
¶3. (U) Colombian media and the general public reacted \
positively to Reyes’ death. Former Colombian President \
Ernesto Samper said Uribe’s tough policies were “showing \
results;” security analyst Alfredo Rangel said Reyes’ death \
was a “devastating blow” to its “myth of invulnerability.” \
Opposition Senator Gustavo Petro speculated that the army’s \
“greatest military success” could lead the FARC to seek \
alternatives to end the war. Former President and Liberal \
party leader Cesar Gaviria said he fully supports GOC actions \
and asked Venezuelan President Chavez to respect the \
Colombian president. \
\
¶4. (C) Colombia’s daily, El Tiempo, reported that the FARC \
issued a statement saying it would continue efforts to \
achieve a humanitarian accord. Catholic Bishops’ Conference \
Secretary Fabian Marulanda called on the FARC to accept the \
\
SIPDIS \
Church’s invitation to engage in dialogue on a humanitarian \
exchange. Hostage family members, including Ingrid \
Betancourt’s son, expressed concern about the fate of family \
members after the attack. French President Nicholas Sarkozy \
called for Betancourt’s immediate release and said \
“humanitarian concerns should prevail.” French Foreign \
Minister Bernard Kouchner said Reyes’ death was “bad news” \
for the hostages. Reyes was the main contact for French and \
SWISS negotiators Noel Saenz and Jean Pierre Gontard, as well \
as longtime Colombian politician Alvaro Leyva. Still, Reyes \
was a FARC hardliner who did little to advance a humanitarian \
\
exchange. \
\
——————————– \
Regional Reaction Stirs Tensions \
——————————– \
\
¶5. (U) Regional reactions were heated as Chavez paid tribute \
to his “fellow revolutionary” and accused the GOC of \
murdering Reyes due to U.S. pressure. He accused the GOC of \
violating Ecuador’s sovereignty, warning that any incursion \
into Venezuelan territory would be “cause for war.” Chavez \
ordered ten army battalions to the border with Colombia and \
closed Venezuela’s embassy in Bogota. Ecuadorian president \
Rafael Correa initially announced he had been informed in \
advance of the operation but later accused the GOC of “lying” \
about the incident. Correa ordered Ecuadorian troops to \
deploy to its northern border, withdrew Ecuador’s Ambassador \
in Bogota, and expelled the Colombian Ambassador in Quito. He \
called the attack on Reyes’ camp a “massacre.” \
\
¶6. (C) Former Cuban President Fidel Castro accused the U.S. \
of helping plan the attack to fuel a regional crisis while \
Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega condemned the GOC for \
killing the peace process. The Brazilian government \
condemned the military strike and called on Bogota to offer \
an explicit apology to Ecuador for its “territorial \
violation.” It also suggested the OAS form a committee to \
investigate the circumstances of the attack. At Ecuador’s \
request, the OAS Permanent Council will meet hold an \
emergency session on March 4. Colombian Defense Minister \
Juan Manuel Santos told us the GOC would use the session to \
highlight Venezuela’s and Ecuador’s support of the FARC. \
\
——————————————— – \
GOC Concerned about Some Regional Ties to FARC \
——————————————— – \
\
¶7. (U) Foreign Minister Fernando Araujo apologized for \
Colombia’s incursion into Ecuadorian territory on March 2, \
but said the GOC abided by all international laws in its \
operations. Colombian National Police director Oscar Naranjo \
later revealed the contents of computer files found at Reyes’ \
camp which showed communications between Ecuadorian Internal \
Security Minister Gustavo Larrea and the FARC aimed at \
“formalizing” the GOE’s relations with the terrorist group. \
The GOE denied the accusations. \
\
¶8. (U) At a March 3 press conference, Naranjo announced \
evidence indicating the Venezuelan government provided the \
FARC with $300 million. He also claimed the FARC gave Chavez \
$50,000 after his failed coup attempt in 1992. Naranjo said \
the computer files showed the FARC purchasd 50 kilograms of \
uranium and sold 700 kilograms of cocaine worth $1.5 million. \
Casa Narino spokesman Cesar Mauricio Velasquez said that all \
evidence would be handed over to the OAS and the United \
Nations for international verification. Vice President \
Francisco Santos Calderon accused unnamed governments of \
“deliberately violating” UN Security Resolution 1373 which \
prohibits members states from hosting groups that finance, \
plan or commit acts of terrorism. \
Brownfield \
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ADDED 2011-02-18 21:09:00
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http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/03/08BOGOTA800.html

FM CALMY-REY LASHES OUT AT THE UNITED STATES, EU AND UN; PUSHES ENVELOPE ON SWISS “ACTIVE NEUTRALITY”

Friday, February 18th, 2011

ID 06BERN1553
SUBJECT FM CALMY-REY LASHES OUT AT THE UNITED STATES, EU \
DATE 2006-08-23 08:08:00
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGIN Embassy Bern
TEXT 75837 2006-08-23 08:46:00 06BERN1553 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO8379\
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR\
DE RUEHSW #1553/01 2350846\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
O 230846Z AUG 06\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE\
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2583\
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0092 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 001553 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
SIPDIS \
\
STATE FOR P, G, EUR, EUR/AGS \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2016 \
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD SZ
SUBJECT: FM CALMY-REY LASHES OUT AT THE UNITED STATES, EU \
AND UN; PUSHES ENVELOPE ON SWISS “ACTIVE NEUTRALITY” \
\
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires a.i. Carol Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
\
1.(SBU) Summary: Addressing an August 21 conclave of SWISS \
ambassadors in Bern, Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey \
touted her vision of SWISS “active neutrality” and action on \
international humanitarian law, peacekeeping, and good \
offices as a means to maximizing SWISS influence. Bemoaning \
the lack of international consensus on various world hot \
spots Calmy-Rey slammed the United States as unilateral, \
simplistic, and offensive in its pursuit of national \
interests. She also described the Europe Union as too weak \
and divided to play its proper “balancing role,” and the \
United Nations as too powerless to resolve crises in Iraq, \
Sudan, and Lebanon. Calmy-Rey proposed that Switzerland seek \
a seat on the UN Security Council to expand its influence. \
While media reaction to the speech was muted, critics on the \
center-right rejected as contrary to the SWISS neutrality \
principle the proposed enlargement of the SWISS military role \
in peacekeeping. Some SWISS MPs objected to Calmy-Rey’s \
criticism of Europe as counterproductive to good relations \
and promised follow up. Last month, Calmy-Rey’s cabinet \
colleagues agreed to adopt a low profile on the current \
conflict in the Middle East after the FM criticized Israel’s \
“disproportionate” response. End summary. \
\
Seeking Influence through International Law, Peacekeeping \
——————————————— ———— \
\
2.(SBU) Opening the traditional annual conference of SWISS \
ambassadors in Bern, August 21, Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey \
called for a stronger international political role for \
Switzerland. The theme of this year’s three-day gathering of \
high-level SWISS diplomats was “power and influence – the \
opportunities and limits of a strategy of influence.” \
Undeterred by the total lack of support from cabinet \
colleagues and heavy criticism from MPs over her public \
criticism of Israel during the Lebanon crisis, Calmy-Rey \
defended her version of “active neutrality.” In her view, \
neutrality must not impede Switzerland from actively \
defending its own interests abroad. Switzerland, she argued, \
would only lose credibility were it to remain silent in the \
face of violations of international law, be they in the \
Middle East, Sri Lanka, or Sudan. Recognizing that \
Switzerland lacked clout to resolve crises on its own, \
Calmy-Rey argued for a foreign policy based on the promotion \
of international law and participation in UN peacekeeping \
efforts. She supported the idea of Switzerland competing for \
a UN Security Council seat, since Switzerland’s “voice is not \
properly heard during the resolution of international crises.” \
\
United States too powerful; EU and UN too weak \
——————————————— – \
\
3.(SBU) Calmy-Rey sharply criticized the United States, and \
bemoaned the ineffectiveness of the European Union, and \
United Nations. “The world is dominated by a single \
superpower,” she said, and there is nothing new in the United \
States pursuing its interests in a clear and aggressive \
manner. “What is new is the unilateral approach and the \
simplicity of the arguments.” In Calmy-Rey’s view, the whole \
world is waiting for Europe to assume the role “that is \
expected” as a balancing force in world politics. Instead, \
Europe is divided, as seen before the Iraq war, and it risks \
being caught in a vise between the United States and China. \
The international community, too, has a long way to go before \
becoming a community of states governed by laws, with Iraq, \
Lebanon, and Sudan exhibiting the “powerlessness” of the UN. \
\
Mixed Domestic Reaction \
———————– \
\
4.(U) Among major political parties, Calmy-Rey’s speech \
prompted predictable reactions, although there was some \
surprising criticism from her own party. The right-populist \
SWISS Peoples Party (SVP) strenuously objected to Calmy-Rey’s \
“aimless activism” and her attempt “to toss out neutrality,” \
and vowed to follow up in Parliament. The centrist Free \
Democrats (FDP) and Christian Democrats (CD) agreed with a \
more active foreign policy, but were skeptical of a Security \
Council bid and thought counterproductive her criticism of \
the EU. Calmy-Rey’s own Socialists were divided between \
those favoring a UNSC bid as a logical next step and those \
who view such lofty aims as ridiculous. \
\
5.(U) All major SWISS newspapers ran articles covering the \
speech. Given the controversial nature of her remarks, \
coverage was rather low key. Surprisingly, French language \
papers in Calmy-Rey’s home district of Geneva were neutral \
\
BERN 00001553 002 OF 002 \
\
\
rather than supportive of her comments. The majority of \
German media reported on the speech in a balanced-to-critical \
manner. Leftist papers such as the Tages Anzeiger — a daily \
that is typically anti-American — praised her as visionary \
and highlighted the contrast between this year’s speech and \
last year’s, when Calmy-Rey underscored the need to \
“strengthen ties with strategic partners USA and China.” \
According to the paper, with the prospect of a U.S.-SWISS \
free trade agreement off the table, Calmy-Rey was happy to \
give the superpower USA the cold shoulder. \
\
Comment \
——- \
\
6.(C) It has been post’s frequent assessment that Calmy-Rey \
has never ceased being a political activist, even while \
serving on the SWISS Federal Council (Cabinet) as Foreign \
Minister. Certainly, her penchant for “speaking truth to \
power,” that is, speaking out against the United States, has \
burnished her domestic credentials as an independent voice of \
the people. She regularly receives some of the highest \
ratings among SWISS political figures in popularity polls. \
That said, she is not particularly beloved by her cabinet \
colleagues, or even her own Department of Foreign Affairs \
staff. We anticipate that the speech will offer an \
opportunity for her opponents to again criticize her as too \
extreme and isolated. However, her bold talk will likely \
further endear her to her party and the broader SWISS public. \
End comment. \
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http://213.251.145.96/cable/2006/08/06BERN1553.html

SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER CALMY-REY EMPHASIZES IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-SWISS RELATIONS, REGRETS “MISUNDERSTANDING” CONCERNING HER RECENT REMARKS TO THE SWISS AMBASSADORS’ CONFERENCE

Friday, February 18th, 2011

ID 06BERN1593
SUBJECT CORRECTED COPY) SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER \
DATE 2006-08-29 17:05:00
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGIN Embassy Bern
TEXT 76571 2006-08-29 17:54:00 06BERN1593 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO0211\
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0095 C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 001593 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y — FORMATTING \
\
SIPDIS \
\
STATE FOR P, G, EUR, EUR/AGS/TRICK AND SAINT-ANDRE \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016 \
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD SZ
SUBJECT: (CORRECTED COPY) SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER \
CALMY-REY EMPHASIZES IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-SWISS \
RELATIONS, REGRETS “MISUNDERSTANDING” CONCERNING HER \
RECENT REMARKS TO THE SWISS AMBASSADORS’ CONFERENCE \
\
\
Classified By: CHARGE D’AFFAIRES A. I. CAROL URBAN, REASONS 1.4 B/D \
\
¶1. (C) Charge Urban met with SWISS Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey \
this afternoon at the FM’s invitation. The FM wished to \
clarify remarks she made about the U.S. during her August 21 \
speech to the SWISS ambassadors conference in Bern. Asked to \
speak first, the Charge noted concerns in Washington over the \
FM’s singling out of the United States for criticism in a \
public forum (press had been invited to cover the speech) \
without any mention of the positive aspects of the U.S.-SWISS \
relationship. She emphasized that it was difficult to \
reconcile the FM’s remarks with the several U.S-SWISS \
cooperative efforts and successes of the past year. \
\
————————– \
“Not Meant as a Criticism” \
————————– \
\
2.(C) The 45 minute meeting, which included SWISS State \
Secretary (and Political Director) Ambuehl and POL/ECON \
\
SIPDIS \
Counselor, was extremely cordial, and Calmy-Rey took pains to \
express her concern over the “misunderstanding” that her \
remarks had created. She blamed this partially on the press, \
noting that her remarks about the United States had been \
taken out of context. She protested that her remarks were \
perhaps not “la formule la plus elegante” (not the most \
elegant formulation) but that they were simply “une \
constatation” (statement of fact) and not meant to be taken \
as a criticism or “singling out” of the United States. She \
was simply trying to lay out the parameters and limits of \
SWISS foreign policy “based on principles of international \
law” to her assembled ambassadors. Ambuehl added that \
Calmy-Rey had put great emphasis on the U.S.-SWISS \
relationship in previous speeches, and is planning another \
speech in the near future that will focus on the \
relationship, which he noted is based on common values. \
\
————————— \
Importance of Political MOU \
————————— \
\
3.(C) Calmy-Rey went on to state that Switzerland needs a \
“coherent foreign policy” with the United States, and \
repeated several times that she was proud of the recently \
signed MOU that provides for enhanced U.S.-SWISS political \
cooperation, and which she counted as one of her personal \
successes. She emphasized that the MOU framework must be \
“institutionalized as soon as possible” and that she was \
looking forward to an early meeting in Bern between A/S Fried \
and Ambuehl, hopefully at the end of September or in early \
October. She promised that important topics would be raised, \
and she hoped for positive press coverage to set the record \
straight. Ambuehl added that Calmy-Rey had already chaired \
two meetings to discuss possible topics for the discussions, \
and that they had developed a good list of substantive \
issues. He promised to share them with the Embassy soonest \
in order to speed preparation for the high-level meeting. \
\
¶4. (C) Comment: Calmy-Rey and Ambuehl obviously realized \
that her recent speech was unbalanced and were extremely \
polite and apologetic. They were eager to repair any damage \
done and were intent on establishing a positive tone for the \
upcoming talks under the political framework MOU. Embassy \
will follow up on their proposed “substantive agenda” and \
provide EUR with comments and suggestions. End comment. \
\
\
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http://213.251.145.96/cable/2006/08/06BERN1593.html

EUR A/S FRIED AND SWISS STATE SECRETARY AMBUHL LAUNCH COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE

Friday, February 18th, 2011

ID 06BERN1971
SUBJECT EUR A/S FRIED AND SWISS STATE SECRETARY AMBUHL \
DATE 2006-10-23 08:08:00
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGIN Embassy Bern
TEXT 82783 2006-10-23 08:56:00 06BERN1971 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 06BELGRADE1566|06BERN1867|06BERN1876|06PRISTINA833 VZCZCXRO7014\
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV\
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FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE\
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\
SIPDIS \
\
SIPDIS \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2016 \
TAGS: PREL PTER KNNP EAID SZ
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED AND SWISS STATE SECRETARY AMBUHL \
LAUNCH COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE — MULTIPLE \
DELIVERABLES \
\
REF: A. BELGRADE 1566 \
¶B. PRISTINA 833 \
¶C. BERN 1867 \
¶D. BERN 1876 \
\
Classified By: DCM Carol Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
\
1.(C) Summary: In the first round of official political level \
talks under the recently inaugurated Framework for Enhanced \
Political Cooperation, EUR A/S Dan Fried and SWISS State \
Secretary Michael Ambuehl identified a number of specific \
\
SIPDIS \
areas for closer cooperation. Areas discussed included \
regional stabilization in the Balkans, Middle East, and \
Sudan; security and counter-terror cooperation; promotion of \
mutual economic interests; disaster relief; educational \
exchanges; and UN reform. The SWISS offered specific \
proposals for cooperation. For Ambuehl, a formal Framework \
is important in that it regularizes bilateral consultations \
and, as much as getting the USG’s attention, it serves as a \
means to ensure that Ambuehl’s boss — Foreign Minister \
Calmy-Rey — and their SWISS colleagues get into the habit of \
thinking about cooperating with Washington. End summary. \
\
2.(C) Assistant Secretary Fried conducted the first \
high-level dialogue on enhanced bilateral political \
cooperation with Ambuehl on September 29. Participants \
included officials from the SWISS Departments of Foreign \
Affairs, Economic Affairs, Finance, and Defense, along with \
Ambassador Coneway, DCM, Pol/Econ officers, and visiting \
EUR/AGS desk officer. \
\
——————————- \
Pre-Meeting: Iran & the Balkans \
——————————- \
\
3.(C) In a meeting A/S Fried and Ambassador Coneway prior to \
the plenary session, Ambuehl offered his views on the Iran \
situation and reiterated Switzerland’s standing offer to \
facilitate talks with Tehran. A/S Fried thanked Ambuehl for \
Switzerland’s efforts as Protecting Power for the United \
States in Tehran and emphasized the need for the \
international community to show solidarity against Iranian \
intransigence on the nuclear issue. \
\
4.(C) During this pre-meeting, Foreign Minister Micheline \
Calmy-Rey dropped by to welcome A/S Fried. Noting that she \
was one of the first European leaders to call for Kosovo’s \
independence, Calmy-Rey expressed particular interest in A/S \
Fried’s just-completed visit to Serbia and Kosovo. Fried \
reviewed his message to Serbian and Kosovar leaders, adding \
that KFOR members, including the U.S. and Switzerland, should \
be prepared to beef up their presence during the first part \
of the transition in 2007. Calmy-Rey explained that \
Switzerland currently deployed about 200 troops out of the \
250 currently authorized for peace operations abroad, but was \
in the process of enlarging deployable forces to 500 by 2008. \
(Comment: The SWISS Parliament has authorized a maximum of \
220 for SWISSCoy in Kosovo; any increase would require \
Parliamentary approval, usually a time-consuming process. \
End comment.) \
\
——————————————– \
Framework for Enhanced Bilateral Cooperation \
——————————————– \
\
5.(C) Ambuehl opened the plenary with a statement hailing the \
Framework Agreement for Enhanced Political Cooperation (the \
U.S.-SWISS MOU signed in May 2005) as providing a “legal \
basis” under SWISS law for closer cooperation between the two \
countries. He said that both sides had exhibited excellent \
cooperation in the adoption of the Third Additional Protocol \
to the Geneva Conventions and the acceptance of the Israeli \
Magan David Adom in the International Red Cross, Red Crescent \
Movement. Ambuehl also noted that the U.S. and Switzerland \
share “mostly the same objectives,” though often with \
different strategies, due to the distinct global roles \
played: the U.S. as sole superpower and Switzerland as \
(almost) sole neutral. \
\
——————————————- \
Balkans: SWISS Program Proposals for Kosovo \
——————————————- \
\
6.(C) A/S Fried provided a detailed report of his visit \
earlier that week to Belgrade, Pristina, and Mitrovica \
(reftels a and b): The next few weeks were going to be \
difficult; the situation in Kosovo will only deteriorate \
unless action is taken. Thus, the USG and the Quint \
concluded that the status issue must be finalized and the \
final status must be independence. According to A/S Fried, \
\
BERN 00001971 002 OF 005 \
\
\
both ethnic Serbs and Albanians realize this, however \
unenthusiastic the Serb leadership felt. Encouragingly, Serb \
students in Belgrade and even moderate Serb community leaders \
in Mitrovica seemed prepared to move on. To hold-outs, such \
as President Kostunica and Foreign Minister Draskovic, A/S \
Fried’s message was that their reluctance must not translate \
into obstructionism or violence, or else Belgrade’s European \
ambitions would be drastically set back. \
\
7.(SBU) Addressing Switzerland as a participant in KFOR, A/S \
Fried emphasized his hope that when KFOR needed more troops, \
Switzerland would be there. State Secretary Ambuehl advised \
that Switzerland’s analysis of Kosovo was completely in line \
with that of the U.S. Switzerland supported independence \
soon, under the right conditions. He described the Balkans \
as a prime place for U.S.-SWISS cooperation in areas of good \
governance and “transitional justice.” SWISS DFA Human \
Security director Thomas Greminger described SWISS thinking \
on decentralization and transitional justice and noted that \
the SWISS had presented a menu of maximal and minimal program \
proposals to Kosovo Coordinator Ahtisaari and the European \
Commission (EC) and would be interested in USG views (paper \
handed to EUR/AGS desk officer). A/S Fried and Ambuehl \
agreed to that an expert level group would review the SWISS \
proposal and meet in either Washington or Bern to define \
areas of bilateral cooperation on transitional justice and \
other good-governance issues. \
\
—– \
Sudan \
—– \
\
8.(SBU) Moving on to Sudan, Ambuehl recalled that \
Switzerland and the United States had worked together in 2002 \
to mediate the North-South Agreement. Ambuehl laid out three \
areas of current SWISS activity: demarcating the north/south \
boundary; assisting the regional government of southern Sudan \
in mediation with the Lords Resistance Army; and helping the \
SPLA militia transition into a civil force. A/S Fried \
replied that he was aware that the SWISS had discussed with \
EUCOM officers the idea of bilateral cooperation. He said he \
would take the SWISS ideas to State’s AF Bureau and would \
speak with EUCOM Combatant Commander General Jones about the \
SWISS proposal and potential for cooperation. \
\
——— \
Detainees \
——— \
\
9.(SBU) A/S Fried opened the discussion of the \
detainee/renditions issue by recommending to the SWISS the \
recent Financial Times article by State Department Legal \
Advisor Bellinger. A/S Fried stressed the fundamental \
points: terrorists want to kill civilians in our countries, \
and the Geneva Conventions — while adequate for conventional \
war — were not designed for the current threat. On \
renditions, A/S Fried noted that several countries had used \
this method to bring criminals to justice — for example, \
France with Carlos the Jackal, and Turkey with PKK leader \
Abdullah Ocalan. Those insisting on treating terror suspects \
as POWs are not factoring in that, under Geneva, detainees \
should be held until the end of hostilities; indeed the \
closest parallel to terrorists in the Geneva Conventions \
would be “spies and saboteurs,” who do not merit POW \
protection. A/S Fried stressed that the United States was \
not trying to “bend the rules,” rather trying to “get it \
right.” \
\
10.(SBU) Christine Schraner, DFA deputy chief for \
international public law, stressed that Switzerland took the \
fight against terrorism seriously. Switzerland was seeking \
the proper balance between counterterrorism and human rights. \
She welcomed progress in the UN 1267 Committee on \
de-listing, citing recent UN discussions and a well-received \
SWISS co-sponsored study conducted with the Watson Institute \
at Brown University. Ambuehl asked that the USG understand \
Switzerland’s role as guardians of international law. He \
suggested that Ambassador Bellinger agree to meet with his \
SWISS counterpart, Ambassador Paul Seger, to discuss the \
issues of detainees and renditions, as well as the listing \
and delisting of terrorist entities. A/S Fried said he would \
pass the request on to Ambassador Bellinger. \
\
——————————- \
Property Rights as Human Rights \
——————————- \
\
11.(SBU) State Secretary Ambuehl presented A/S Fried with a \
copy of a SWISS-sponsored book “Realizing Property Rights,” \
co-authored by Peruvian economist Hernando DeSoto. The \
\
BERN 00001971 003 OF 005 \
\
\
SWISS, Ambuehl said, would like to co-sponsor with the U.S. a \
workshop on the subject. The issue was particularly \
pertinent in the developing world. A/S Fried replied that he \
would want to see how the notion of property rights as \
fundamental human rights conformed to the need to seize \
terrorist and criminal assets and fight kleptocracy, but \
agreed to raise the proposal with Under Secretary Paula \
Dobriansky. \
\
——————– \
Intelligence Sharing \
——————– \
\
12.(C) Additional areas where traditional structures were \
challenged by terrorism were law enforcement cooperation and \
intelligence sharing, according to A/S Fried. Reviewing the \
message delivered by S/CT Crumpton on September 7 (reftel c), \
A/S Fried emphasized that the updated U.S.-SWISS operative \
working agreement on counter-terrorism cooperation would only \
be as valuable as the cooperation it fostered. The SWISS \
needed to share more broadly the intelligence they develop. \
SWISS DFA Security Policy Director Jacques Pitteloud pointed \
out that September 11 had found Switzerland even less \
prepared than the U.S. to face the new threat. In \
Switzerland, counterterrorism had traditionally been a purely \
law enforcement matter. The key to producing more \
intelligence information was first to develop better \
intelligence services. Both sides agreed on the importance \
of ensuring the success of intelligence and law enforcement \
cooperation. \
\
13.(SBU) In the broader area of bilateral counterterrorism \
cooperation, Ambuehl and Pitteloud both praised the \
U.S.-SWISS sponsored “Black Ice” bioterrorism exercise held \
September 7-8 in Montreux, which brought senior leaders of \
international organizations together for the first time on \
this issue. Pitteloud expressed strong support for a \
follow-up conference. A/S Fried and Embassy Bern agreed to \
pursue the idea with Black Ice Conference organizers. \
\
————— \
Disaster Relief \
————— \
\
14.(SBU) Describing an ongoing SWISS Development Agency \
project to assess hazards and risks. Ambuehl promised to \
provide the USG a copy of the “risk mapping” exercise \
identified areas of potential flooding, landslides, \
avalanches, desertification, soil erosion, and other risks. \
A/S Fried recommended that, in assessing the potential risks, \
the SWISS also incorporate a data base of the PfP assets \
available. A/S Fried asserted that Switzerland was in an \
optimal position among NATO partners to develop a data base \
of partner assets to respond to such natural disasters as the \
Kashmir earthquake or a tsunami. The upcoming Riga NATO \
Summit would be addressing “NATO in the World;” SWISS efforts \
targeting humanitarian disasters could sell well within the \
neutrality-conscious SWISS public. Ambuehl agreed. \
\
—————————————- \
Financial Sanctions Implementation Group \
—————————————- \
\
15.(SBU) Turning to economic relations, Ambuehl regretted \
that the “time had seemed not to be right” on a full Free \
Trade Agreement, but hoped that the proposal could be revived \
some day. Monica Ruehl, Director of Bilateral Relations at \
the SWISS Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), described \
the U.S.-SWISS Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum (the \
“Forum”), inaugurated by USTR and SECO in May. While still \
in its infancy, the Forum already has as possible agenda \
items intellectual property rights, a wine agreement based on \
the U.S.-EU model, and recognition of organic products \
standards. The Forum had passed its first hurdle in \
providing a platform to head off a potential U.S.-SWISS \
collision regarding drastic restrictions on U.S. beef exports \
to Switzerland. \
\
16.(SBU) Ruehl raised the issue of sanctions implementation. \
Reiterating SWISS points to Treasury Under Secretary Stuart \
Levey on September 14 (ref d), Ruehl described the Financial \
Sanctions Implementation Experts Group that had operated \
during the 1990s. Switzerland hosted the last meeting in \
November 2001. The USG was supposed to host the next, but \
never had. Ruehl stressed that Switzerland and others would \
be more successful in enforcing international sanctions if \
the actual implementers — OFAC in the USG’s case — would \
meet regularly to discuss the mechanics of sanctions \
enforcement. Welcoming the proposal to revive the experts \
group, A/S Fried hoped that its scope be broad enough to \
\
BERN 00001971 004 OF 005 \
\
\
encompass organized crime and kleptocracy and agreed to \
contact Treasury to encourage revival of the Sanctions \
Implementation Experts Group. Embassy Bern also agreed to \
push the idea with visiting Treasury officials. \
\
——————— \
United Nations Reform \
——————— \
\
17.(SBU) State Secretary Ambuehl laid out Switzerland’s three \
priorities within the United Nations: strengthen the overall \
UN system; promote reform in the budget and “cohesion” of UN \
agencies; and invigorate Geneva as a UN host city. Mindful \
of U.S.-SWISS common goals with regard to management reform, \
Ambuehl suggested that the two governments should introduce \
a proposal for outsourcing oversight functions (auditing, \
etc.) at smaller UN agencies, including the Bern-based \
Universal Postal Union. A/S Fried agreed that it was \
interesting and offered to run it by UN specialists. The \
SWISS agreed to provide the USG with a paper, which EUR will \
discuss proposal with IO and USUN. \
\
—————— \
Muslim Integration \
—————— \
\
18.(SBU) Addressing the challenge of Muslim integration, A/S \
Fried regretted that the prevailing radical character in the \
Muslim world was drowning out other voices. He recalled his \
visit to Denmark in the wake of the so-called “cartoon \
crisis.” Initially, the West was as ill-equipped to deal \
with Muslim realities in Europe and the Greater Middle East \
as they had been with the communist threat following the \
Second World War. Ambuehl underscored Switzerland’s relative \
success with Muslim integration, due to the country’s status \
as a secular state with a highly decentralized system and \
republican, egalitarian structures. The SWISS population is \
22 percent foreign born; of this, about 20 percent is Balkan \
and 5 percent Islamic, he said. The SWISS Government was \
working on two projects with regard to integration: the \
Montreux Initiative on transparent charitable best practices; \
and “Chantier Islamisme” involving the mapping of Islamist \
organizations and parties. A/S Fried recommended that both \
sides meet at the expert level to share information on \
outreach activities and to include Muslim integration as a \
regular topic in Framework discussions. \
\
——————– \
Forum for the Future \
——————– \
\
19.(SBU) Welcoming Switzerland’s participation in the Forum \
and the Foundation for the Future, A/S Fried noted that the \
Foundation, designed to promote and subsidize civil society \
in the BMENA region, had had a slow first year, in part due \
to the Russian G-8 presidency. However, the Germans were \
promising to do more during their dual G-8/EU presidency. \
A/S Fried commended President Bush’s recent UN speech on the \
importance coupling democracy with outreach. \
\
¶20. (SBU) Ambuehl shared the concerns of Foundation board \
member (and former SWISS diplomat and ICRC chief) Cornelio \
Sommaruga that the Foundation was not sufficiently light \
(agile) or transparent. A/S Fried agreed to look into it. \
When A/S Fried emphasized the need for Western unity \
vis-a-vis Hamas and Syria, Ambuehl countered that — however \
difficult to deal with they were — they remained a factor in \
the region. A/S Fried pushed back and urged the SWISS to \
allow pressure on Hamas to work. Ambuehl said he would send \
a DFA regional expert to Washington to talk about Syria and \
other regional concerns. \
\
——————— \
Russia & Central Asia \
——————— \
\
21.(C) A/S Fried also discussed Russia (particularly the \
energy-security nexus) and its neighbors. The arrest the \
previous day of several Russian “spies” by the Government of \
Georgia had not been handled well by either side, but \
illustrated our difficulties with Moscow; Russia seemed to \
want all of its neighbors to adopt the posture of Finland \
during the Cold War. SWISS DFA Deputy Poldir Anton Thalmann \
agreed that dealing with the Russians required firmness, \
expressing admiration for the performance of Alexander \
Vershbow and Nicholas Burns as NATO ambassadors. In response \
to Ruehl’s question about Russian WTO membership, A/S Fried \
replied that President Bush would have loved to welcome the \
Russians in, but he was not willing to compromise the WTO’s \
criteria. \
\
BERN 00001971 005 OF 005 \
\
\
\
———— \
Next Meeting \
———— \
\
22.(SBU) A/S Fried and State Secretary Ambuehl agreed that \
working-level discussions should continue under the bilateral \
framework and that they would meet in Washington during 2007. \
\
——- \
Comment \
——- \
\
23.(SBU) SWISS offers of specific proposals for cooperation \
made the talks were more successful than anticipated. For \
State Secretary Ambuehl, a formal Framework is important in \
that it regularizes bilateral consultations and, as much as \
getting the USG’s attention, it is a means to ensure that \
Ambuehl’s boss — Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey — and their DFA \
colleagues get into the habit of thinking about cooperating \
with Washington. The Framework is also a way for the SWISS \
Department of Foreign Affairs to keep pace with the \
Department of Economic Affairs and its TIC Forum and Joint \
Economic Commission. We will continue to use the Framework \
to steer SWISS engagement into areas of mutual interest. \
\
24.(U) This telegram was cleared by EUR Assistant Secretary \
Dan Fried. \
CONEWAY \
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http://213.251.145.96/cable/2006/10/06BERN1971.html

SWISS DFA DEPUTY POLDIR ON IRAN, UNHRC, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS

Friday, February 18th, 2011

ID
06BERN1686
SUBJECT
SWISS DFA DEPUTY POLDIR ON IRAN, UNHRC, AND \
DATE
2006-09-14 07:07:00
CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGIN
Embassy Bern
TEXT
78299 2006-09-14 07:49:00 06BERN1686 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 06BERN1593 VZCZCXRO2756\
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RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2595\
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0099 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 001686 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y — FORMATTING \
\
SIPDIS \
\
STATE FOR P, EUR, NEA, CA \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016 \
TAGS: PREL KNNP CASC SZ
SUBJECT: SWISS DFA DEPUTY POLDIR ON IRAN, UNHRC, AND \
BILATERAL RELATIONS \
\
REF: A. BERN 1593 \
\
¶B. BERN 1553 \
\
BERN 00001686 001.2 OF 002 \
\
\
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i., Carol Urban, reasons \
1.4 b/d \
\
1.(C) Summary: Charge d’Affaires has asked SWISS DFA \
Deputy Poldir Thalmann to help spread the positive news about \
U.S.-SWISS bilateral cooperation. Charge also urged the \
SWISS not to break with transatlantic unity on the UN Human \
Rights Council (HRC) and Iran. Thalmann, who was pleasantly \
surprised in the number of areas the United States and \
Switzerland cooperate, said that Switzerland very much hoped \
that EUR A/S Dan Fried would visit Bern in the fall. \
Thalmann revealed broad SWISS frustration with the HRC and \
confided that there had been considerable internal debate \
over Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey’s decision to abstain on the \
anti-Israel resolutions. On Iran, Thalmann rejected a \
confrontational stance for Switzerland and mentioned that \
his government — as U.S. protecting power in Iran — had \
assigned additional security personnel at the SPP facility \
in Tehran. End summary. \
\
Surprise at Numerous Areas of Cooperation \
—————————————– \
\
2.(C) Charge d’Affaires Urban used her introductory \
courtesy call on incoming Department of Foreign Affairs \
(DFA) Deputy Political Director Anthon Thalmann in early \
September to press for greater SWISS acknowledgment of the \
positive areas of cooperation underway between Bern and \
Washington. DFA Americas Division deputy Urs Hammer, desk \
officer Balz Abplanalp, and Poloff joined the meeting. \
Charge \
reminded Thalmann that Switzerland and the United States in \
May had signed a framework agreement on enhanced political \
dialogue — as well as agreements on trade/investment and law \
enforcement. Unfortunately, little positive about the \
bilateral relationship was reported on in the press. SWISS \
Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey had been critical of the United \
States in her August speech to SWISS Ambassadors \
(reftels). With the public story primarily negative, it \
was difficult to imagine how the enhanced dialog could go \
forward. \
\
3.(C) Thalmann replied that he had been surprised at the \
numerous areas of cooperation between the United States and \
Switzerland. Switzerland, he said, was anxious to add \
substance to the framework agreement and hoped that \
Assistant Secretary Dan Fried would be able to visit Bern \
in the fall. As for Calmy-Rey, Thalmann observed that she \
was from the Socialist Party, which was traditionally \
critical of the United States. “However, they are NOT in \
the majority,” he said bluntly, as he told his notetakers \
to put down their pens. (Comment: The Socialists and \
other left-wing parties garnered a little over one-third of \
the nationwide vote in the 2003 elections. End comment.) \
Thalmann said that he understood that Calmy-Rey planned to \
deliver some “feel good” speeches on the United States in \
the coming weeks. \
\
Human Rights Council \
——————– \
\
4.(C) Charge reviewed the disappointing track record of the \
HRC since its inception last June. The two special \
sessions involved little more than Israel bashing. Adding \
to our chagrin was Switzerland’s decision to abstain on two \
imbalanced resolutions, when the remainder of Western Group \
united to oppose. Thalmann admitted there had been heated \
internal debate within the SWISS DFA on the issue of \
abstention, but that ultimately FM Calmy-Rey’s decision was \
final. The only consolation had been that Islamic \
countries had also complained about Bern’s decision not to \
support. The HRC was not what Switzerland had hoped for, \
Thalmann conceded. The SWISS continued to hope that the \
process of peer review would have a moderating effect on \
member states. \
\
Iran \
—- \
\
5.(C) Addressing Iran’s failure to meet the UN Security \
Council’s deadline, Charge urged Switzerland not to split \
from P6 consensus, or P3 consensus if Russia or China chose \
\
BERN 00001686 002.2 OF 002 \
\
\
to split off. Thalmann demurred from a direct commitment, \
saying that it was not Switzerland’s role to pressure \
Iran. Thalmann agreed only that “Switzerland would not \
undermine P6 efforts.” Charge retorted that she hoped \
Switzerland, in its dealings with Iran, would not give \
Tehran false hope of splitting the West, to which Thalmann \
appeared taken aback. \
\
6.(C) Turning to Switzerland’s role as Protecting Power \
(SPP) for the United States in Iran, Thalmann informed \
Charge that the SWISS Embassy in Tehran had beefed up \
security at the SPP facility (some distance away). More \
security personnel were now on hand. He said that he hoped \
these new security measures would not hinder the quality of \
services provided. \
\
Comment \
——- \
\
7.(C) Our repeated pleas for public acknowledgment of \
U.S.-SWISS cooperation appear to have registered with key \
SWISS officials. On the issue of Western unity, SWISS \
officials are a somewhat schizophrenic — proselytizing on \
behalf of multilateralism, while chafing at pressure to toe \
the Western line. In the end, however, the SWISS do not \
wish to be isolated from their closest Western partners. \
As demonstrated in their push last year to complete three \
bilateral agreements in political, economic, and law \
enforcement spheres, the SWISS also retain an interest in \
working with us in areas of mutual concern. \
URBAN \
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RECONCILIATION COMMISSION CONFIRMS PEACE PROCESS WITH GUERRILLAS STALLED

Friday, February 18th, 2011

ID 05BOGOTA9257
SUBJECT RECONCILIATION COMMISSION CONFIRMS PEACE PROCESS \
DATE 2005-09-29 20:08:00
CLASSIFICATION SECRET//NOFORN
ORIGIN Embassy Bogota
TEXT 41662 2005-09-29 20:31:00 05BOGOTA9257 Embassy Bogota SECRET//NOFORN This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.\
\
292031Z Sep 05\
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 009257 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
NOFORN \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015 \
TAGS: PGOV PTER SOCI CO ELN ELN FARC
SUBJECT: RECONCILIATION COMMISSION CONFIRMS PEACE PROCESS \
WITH GUERRILLAS STALLED \
\
\
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood; reasons 1.4 \
(b) and (d) \
\
——- \
Summary \
——- \
\
¶1. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed the status of the Catholic Church’s role in peace \
talks between guerrilla groups and the Colombian government. \
He said he believed both negotiations were on hold ) the ELN \
would not advance during Francisco Galan’s parole and the \
FARC consistently had refused all offers to date. He \
commented that the Catholic Church’s efforts to serve as \
intermediary had stalled, but it remained committed. \
XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that imprisoned FARC “ambassador” Rodrigo \
Granda had prostate cancer and was reluctant to seek \
treatment outside of prison because he feared for his life. \
End summary. \
\
————————————- \
ELN’s Galan on Parole but Little More \
————————————- \
\
¶2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX met Emboffs on September 22 and \
updated the Catholic Church’s role in potential GOC talks \
with guerrillas. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the Catholic Church \
is committed to peace with the National Liberation Army (ELN) \
but not optimistic that ELN leader Francisco Galan’s \
three-month parole will advance talks. Galan’s release is a \
good gesture, but he will spend most of his time shuttling \
between Bogota, Medellin and Cali to talk with civil society, \
he noted. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Catholic Church decided to \
take a low-profile role in the Galan initiative, believing it \
would not amount to much. He added that the Church remained \
frustrated with the ELN in the wake of its attempt to \
negotiate with Galan in July 2004. The ELN kidnapped the \
Bishop of Yopal while a senior Church delegation was visiting \
with Galan in prison. In XXXXXXXXXXXX’s view, this underscored \
that either the ELN was not serious about talks, or \
disorganized and unable to control its fighters. The \
Catholic Church had to forgive, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, but it had \
not forgotten the ELN’s actions. \
\
———————————— \
Church’s Bolo Azul Suggestion Leaked \
———————————— \
\
¶3. (C) All Catholic Church attempts to date to negotiate a \
humanitarian exchange with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of \
Colombia (FARC) had failed, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. He \
reported that recently the Church had attempted to select a \
prisoner exchange location that would be amenable to the GOC \
and FARC in Valle del Cauca Department. Valle del Cauca \
Governor Angelino Garzon suggested Bolo Azul Village, and \
XXXXXXXXXXXX had planned to keep the suggestion confidential \
until the Constitutional Court ruled on the legality of the \
reelection law. However, the secret reached ex-President \
Samper, who pushed the idea with the Uribe Administration. \
XXXXXXXXXXXX lamented that the Bolo Azul proposal had become \
“Uribefied,” political, and therefore unacceptable to the \
FARC. He hoped that the Church could advance another \
proposal in a less politically charged climate in the future. \
\
¶4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX asked whether Emboffs knew about the state \
of FARC “ambassador” Rodrigo Granda’s health. He said the \
Church had discovered Granda had prostate cancer and refused \
medical treatment out of fear that he would be killed. The \
Church has asked the GOC for permission to visit Granda as a \
pastoral duty to assess his health. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that \
Granda is much more important than the Colombian Government \
knows and promised to keep the Embassy informed. He said the \
GOC had refused to allow the Church to visit FARC prisoner \
Simon Trinidad last year, stating that it did not want to \
create “a Galan for the FARC” referring to the temporarily \
paroled ELN interlocutor Francisco Galan. Nevertheless, \
XXXXXXXXXXXX was hopeful that Archbishop Castro would be allowed \
to visit Granda since he was incarcerated in Castro’s \
pastoral district. \
\
—————————————- \
European Trip Interesting but not Useful \
—————————————- \
\
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that his recent trip to Geneva, the \
Netherlands and Spain had been interesting but had not \
advanced the peace process. He spoke with several European \
officials, UN representatives, and unofficial interlocutors \
who agreed that the GOC’s peace process with guerrilla groups \
had stalled. He was impressed by the Europeans’ interest in \
the Colombia peace process, but commented that one unofficial \
SWISS representative (Jean Paul Gontard) had offered the FARC \
different incentives to begin a humanitarian exchange and \
received nothing for his efforts. “They (the FARC) have been \
stingy with him,” said XXXXXXXXXXXX. \
WOOD \
HEADER This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

292031Z Sep 05

XTAGS: XTAGPGOV, XTAGPTER, XTAGSOCI, XTAGCO, XTAGELN, XTAGELN, XTAGFARC 05BOGOTA9257
TAGS PGOV PTER SOCI CO ELN ELN FARC
ADDED 2011-02-18 21:09:00
STAMP 2011-02-18 23:22:24
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