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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 013139

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2014
TAGS: PTER PHUM PINR PREL PGOV CO ELN
SUBJECT: DAS SHAPIRO MEETS WITH FATHER DARIO ECHEVERRI

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (U) December 15, 2004, 11:15-12:15 a.m., Espicopal
Conference, Bogota

¶2. (U) Participants:

U.S.
—-

DAS Charles Shapiro
Ambassador William B. Wood
Jeff DeLaurentis, POLCOUNS
David Henifin, Deputy Director for Andean Affairs
Sarah LaGier, POL (notetaker)

Colombia
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Father Dario Echeverri, Secretary General of the National
Conciliation Commission (CCN)

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Summary
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¶3. (C) Father Echeverri was optimistic that a meeting between the ELN and Mexican Government would create the right conditions for the launching of a formal peace process between the ELN and the GOC. However, he said two major obstacles remained: (1) the FARC’s control over the ELN; and (2) the ELN’s belief that the Uribe administration was not committed to social and political reform. Echeverri believed that the FARC was not serious about a peace process with the Uribe government, but said the Catholic Church would keep pressing for a humanitarian exchange and eventually a peace process. He asserted that the best way to weaken the illegal armed groups was to have an effective reinsertion program, but expressed concern that the GOC’s program was weak and poorly funded. Echeverri acknowledged that the FARC and the Chavez administration have long-standing ties. End Summary.

¶4. (C) As Secretary General of National Conciliation Commission (CNN), Father Echeverri is authorized by the GOC to reach out to the illegal armed groups, particularly the FARC, to try start formal peace talks.

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ELN: Possible Meeting in Mexico
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¶5. (C) Echeverri was hopeful that the proposed meeting between the ELN Central Command (COCE) and Mexican facilitator Ambassador Andres Valencia would help set conditions for a formal peace process. He praised Valencia’s efforts and said the ELN was likely to accept the conditions of the proposal, including suspending all violent activity while the meeting took place. He said the ELN was seeking to gain political recognition. However, two obstacles to formal negotiations remain:

– The ELN is dependent on the FARC financially and militarily. The FARC would control any ELN peace process with the Uribe administration. The COCE does not have sufficient power over the group’s combatant fronts to implement a peace process.

– The ELN does not view the Uribe Administration as serious about meeting its demands for social reform. Although Uribe has said he is not opposed to holding a national assembly, the ELN would not be satisfied with a one-time forum but rather wants concrete political concessions. Echeverri said that he believed the Uribe administration should allocate as many resources to social programs as it does to the armed forces.

¶6. (C) Echeverri agreed that the ELN is no longer a military threat but warned against discounting it altogether. The December 13 capture of an ELN field commander powerful in Valle del Cauca Department was a serious blow to the group. He asserted that the ELN, nonetheless, has a significant social base in parts of Arauca, Narino, Santander, and Valle del Cauca Departments. He noted that the group is not as deeply involved in drug trafficking as the FARC or the paramilitaries. He hoped the group would eventually be held accountable for numerous kidnappings, including the 2002 kidnapping of a 12 year-old boy whom they continue to hold for ransom. He also expressed concern that ELN units could be absorbed into either the FARC or paramilitary groups.
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FARC: Not Yet Serious About Peace
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¶7. (C) In October, Echeverri met with the SWISS government to coordinate efforts to facilitate a humanitarian exchange. The SWISS have been authorized by the Uribe  administration to reach out to the FARC to orchestrate an exchange. Echeverri hoped that an exchange would be a first step toward an eventual peace process. He pulled Shapiro aside at the end of the meeting to assure him that he is putting exactly the same priority on the three U.S. hostages as on the Colombian hostages. He stressed that the FARC was not serious about holding negotiations with the Uribe administration in part because the country’s widespread poverty provides the FARC with easy recruits, and Plan Patriota, in Echeverri’s view, was not hurting the FARC. For example, Echeverri claimed that FARC Secretariat member Mono Jojoy recently met with journalists in the middle of a Plan Patriota area of operations with minimal security.

¶8. (C) Echeverri noted that the FARC was undergoing a leadership change, which he does not fully understand yet. He believes Secretariat member Raul Reyes may be sick and
losing influence, while Secretariat member Alfonso Cano and subordinate Pablo Catatumbo are gaining power. Echeverri has received invitations from both Reyes and Catatumbo to meet to discuss conditions for the humanitarian exchange. He implied that there were some divergences among the FARC leaders that could possibly be exploited.

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Reinsertion Program Weak
————————

¶9. (C) Echeverri asserted that the best way to weaken the illegal armed groups was to offer the rank and file a better life as civilians. He expressed concern that the government’s reinsertion program for deserters and the demobilizing paramilitaries was not effective. Without adequate funding to train and employ the deserters, they would return to a life of crime and violence.

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Venezuelan Ties to FARC
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¶10. (C) Echeverri acknowledged that the FARC have long-standing ties to Venezuela and President Chavez. He is aware of at least one meeting between FARC Secretariat member Raul Reyes on December 26, 2003 in the Petare municipality in Caracas with GOV officials. Echeverri noted that when Venezuela hosted meetings between the GOC and the FARC in the 1990s, the FARC negotiators clearly were on friendly terms with the GOV officials. Colombian Ambassador to Venezuela Enrique Vargas Ramirez is a member of the CCN, and Echeverri hopes Vargas can take advantage of GOV-FARC ties to reach out to the FARC through Venezuelan channels.

¶11. (U) DAS Shapiro cleared on this cable.
WOOD

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

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