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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017
TAGS: EINV EPET ETRD NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: GOVERNMENT STILL CONTROLS EXXON FUEL
DEPOT

REF: A. MANAGUA 1952
¶B. MANAGUA 1789
¶C. MANAGUA 640
¶D. MANAGUA 788

Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, Reason: E.O. 12958 1.4 (b) and
(d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Ten days after the government seized one of Esso/Nicaragua’s fuel depots at the Port of Corinto, it refuses to return the facility to Esso without preconditions. The government wants Esso to honor third party contracts involving the use of the depot; for safety and liability reasons, this is a non starter for Exxon. The implementation of a “peace plan” remains on the table, waiting for Energy Minister Rappaccioli to return from Brazil. Theoretically, Exxon is willing to purchase fuel from Petronic, the state-owned holding company, but will only negotiate a deal after the depot is returned. In return, Exxon wants government harassment, in the form of tax liens and accusations of nonpayment, to stop. While the stalemate continues, Petronic controls Esso’s facility. Petronic has already offloaded fuel from one Venezuelan vessel and is preparing to do the same with another. We believe that the government’s driving motivation for its treatment of Esso is an overwhelming desire to siphon ALBA funding from the sale of Venezuelan petroleum to Nicaragua to fund inter alia the creation of 17,000 citizens’ councils. End Summary.

¶2. (C) As reported in Ref A, the Government of Nicaragua seized one of Esso/Nicaragua’s fuel storage facilities at the Port of Corinto on August 17. The pretext for the seizure was a lien for the nonpayment of taxes, placed on the property by the Director General of Customs Roberto Zepeda. Zepeda charged that Exxon had failed to pay the value added tax on imported petroleum product.

¶3. (C) The issue first surfaced more than a year ago when the government noticed that Exxon had not filed the proper paperwork for an exemption from the value added tax. Industry insiders tell us that this is fairly common, as ships frequently arrive and are offloaded before all the paperwork is finished. Instead of seeking an administrative solution to an administrative problem, the government parlayed a paperwork glitch into something much grander to suit its purposes. Customs insists that Esso/Nicaragua owed as much as $3 million in unpaid value added tax.

¶4. (C) What makes the claim verifiably specious is that Nicaraguan law clearly exempts petroleum products from most normal taxes, including the value added tax. For this reason, no mechanism exists for Exxon to collect value added taxes along the supply chain. Instead, the industry essentially operates under its own tax regime, centered on the energy consumption tax. As the major supplier of refined products to Nicaragua, Exxon helps collect this tax from other fuel distributors on behalf of the government.

“We Pay Our Taxes”
——————

¶5. (C) At no time has Exxon accepted publicly or privately that the government’s charges of tax evasion are correct. Exxon spokesmen Alfredo Fernandez-Sivori and Milton Chavez have publicly stated Esso/Nicaragua has always paid its taxes and is a good corporate citizen, investing in Nicaragua to reliably and safely supply fuel to the country and importing technology. Indeed, as a high profile foreign investor and a major taxpayer, Esso/Nicaragua has long come under regular scrutiny by local tax authorities. Former Director General for Taxation Roger Arteaga was quoted in the press as having said that, in his experience, Esso/Nicaragua was meticulous about paying its taxes.

“I’d Like a Fuel Depot, Judge”
——————————

¶6. (C) As the demandeur, Director General for Customs Zepeda has the right to go to a judge in a district where an Esso/Nicaragua asset resides and demand that a tax lien be placed on it. Zepeda chose an out-of-commission Esso fuel depot called Corinto I.

¶7. (C) Nicaraguan law clearly states that custody of a
property subject to a lien “will be awarded to the owner of the property,” but this did not stop the Sandinista (FSLN) judge from Chinandega, Judge Socorro Toruno, from enlisting the assistance of armed local police to forcefully remove Esso/Nicaragua personnel from Corinto I and awarding custody of the depot to Zepeda. The mission all took place with clockwork precision shortly after close of business on Friday, August 17.

¶8. (C) Zepeda immediately used his ill-gotten authority to request Petronic to prepare Esso’s tanks to receive fuel from a Venezuelan vessel that had arrived in port the day before. The last Venezuelan vessel to call paid demurrage of $400,000, and the GON appeared determined that such a delay was not going to happen again.

Our Friends at Petronic
———————–

¶9. (C) Petronic is a state-owned holding company whose primary responsibility is to oversee a long-term contract with Glencore (SWISS) for the supply and distribution of petroleum products. In April, two months after Evo Morales nationalized Glencore’s mining assets in Bolivia, the Nicaraguan government tried to nullify its ten-year contract with Glencore in its eighth year, arguing that the government official who signed the contract was not authorized to do so. This charge soon devolved into negotiations with Glencore, the outcome of which is unclear. However, Glencore is now onboard with the idea of receiving Venezuelan product through Petronic.

¶10. (C) The local IMF Representative informs us that as a result of IMF negotiations restricting rapid growth in foreign debt, the Sandinista Government will no long siphon funds from the purchase of Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) products through a discount financing scheme as reported in Ref B. Rather, 25% of the proceeds of a sale to Petronic will be deposited into a fund supporting a development bank and 25% into an ALBA Fund. To make this work, real companies with refining or distributive capacity like Exxon have to buy the fuel from Petronic.

Chico and the Man
—————–

¶11. (C) The President of Petronic is Francisco “Chico” Lopez, who despite some reports that he has resigned, apparently still functions as the Treasurer of the FSLN, whose headquarters serve as President Ortega’s official residence and office. As an accounting master with nimble fingers massaging the financial heart of the FSLN, Chico Lopez appears to be just the guy Ortega wants to manage his ALBA funds.

¶12. (C) We note that in a public scandal last April, Amcit Armel Gonzalez implicated Chico Lopez and FSLN Director for Organization Lenin Cerna in a $4.5 million extortion attempt involving a tourism development in the Department of Tola (Ref C). Although Gonzalez recorded the conversations on audio tape verified by experts, Gonzalez has been accused of creating false evidence.

Hard Day’s Night
—————-

¶13. (C) With free run of Corinto I as provided by Judge Toruno, Chico Lopez sprung into action. Within hours, local contractors showed up to perform welding and other metal work on Esso’s tanks to prepare Corinto I to accept 18,000 barrels of Venezuelan diesel, i.e., what remained of Venezuela’s 120,000 barrel shipment. The contractors welded all night. Reportedly, 40,000 barrels of diesel and 20,000 barrels of gasoline were offloaded to a depot managed by Glencore, and 30,000 barrels of diesel were offloaded to a depot managed by the Nicaraguan Port Authority.

¶14. (C) While contractors continued to weld, President Ortega appointed Minister of Energy Emilio Rappaccioli to act as point person for the government in talks with Exxon. Business Federation (COSEP) President Erwin Kruger offered his good offices to broker a deal, and helped Exxon reps to initiate discussions with Rappaccioli on August 21. (Ref D).

“What Do You Really Want?”
————————–

¶15. (C) Exxon soon discovered that the issue was not unpaid taxes. Rappaccioli freely admitted in private conversations and then publicly to the press that the government launched tax cases against Exxon to pressure the company into accepting Venezuelan product ) a bit like the government had pressured Glencore into accepting Venezuelan product last April. Exxon rep Augustin Fuentes (protect) told us that Rappaccioli also broached the possibility of organizing a buyout of Exxon’s refinery. While Rappaccioli had hinted at this possibility before, Fuentes paid closer attention this time.

¶16. (C) Talks with Rappaccioli continued through the week while other parts of the government tried to apply increasing pressure on Exxon. At one point, the government filed twelve claims of tax evasion within five hours. Exxon reps calculated that the government’s tax claims totaled $57 million, the approximate book value of Esso/Nicaragua’s refinery located near Managua.

Misdirection
————

¶17. (C) One of these claims of tax evasion involved the supposed nonpayment of corporate income tax over ten years. Director General of Taxation Walter Porras publicly stated that a company like Exxon should be paying the same income tax that everyone else pays. Under its investment agreement with the government, however, Exxon pays 25%. The general corporate tax rate has since been raised to 30%, but the law allows agreed rates to remain valid. At another point, Attorney General Estrada questioned whether an investment agreement signed by Arnoldo Aleman’s famously corrupt Director General for Taxation Byron Jerez should be honored. Exxon reps inform us Jerez did not sign the agreement, which dates back to Violeta Chamorro’s government, not Aleman’s.

All The News That Is Fit To Print
———————————

¶18. (C) Throughout, headlines raged and talk shows chatted storms. Minister of Finance Alberto Guevara, Director General of Taxes Walter Porras, and an assortment of Sandinista party hacks and diputados continued to rant that Exxon owed taxes — all kinds of taxes. Managua Mayor Marenco claimed that the city’s gasoline stations owed Managua $90 million for unpaid municipal business licenses over the last 10 years — the case just happens to be pending a decision in the Supreme Court. But the propaganda effort did not seem to carry much weight with the press. In front page headlines, La Prensa called the seizure “blackmail” and El Nuevo Diario questioned the ramifications of Exxon delaying its next shipment of fuel. Through it all, Ortega refused to comment much more than to say that that “the case is in the courts.” Exxon spokesmen kept repeating that the assertion that Exxon had failed to pay its taxes was patently false.

¶19. (C) At an August 23rd signing ceremony for a U.S. Trade Development Agency grant to develop a modern ports law, the Ambassador emphasized the importance of the rule of law, of trade and investment to growth and development, and what the United States is doing to help Nicaragua take advantage of CAFTA. He also mentioned how the Exxon case was detracting from the image that Nicaragua was a good place to invest. In comments to the press after the event, the Ambassador stressed the importance of the rule of law, respect for private property, and the need for the government to return Corinto I to Exxon. He continued to encourage both sides to sit down to settle their differences. The Port Authority held the signing ceremony at the hotel owned by Foreign Minister Samuel Santos and Chief Economic Advisor Bayardo Arce, neither of whom bothered to show. Santos was on the agenda, but sent his Vice Minister for Development who nervously mouthed a few words he had scribbled on a quarter piece of paper.

The Peace Plan
————–

¶20. (C) By August 25, it looked as if Rappaccioli and Exxon
had agreed to an orchestrated exchange of letters in a deal that read like an Israeli-Palestinian peace plan. The basics of the deal were pretty much the way Exxon had mapped it out a week before.

¶21. (C) In the first phase, Exxon would regain control of Corinto I as the result of the Director General of Taxation Zepeda’s request to Chinandega Judge Toruno to replace Zepeda with Esso/Nicaragua’s Corinto plant supervisor.

¶22. (C) In the second phase, Exxon would deliver a letter stating its intention to sell/rent the seven small tanks located in Corinto I, or to use them to receive Petronic product. Exxon also would deliver a letter committing to the purchase of 400,000 barrels of crude oil per month from Petronic, about 60% of refinery needs. Presumably, Petronic would source the oil from PDVSA at market prices and sell it to Exxon. Exxon would transport the crude on its own ships, something that Exxon had wanted to do all along because PDVSA is unreliable. In return, the government would commit to jointly reviewing all tax cases that it had thrown at Esso/Nicaragua, with a view to resolving any legitimate claims and dismissing the rest.

¶23. (C) In the third phase, negotiations on the commitments that each side had stated in their letters would take place, in parallel. Exxon’s goal is to extract itself from the government’s onerous tax cases and restore a good operating environment for its business. The government’s goal is to siphon off ALBA funds from the sale of Venezuelan petroleum.

The Conductor Taps His Baton, But No Orchestra
——————————————— –

¶24. (C) On August 27, Judge Toruno showed up at Corinto with an order to reinstate Esso/Nicaragua as the custodian of Corinto I. In a cooperative manner, Petronic and Esso/Nicaragua inspected the depot to make sure that its facilities had not been damaged, and to verify volumes of Venezuelan fuel. Exxon reps told us that there had been a few diesel spills. Before the transfer could proceed, Toruno asserted that the reinstatement of Esso/Nicaragua as custodian would be conditioned on Petronic’s continued control of the seven tanks filled with Venezuelan product.

¶25. (C) Exxon refused to allow its Esso/Nicaragua Corinto supervisor to sign the order. The deal broke down. Compounding the situation, Energy Minister Rappaccioli had had flown to Brazil on August 26. He was therefore unavailable to shepherd implementation of a deal he had brokered, leaving Vice Minister Lorena Lanza behind to answer the phone.

¶26. (C) On August 29, Judge Toruno unilaterally issued a revised order transferring custodianship to Esso/Nicaragua, but obligating Esso/Nicaragua to honor Petronic operations on its property. Exxon again rejected the order and refused to take control of Corinto I until all non-Esso personnel had vacated the premises. Exxon also refused to take responsibility for, or to honor, Petronic contracts that involved Petronic’s continued use of Corinto I. Exxon reps explained that their refusal is a matter of law, safety, and ultimately corporate liability. On August 30, Exxon spokesman Milton Chavez stood up at a press conference in front of a long list operational requirements that Exxon follows for safety and liability reasons, and are presumably ignored by the Petronic usurpers.

¶27. (C) Exxon continues to pursue a mutually acceptable solution with the government while it explores legal recourse. Exxon wants to replace the tax lien on Corinto I with a bank guaranty; such a guaranty would remove any claim that the government may have on Corinto I. On August 29, Chavez and others met with Vice President Jaime Morales Carazo, who in an impromptu press conference that followed, offered some support, saying that he thought that the asset should be returned to Esso.

Exxon’s Immediate Concern
————————-

¶28. (C) Of immediate concern to Exxon has been the safety and security of both its fuel depots at the port, Corinto I and Corinto II. Former Esso/Nicaragua General Manager Augustin
Fuentes explains that these tanks have been in disuse, some for considerable time, and are “not suitable for service” of the kind that Petronic is using them. They require constant vigilance, he said. Some of the tanks have been used recently to store lubricants, but not fuel. One Corinto I tank is larger, capable of storing 30,000 barrels of diesel, and still in use. It was in fact full with Exxon product when Petronic took management control of Corinto I. Moreover, Esso/Nicaragua’s fire fighting equipment for both Corinto I and II is located in Corinto I. This has caused Exxon to halt all operations at Corinto II for safety reasons.

At the Break of Dawn
——————–

¶29. (C) In the early morning ours of August 30, another Venezuelan vessel crept into the Port of Corinto with another 120,000 barrels of fuel. Petronic still controls Corinto I and is again preparing to offload Venezuelan fuel.

Comment
——-

¶30. (C) We strongly suspect that the Sandinista rush to received Venezuelan fuel is tied to FSLN financing needs, inter alia, the creation of 17,000 peoples’ councils, an initiative recently launched by President Ortega. Each Venezuelan ship offloded by Petronic translates directly into $5 million for the GON, given current ALBA financing terms. The level of interagency coordination demonstrated by the government’s assault on Exxon and pressure on Glencore reflects direction from the highest levels of Government and the FSLN, which, in this case, work out of the same office.

TRIVELLI

DE RUEHMU #2016/01 2430006
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 310006Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1145
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1158
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

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