MARCH 26 MEETING OF THE G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP WORKING GROUP IN TOKYO

ID
08STATE35962
SUBJECT
MARCH 26 MEETING OF THE G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
DATE
2008-04-07 20:08:00
CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ORIGIN
Secretary of State
TEXT
UNCLAS STATE 035962

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CA CBC ETTC FR GM JA KNNP PARM PREL RS TRGY UK
SUBJECT: MARCH 26 MEETING OF THE G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP WORKING GROUP IN TOKYO

REF: STATE 13105

——- SUMMARY ——-
¶1. (SBU) AT THE MARCH 26 G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP WORKING GROUP MEETING (GPWG), RUSSIA POURED MORE COLD WATER ON THE PROPOSAL TO EXPAND GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP (GP) ACTIVITIES BEYOND RUSSIA AND THE REST OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (FSU) — THE PROPOSAL SUPPORTED BY ALL OTHER G-8 MEMBERS AND THE MAJOR GP OBJECTIVE FOR THE U.S. UNDER JAPAN’S G-8 PRESIDENCY. AT THE TABLE AND ON THE MARGINS, RUSSIA MADE CLEAR IT WOULD OPPOSE ANY SUMMIT LANGUAGE ON GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION THIS YEAR, CITING THE NEED TO FINISH THE PROMISED PROJECTS IN RUSSIA FIRST. DURING DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE STATE OF GP PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION IN RUSSIA, THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE FAILURE OF SOME PARTNERS (IDENTIFIED ON THE MARGINS AS ITALY AND FRANCE, IN PARTICULAR) TO FULFILL THEIR GP PLEDGES OR TO RESPOND MEANINGFULLY TO RUSSIA’S EARLIER REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION OF THEIR INTENTIONS IN THAT REGARD. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HAYWARD REAFFIRMED THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO FULFILL ITS PLEDGE IN RUSSIA, A COMMITMENT ECHOED BY MOST OTHER DELEGATIONS. SHE ALSO JOINED THE JAPANESE GPWG CHAIR AND OTHER DELEGATIONS IN DECLARING THAT THE GP HAS IN FACT — IF NOT IN NAME — ALREADY EXPANDED GEOGRAPHICALLY, AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE RANGE OF NONPROLIFERATION PROJECTS ALREADY BEING CARRIED OUT BY GP PARTNERS WORLDWIDE. THREAT BRIEFINGS BY THE U.S. AND OTHERS MADE THE CASE THAT THERE EXIST BOTH A WORLDWIDE THREAT AND A RISK THAT CURRENT THREAT REDUCTION EFFORTS MIGHT LEAVE GAPS THAT COULD BE EXPLOITED BY TERRORIST GROUPS OR PROLIFERANT STATES. THE JAPANESE CHAIR WAS COOL TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL THAT PROSPECTIVE NEW GP DONORS BE APPROACHED IN ORDER TO GENERATE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO HELP FILL SUCH GAPS, BUT AGREED THAT THERE COULD BE INFORMAL CONTACTS TO CONVEY INFORMATION ABOUT THE GP, SUCH AS WITH KAZAKHSTAN. THIS EXPANDED GPWG SESSION INCLUDED THE G-8 PARTNERS, TWELVE OTHER DONOR NATIONS, THE EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, THE EU COMMISSION, THE IAEA, AND UKRAINE. END SUMMARY.

——————————————— ——— JAPAN’S AGENDA — A TWO-PART ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF GP EXPANSION ——————————————— ———

¶2. (SBU) AT THE JANUARY GPWG (REFTEL), RUSSIA HAD MINCED FEW WORDS IN COMPLAINING ABOUT THE UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF SEVERAL PARTNERS (MENTIONING ITALY, FRANCE, AND JAPAN) IN FULFILLING THEIR PLEDGES TO UNDERTAKE AND COMPLETE PROJECTS IN RUSSIA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED IN 2002. AS THEY HAD LAST YEAR, THE RUSSIANS CONTINUED IN JANUARY AND MARCH TO ARGUE THAT THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON UNFINISHED WORK IN RUSSIA INSTEAD OF ON EXPANDING TO NEW COUNTRIES. IN AN ATTEMPT TO MOVE THE RUSSIANS FROM THEIR OPPOSITION BY ADDRESSING THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT FUNDING SHORTFALLS, THE JAPANESE PRESIDENCY MADE A REVIEW OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION IN RUSSIA THE AGENDA’S FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS. THE OTHER MAJOR AGENDA ITEM CONCERNED THREAT BRIEFINGS, INTENDED TO ESTABLISH THE URGENCY OF THE GLOBAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROLIFERATION THREAT AND THEREFORE THE NEED TO EXPAND THE GP GEOGRAPHICALLY TO MEET IT.

——————- RUSSIA’S COMPLAINTS ——————-

¶3. (SBU) THE DISCUSSION OF IMPLEMENTATION STATE OF PLAY TOOK PLACE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF TWO SETS OF DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTED BEFORE THE GPWG: A CATALOGUE OF CHALLENGES COVERING IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS, AND A LISTING OF PROJECT BENCHMARKS AND ANTICIPATED TIMELINES — BOTH DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY EACH OF THE GP DONORS. TO LEAD OFF, RUSSIAN HEAD OF DELEGATION ANTONOV CLAIMED RUSSIA HAD SO FAR RECEIVED ONLY 25 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL FUNDS PLEDGED TO IT, AS ILLUSTRATED ON A CHART. HE NOTED WITH REGRET THAT RUSSIA HAD RECEIVED NO RESPONSES TO ITS JANUARY REQUEST FOR CONFIRMATION FROM CERTAIN COUNTRIES — WHICH HE LATER IDENTIFIED ON THE MARGINS AS ITALY AND FRANCE — CONCERNING THEIR INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO FULFILLING THEIR PLEDGES. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH CLARIFICATIONS, IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR RUSSIA TO IDENTIFY THE NECESSARY BENCHMARKS OR DO ITS OWN BUDGET PLANNING. THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS A LACK OF FUNDS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION (CWD). BASED ON A CHART COVERING GP ASSISTANCE RECEIVED FROM ALL COUNTRIES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ROSATOM THEN MADE A POWERPOINT PRESENTATION CONCERNING THE STATUS OF PROJECTS IN RUSSIA, SPECIFICALLY SUBMARINE DISMANTLEMENT IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST.

¶4. (SBU) SEVERAL DELEGATIONS NOTED THAT ADMINISTRATIVE OBSTACLES THEY HAD ENCOUNTERED IN RUSSIA HAD SLOWED THE TEMPO OF THEIR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ALSO TOOK ISSUE WITH THE RUSSIAN CHART’S FIGURES, POINTING OUT THAT THEY CONCERNED ONLY THE MONIES EXPENDED DIRECTLY INSIDE RUSSIA, BUT NOT THE EQUIPMENT, SHIPPING, SERVICES, AND ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHEAD COVERED BY EXPENDITURES OUTSIDE RUSSIA. GERMANY NOTED THAT IT HAD COMMITTED $1.2 BILLION IN 2002, NOT THE $1.8 BILLION CLAIMED ON THE RUSSIAN CHART. FRANCE SAID ITS FIGURE SHOULD BE SHOWN AS $750 MILLION, NOT THE $950 MILLION ON THE CHART. CANADA SAID ITS DISBURSEMENTS HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT DELAYED BY ITS OBLIGATION TO SPEND THE FUNDS EFFICIENTLY; OVER THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES, INCLUDING TAXATION AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS, HAD SLOWED A PACE, BUT IT WAS HOPED THINGS WOULD NOW SPEED UP. KOREA ASKED WHY ITS ASSISTANCE DID NOT APPEAR IN THE RUSSIAN FIGURES.

¶5. (SBU) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HAYWARD REITERATED THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO FULFILL ITS ENTIRE PLEDGE TO RUSSIA BY 2012. THE U.S. CATALOGUE OF CHALLENGES CONTAINED A RECORD OF PROBLEMS SOLVED AND SUCCESSFUL PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. (WHEN ASKED ON THE MARGINS, THE RUSSIANS HAD NO COMPLAINT ABOUT U.S. IMPLEMENTATION. THEY ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEIR PERCENTAGE FIGURE FOR PLEDGE FULFILLMENT, WHICH LISTED ONLY 31 PERCENT FOR THE U.S., MIGHT WELL FALL SHORT OF THE REALITY SINCE IT A ADMITTEDLY INCLUDED ONLY MONIES TRANSFERRED TO RUSSIA AND NOT THOSE LEGITIMATE EXPENSES INCURRED OUTSIDE RUSSIA. WHILE THIS UNDERSTANDING APPLIED TO SOME OTHER DONORS AS WELL, IT DID NOT APPLY TO ALL DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN RUSSIAN FIGURES AND DONORS’ CLAIMS.) THE UK REPRESENTATIVE NOTED THE CHART’S 61 PERCENT COMPLETION FIGURE FOR HIS COUNTRY’S PROJECTS LOOKED ACCURATE A ND AFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO FINISH THE WORK IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE. ITALY, WHICH THE RUSSIAN CHART SHOWED AS HAVING SPENT ONLY 2 PERCENT OF ITS PLEDGE, SAID ITS OWN FIGURES FOR ITS ASSISTANCE “MIGHT BE A LITTLE HIGHER” THAN THOSE ON THE RUSSIAN CHART, AND IT “MIGHT HAVE SOME ADDITIONAL CONTRACTS TO ANNOUNCE SOON.” FRANCE SAID IT “INTENDED TO WORK WITH RUSSIA TO IMPROVE” ITS IMPLEMENTATION RECORD. SWITZERLAND, THE EU, AND THE NETHERLANDS BRIEFLY REVIEWED THEIR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION HISTORIES IN RUSSIA. THE UK NOTED THAT IT HAD ALLOCATED MORE GP FUNDS TO ROSATOM THAN ROSATOM HAD BEEN ABLE TO SPEND. MOST DELEGATIONS ECHOED HAYWARD’S COMMITMENT WITH REGARD TO FULFILLMENT OF PLEDGES. THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION REPORTED THAT ITS PARLIAMENT HAD QUESTIONED WHY THE GOVERNMENT WAS SUPPORTING A NOW PROSPEROUS RUSSIA WITH GP ASSISTANCE. THE RESPONSE TO PARLIAMENT WAS THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE SERVED A “COMMON SECURITY INTEREST”. NONETHELESS, THE DUTCH REPRESENTATIVE NOTED, HIS GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HOW THE TAXPAYER VIEWED THE FUNDS PROVIDED UNDER THE GP.

¶6. (SBU) ANTONOV RESPONDED THAT THE ISSUE WAS NOT SO MUCH ONE OF “COMMITMENTS”, BUT RATHER OF ACTUALLY TRANSFORMING THEM INTO PROJECTS. RUSSIA HAD REAL PROBLEMS TO SOLVE: ECOLOGICAL ONES WITH REGARD TO SUBMARINE DISMANTLEMENT AND THE ISSUE OF TREATY OBLIGATION WITH CWD. RUSSIA WOULD MEET THESE CHALLENGES — WITH OR WITHOUT GP HELP. IT WAS SPENDING ITS OWN MONEY TO DO SO, BUT SIMPLY NEEDED TO KNOW THE ACTUAL PROSPECTS FOR ASSISTANCE.

¶7. (SBU) TO THOSE WHO HAD CITED DIFFICULTIES WITH SITE ACCESS (MENTIONING ITALY), ANTONOV NOTED THAT, LIKE OTHERS, RUSSIA HAD CLEAR RULES ABOUT NOTIFICATIONS WITH WHICH PARTNERS SIMPLY HAD TO COMPLY. REFERRING DIRECTLY TO FRANCE’S BENCHMARKS DOCUMENT, ANTONOV SAID, “THIS IS MONEY YOU SPENT SOMEPLACE ELSE.” TO KOREA, ANTONOV BRUSQUELY DISMISSED ITS QUESTION WITH THE COMMENT THAT IT HAD TRANSFERRED ITS FUNDS TO JAPAN (IN A “PIGGYBACK” PROCESS). (FROM THE GPWG CHAIR MORINO LATER POINTEDLY REGRETTED THAT RUSSIA HAD NOT SEEN FIT TO THANK KOREA FOR ITS ASSISTANCE.) ANTONOV WENT ON TO COMPLAIN THAT PIGGYBACKING WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATE WAY TO EXTEND ASSISTANCE FOR LARGE PROJECTS, THOUGH IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR SMALL PROJECTS — AN ARGUMENT THAT WAS INTERPRETED PRIVATELY BY OTHER DELEGATIONS AS THE RUSSIANS’ DESIRE TO HAVE THE CHECKS WRITTEN DIRECTLY TO THEM.) ANTONOV CITED THE UK AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHERE PIGGYBACKING CAUSED A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY, SINCE IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO TELL WHERE A PIGGYBACKING COUNTRY’S MONEY HAD GONE. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS RESPONDED, MAKING A COMPELLING CASE FOR SMALLER DONORS’ USE OF LARGER DONORS’ ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITIES AND ESTABLISHED LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES. THE UK REP CALLED ANTONOV’S ATTENTION TO PAGE 47 OF THE (120 PAGE) UK BROCHURE, “GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMME”, WHICH COVERED IN DETAIL THE SOURCES AND PROJECTS OF THE STERLING 61 MILLION CONTRIBUTED BY SOME DOZEN PIGGYBACKERS ON UK GP PROGRAMS.

¶8. (U) IN THE FACE OF EVIDENT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON A HOST OF IMPLEMENTATION QUESTIONS, JAPANESE CHAIR (MORINO) SAID HE MIGHT SUGGEST THAT THE APRIL 23 GPWG INCLUDE A DISCUSSION ON PROJECT COORDINATION INVOLVING AGENCY EXPERTS, CONTRACTORS, SUBCONTRACTORS, ETC. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER MORINO NOW INTENDS TO MAKE SUCH A DISCUSSION PART OF THE APRIL GPWG. (THE U.S. WILL MAKE CLEAR TO MORINO THAT SUCH ISSUES ARE BEST ADDRESSED IN A BILATERAL CONTEXT IN DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN DONORS AND RUSSIA AND THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT EXPERTS FROM A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES COULD ACCOMPLISH IN ONE OR TWO DAYS IN TOKYO.)

———————————- BRIEFINGS ON THE GLOBAL WMD THREAT ———————————-

¶9. (SBU) A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE IAEA MADE A FULL PRESENTATION ON THE NUCLEAR THREAT FROM ITS PERSPECTIVE, THOUGH NOTING THAT HIS ORGANIZATION’S CHARTER DID NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH DEFINING TERRORISM OR COLLECTING INFORMATION ON TERRORIST GROUPS. IN ITS REASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR SECURITY, THE IAEA HAD CONCLUDED THE NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREAT CONSISTED OF, IN ASCENDING ORDER: A) THEFT OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON; B) A DIRTY BOMB; OR, C) SABOTAGE OF A NUCLEAR INSTALLATION/POWER PLANT. THERE HAD BEEN 1340 RELEVANT INCIDENTS RECORDED. PAST BEHAVIOR WAS THE KEY GUIDE TO TERRORISTS’ INTENTIONS. BIN LADEN AND OTHERS WERE QUOTED ON THE ACQUISITION OF WMD. ATTEMPTS TO BREAK INTO RUSSIAN WEAPONS INSTALLATIONS WERE CITED, AS WERE A NUMBER OF NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS.

¶10. (SBU) THE U.S. PRESENTATION COVERED NUMEROUS UNCLASSIFIED CASES WHERE WEAPONS OR MATERIALS OF MASS DESTRUCTION — RADIOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL, AS WELL AS NUCLEAR — WERE EITHER THE OBJECTIVES OR AT RISK OF ACQUISITION BY TERRORIST GROUPS. THE BRIEFING NOTED THAT, WITH INCREASED GLOBALIZTION IN TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, PROLIFERATORS AND TERRORISTS FOUND IT MUCH EASIER TO OBTAIN THESE MATERIALS. THE INCIDENTS CITED COVERED ASIA, EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA AND INVOLVED EQUIPMENT, WEAPONS, MATERIALS AND THE KNOWLEDGE TO MAKE USE OF THEM.

¶11. (SBU) FRANCE MADE A BRIEF INTERVENTION ON SECURITY ISSUES CONCERNING CATEGORY I RADIOLOGICAL SOURCES IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA, WHICH IT SAID TESTIFIED TO THE LEGITIMACY OF GP EXPANSION.

¶12. (SBU) AUSTRALIA REVIEWED INCIDENTS INVOLVING TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION AS WELL AS THE LESS-THAN-ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED VULNERABILITIES OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND CHEMICAL TOXINS IN THE AREA.

—————– CONCLUSIONS DRAWN —————–

¶13. (SBU) WITH REGARD TO THE THREAT BRIEFINGS, THERE APPEARED TO BE A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT THEY WERE SUGGESTIVE OF A WORLDWIDE THREAT AND THE RISK THAT CURRENT EFFORTS MIGHT LEAVE GAPS THAT COULD BE EXPLOITED BY TERRORIST GROUPS. U.S. REP HAYWARD AGAIN AFFIRMED THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DEAL WITH THE PROLIFERATION POTENTIAL REPRESENTED BY UNSECURED MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXPERTISE IN RUSSIA AND OTHER AREAS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION BY FINISHING THE JOB THERE. AT THE SAME TIME, SHE SAID, THE THREAT WAS NOT STATIC, BUT EVOLVING, AND THE GP NEEDED TO BE READY TO RESPOND TO IT ON A GLOBAL BASIS, AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE COURSE OF THE THREAT BRIEFINGS. THE TIME WAS RIPE TO LOOK TO NEW DONORS, NEW RESOURCES THAT WOULD BE APPLIED TO THE REGIONS DOCUMENTED IN THE BRIEFINGS. SHE FURTHER NOTED THAT THE GP HAS IN FACT ALREADY EXPANDED, AND IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE PARTNERSHIP TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS.

¶14. (SBU) GERMANY, JAPAN, SWITZERLAND, CANADA, AND THE UK TOOK THE FLOOR I N SUPPORT OF IMMEDIATE GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION TO DEAL WITH GLOBAL THREATS THAT, AS JAPAN SAID, SHOULD NOT BE LEFT UNADDRESSED. GERMANY ADDED THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT A DECISION FOR EXTENSION BEYOND 2012 AND CAUTIONED THAT ANY NEW GP DONORS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LIKEMINDEDNESS, A POINT LATER ECHOED BY JAPAN AND RUSSIA. ALSO, TOO MANY GP PARTNERS MIGHT MAKE COORDINATION DIFFICULT, ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE.

¶15. (SBU) ON THE U.S. SUGGESTION THAT POTENTIAL NEW DONORS BE APPROACHED IN CAPITALS AND/OR THAT AN OUTREACH SESSION BE HELD FOR THEM IN CONNECTION WITH THE APRIL GPWG, JAPAN POINTED TO THE CONCEPTUAL AWKWARDNESS OF FORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH NEW DONORS IN THE ABSENCE OF A GP DECISION TO ADMIT THEM. INSTEAD, THE JAPANESE SUGGESTED THERE COULD BE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE GP, INCLUDING POTENTIAL NEW DONORS, IN ORDER TO ACQUAINT THEM WITH THE GP.

¶16. (SBU) RUSSIA (ROZHKOV) AGREED THAT THE THREAT BRIEFINGS HAD SHOWN THE DANGERS THAT EXISTED IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD. SUCH DANGERS MIGHT EVEN BE MORE EXTENSIVE THAN SUGGESTED IN THE BRIEFINGS. IT WAS ALSO TRUE THAT MOST OF THE TASKS INVOLVED IN COPING WITH SUCH THREATS RELATED TO THE KANANASKIS PRINCIPLES. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THERE WERE OTHER, EXISTING, GLOBAL INSTRUMENTS (IAEA, ETC.) TO ADDRESS THESE ADMITTEDLY GLOBAL THREATS. MOREOVER, THREAT ASSESSMENT WAS NOT REALLY A TASK FOR WHICH THE GP HAD BEEN DESIGNED. WHAT NEEDED TO BE UNDERLINED WAS THAT THE GP WAS A UNIQUE INSTRUMENT INTENDED TO BRING POLITICAL WILL AND RESOURCES TO BEAR IN SPECIFIC COUNTRIES (RUSSIA AND THE REST OF THE FSU). THAT WAS TO BE THE FIRST STAGE. AND, WITH THE FIRST STAGE ONLY 26 PERCENT COMPLETED, IT WAS NOT TIME TO GO LOOKING FOR NEW TASKS — TASKS FOR WHICH NO SPECIFIC NEW DONORS WITH RESOURCES HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED, NO SPECIFIC PROJECTS PREPARED, AND NO SPECIFIC WILLING RECIPIENTS RECRUITED.

¶17. (SBU) ROZHKOV CONCLUDED BY READING THE RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM THE REPORT OF THE HEILIGENDAMM SUMMIT, CLEARLY INDICATING THAT RUSSIA WOULD AGREE TO SIMILAR SUMMIT LANGUAGE FOR THIS YEAR, RESTATING THE GEOGRAPHICALLY GLOBAL VOCATION OF THE GP, BUT AGAIN ONLY IN PRINCIPLE AND ONLY AS AN ISSUE TO BE EXPLORED FURTHER.

————– ON THE MARGINS ————–

¶18. (SBU) ASKED PRIVATELY ABOUT HIS GOVERNMENT’S STAND ON EXTENSION OF THE GP BEYOND 2012, THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS HAD TWO REDLINES: NO AGREEMENT ON EXTENSION BEYOND 2012 AND NO NEW GERMAN FUNDS FOR THE GP BEFORE THEN. PERSONALLY, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THERE WOULD BE EVENTUAL AGREEMENT ON GP EXTENSION, BUT HE FELT GERMANY WOULD NOT BE READY TO ADDRESS THIS BEFORE 2010. WITH REGARD TO FUNDING FOR PROJECTS BEYOND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION IN A GEOGRAPHICALLY EXPANDED GP, GERMANY HAD BEEN THINKING THAT SOME OF THE FUNDS ALREADY PLEDGED BUT NOT YET COMMITTED TO RUSSIA MIGHT BE USED.

¶19. (SBU) DURING A PRE-GPWG BREAKFAST U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL, MORINO NOTED THE AWKWARDNESS OF TRYING TO ATTRACT NEW DONOR GOVERNMENTS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT THEM INTO THE G-8’S GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP. NONETHELESS, HE ACCEPTED THE U.S. PLAN TO APPROACH POTENTIAL NEW DONORS ON AN INFORMAL BASIS AND SUGGESTED KAZAKHSTAN AS A GOOD START.

¶20. (SBU) SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION IN AN EXPLORATION OF POSSIBLE SUMMIT LANGUAGE COMPROMISES THAT MIGHT ACCOMPLISH EFFECTIVE GP GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION ENDED WITH ROZHKOV’S FLAT DECLARATION THAT MOSCOW HAD DECIDED THERE WOULD BE NO SUCH LANGUAGE THIS YEAR.

————- LOOKING AHEAD ————-

¶21. (SBU) THE JAPANESE CHAIR HAS SIGNALED ITS RELUCTANCE WITH REGARD TO FORMAL APPROACHES TO NEW DONORS, AND TIME IS SHORT TO AFFECT RUSSIA’S STAND AGAINST GP EXPANSION IN TIME FOR THIS YEAR’S SUMMIT. NONETHELESS, THE U.S. IS PREPARING TO OPEN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SOME POTENTIAL NEW DONORS IN ORDER TO BEGIN LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR ADDRESSING RUSSIA’S OBJECTIONS THAT NO DONORS, PROJECTS, OR RECIPIENTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED, AS WELL AS TO ALLAY THE RUSSIANS’ BASIC CONCERN THAT EXPANSION WOULD MEAN DIVERSION OF ALREADY PLEDGED FUNDS AWAY FROM THEM.

¶22. (U) THIS EXPANDED GPWG SESSION INCLUDED THE G-8 PLUS TWELVE OTHER DONOR NATIONS, THE EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, THE EU COMMISSION, THE IAEA, AND UKRAINE. THE NEXT GPWG, SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 23 IN TOKYO, WILL INCLUDE ONLY THE G-8, PLUS THE EU.

RICE

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2011-04-28 00:12:00
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2011-04-29 00:48:16
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