Journalicious Dots from Switzerland

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP PARM UNSC SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL TELLS EUR A/S FRIED HE
IS GOING TO TEHRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Peter Coneway, Reasons 1.4 b/d

——-  Summary  ——-

1.(C/NF) Swiss State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Michael Ambuehl told visiting EUR A/S Fried and Ambassador Coneway on  March 9 that he planned to visit Tehran the week of March 12,  claiming that IAEA DG El Baradei had encouraged Ambuehl to tell Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Ali Larijani that Iran was  facing its “last chance.” A/S Fried and the Ambassador  cautioned strongly against the visit, noting that a Swiss  visit could be misinterpreted and used by Iranian officials,  particularly given Bern’s status as U.S. protecting power in  Tehran. Ambuehl assured the USG that his message would be  identical to that of the UN Security Council and IAEA, namely  that Iran must suspend all enrichment activities and accept  its international obligations. Ambuehl’s staff informed  Embassy on March 12 that he was on his way to Tehran and  would provide a readout immediately upon return. End  summary.

——————————  “Last Chance” Message for Iran  ——————————

2.(C/NF) Swiss State Secretary Michael Ambuehl met with A/S  Dan Fried and the Ambassador on March 9 at ZURICH Airport,  joined by Swiss DFA Americas Desk official Urs Hammer and  Poloff. Ambuehl told A/S Fried that he planned to fly to  Tehran the week of March 12 to meet with Iranian Nuclear  Negotiator Ali Larijani. Ambuehl said that he wanted to  brief A/S Fried and the Ambassador in order to keep the USG  fully apprised of Swiss activities, per Ambassador Coneway’s  request. His purpose, he said, would be to push Iran to  accept the three “modalities” demanded by the UN Security  Council and IAEA, namely:   — Suspension of all enrichment activities, with “no tricks;”  — Transparency with the international community; and  — Acceptance of rights and obligations as defined by the  IAEA and UNSC resolutions.

3.(C/NF) Ambuehl said he had been encouraged to travel to  Iran by IAEA DG ElBaradei, with whom he had spoken three  times in recent days. ElBaradei told Ambuehl that he had  spoken with Secretary Rice and suggested that “we have to use  the Swiss” to urge the Iranians to abide by UNSC resolutions.  Notably, ElBaradei had not conveyed what the Secretary’s  response (if any) was. In any event, Ambuehl would tell the  Iranians that this was their “last chance.” He acknowledged  that a Swiss effort would have only a 30 percent chance of  success, but described the visit as low-risk, high potential  gain.

—————  Counterargument  —————

4.(C/NF) Ambassador Coneway challenged Ambuehl to describe  what if anything new the Swiss could tell the Iranians. It  was a delicate time in the stand-off between the P5 plus 1  and Iran; silence would be the best policy by Switzerland.  Moreover, Tehran would be unlikely to see this as a “last  chance.” A/S Fried told Ambuehl firmly that the USG had been  concerned by some Swiss actions. Side initiatives could  encourage the Iranians to game the unity of the international  community. Bern’s status as U.S. Protecting Power could also  cause Iran to misconstrue Swiss actions.

5.(C/NF) Ambuehl insisted that his prospective visit would  not undermine the P5 plus 1. His points would be exactly the  points agreed to by the UN Security Council and supported by  the IAEA. Iran’s rebuff of the Swiss initiative would be  recognized as further evidence of Tehran’s intransigence.

6.(C/NF) A/S Fried reiterated that the international  community had finally gained traction against Iran. It was  important to let the pressure work. A/S Fried urged Ambuehl  to make no firm plans until we could speak to officials in  Washington. In any event, Ambuehl should make clear to the  Iranians, if he does in the end go, that he did not speak for  the USG. Ambuehl said that this went without saying.  Ambuehl asked for understanding of the difficult situation he  was in (we surmise this means the directive from Foreign  Minister Calmy-Rey to engage with Iran on this issue).  Options other than a flat “no” would be appreciated. A/S  Fried and Ambassador Coneway agreed to get back to him as  soon as possible.

——————————————— –  Ambassador Coneway’s follow up call to Ambuehl  ——————————————— –

7.(C/NF) Using points provided by P staff, Ambassador Coneway  called Ambuehl that night with the message that the USG had  made its opinion clear. There was nothing new in the Swiss  proposal and the visit presented many opportunities for  misinterpretation. The decision to go would be a sovereign  Swiss decision to take. If Ambuehl chose to go, the  Ambassador stressed, it must be clear that he was not acting  on the USG’s behalf.

8.(C/NF) Ambuehl’s initial response was that he would  consider the USG points. However, his diplomatic advisor  Stephan Estermann called DCM on March 12 to announce that  Ambuehl was on his way to Tehran and would provide a briefing  upon his return.

——-  Comment  ——-

9.(C/NF) A/S Fried and Ambassador Coneway were very clear in  their expression of concern about Ambuehl’s planned travel to  Tehran. However, it is obvious that the Swiss think there is  at least the chance that the engagement of a “disinterested”  non-member of the P5 plus 1 could offer Tehran a face-saving  way to give into the UN Security Council – a belief  apparently reinforced by ElBaradei. Ambuehl was noticeably  uncomfortable not taking the USG’s advice. But, there is  little surprise in his decision to go forward with the visit,  given the clear mandate he has received from Swiss Foreign  Minister Calmy-Rey.

CONEWAY

XTAGS: XTAGPREL, XTAGKNNP, XTAGPARM, XTAGUNSC, XTAGSZ 07BERN258