Archive for June, 2011


Wednesday, June 29th, 2011



DATE 2010-02-22 00:00:00


ORIGIN Embassy Sofia





E.O. 12958: N/A




SOFIA 00000123 001.2 OF 007


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Bulgaria is primarily a point of origin and transit, and to a lesser degree destination for human trafficking. The government continued its energetic anti-trafficking  prevention campaign and stepped up efforts in the area of victim protection.

It also passed legislation to increase punishments for traffickers and introduced penalties for the clients of minor prostitutes and trafficking victims. The new government has actively pursued high-profile cases against corrupt officials, including former ministers and agency heads. It fired several police officers accused of aiding traffickers and arrested a high-level Interior Ministry official in charge of migration policy for helping trafficking groups obtain fake documents. The court sentenced two elected local government officials charged with leading a trafficking criminal network.

2. (SBU) Primary point of contact on trafficking is Political Officer XXXXXXXXXXXX. Approximately 100 hours of staff time were required for the completion of this report.






— A. Several agencies, including the Prosecution Service, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy maintain information about trafficking trends, criminal proceedings, traffickers and victims. The National Commission for combating trafficking in human beings (the Commission) collects and summarizes all government-generated data, which is generally inclusive and reliable. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and NGOs also compile data on the destination, source points, and recruitment methods compiled from trafficking victims that they have assisted.

— B. Bulgaria continues to be primarily an origin point for trafficking of women and children, mostly for purposes of commercial sexual exploitation. To a lesser extent it is a transit and destination point for sexual exploitation of foreign victims of trafficking. Bulgarians are also subjected to trafficking conditions within the country. Internal trafficking, particularly to resort areas, is primarily for sexual exploitation, and victims are often later trafficked to Western Europe. The ratio between external and internal trafficking for sexual exploitation is almost equal. Bulgarian victims of sexual exploitation are traditionally recruited from several regions of the country: victims from Sliven, in southeast Bulgaria, are primarily trafficked to Belgium and the Netherlands; victims from Plovdiv and Pazardzhik, in central Bulgaria, are mostly trafficked to France, Austria, and Italy; victims from northeast Bulgaria are mostly trafficked to Germany, Czech Republic, and the Scandinavian countries; victims from Blagoevgrad, in southwest Bulgaria, are usually trafficked to Greece, Italy, and Spain. Bulgarian victims are also trafficked to Poland, SWITZERLAND, Finland, Turkey, Cyprus and Macedonia.

NGOs report few recent cases of Bulgarian victims trafficked outside Europe, primarily to the U.S. and South Africa. Law enforcement officials report that more than 80 percent of the trafficking investigations involve sexual exploitation. However, Greece, Italy, Spain and Great Britain are known also as destinations for labor trafficking of Bulgarian victims.

— C. Victims are subject to forced prostitution, physical and psychological abuse. They are frequently limited in their movement and face punishments for failing to comply with the traffickers’ rules. Victims are also deprived of their identity documents and are controlled through threats against their relatives. Some victims are forced to pay large debts or are sold to other traffickers. Occasionally, in order to keep them dependent, victims are given drugs, mostly heroin.

— D. The most vulnerable populations for human trafficking are young women between the ages of 18 and 24, low income or unemployed persons, and those with less education and problematic family relations. According to NGO estimates, Roma account for approximately 15 percent of victims. Roma children are more vulnerable to being trafficked for begging and delinquency and Roma women are vulnerable to being trafficked for sexual exploitation. NGOs report that female students, particularly from high-schools or universities specializing in dance, have recently become more vulnerable to trafficking.

— E. Law enforcement and NGOs identify four types of traffickers: freelancers, independent pimps (who usually control 2 to 5 victims), partner associations (typically comprised of 2 to 9 traffickers who control up to 7 victims each), and organized crime networks. Freelancers and independent pimps have limited access to territories outside Bulgaria, while partner associations and OC groups largely control the international trafficking. Bulgarian victims are lured by promises of profitable work, often through close friends, acquaintances, or boyfriends. In some cases victims are recruited through false job offers for receptionists, waitresses, models or au pairs. Some victims directly approach the traffickers and voluntarily accept to work as companions but are later exploited.

Occasionally victims are kidnapped, forced to pay back unreasonable debts, or are sold by their relatives. Both Bulgarian and foreign trafficking victims generally use genuine rather than forged documents and cross borders legally. Victims are also moved frequently from one place to another, avoiding detection by authorities for undocumented stays. Children trafficked abroad generally travel with the full consent of their parents as required by Bulgarian border control.


— A. The government acknowledges that human trafficking is a problem in the country.

— B. The Commission, which by law is comprised of deputy ministerial level representatives of different agencies, serves as the focal point for coordinating the government’s anti-trafficking efforts. The Commission is supported in its efforts by six local commissions, which are located in regions identified as major source or destination points for trafficking. In 2009, the Commission continued its energetic prevention campaign and stepped up efforts in the area of victim protection. On the prosecution front, the Ministry of Interior and the Prosecution Service maintained high rates of investigations against sex and labor traffickers.

— C. The government’s challenges to combat trafficking include an overly formalistic judicial process, inadequate compensation for government officials, and lingering public corruption. Different agencies within the Ministry of Interior have the authority to investigate trafficking cases. Some of the agencies’ local branches lack sufficient expertise or administrative capacity to handle complex investigations. Additionally, the lack of a centralized approach in investigating organized crime groups sometimes allows the groups’ leaders to conceal their criminal activities by sacrificing low to mid-level accomplices.

— D. The Commission regularly collects data from all relevant agencies to refine its prevention campaigns and training programs. The National Commission publishes an annual report of the government’s anti-trafficking efforts and hosts a quarterly meeting with international donors and local NGOs. These quarterly meetings provide a forum for sharing accomplishments and coordinating efforts.

— E. The government has a reliable system for birth registration. Regardless of ethnicity or social status, Bulgarian women have traditionally chosen to give birth at hospitals providing specialized medical care. According to latest studies 99.4 percent of all births take place at hospitals and are registered immediately thereafter. In 2009, the government continued to implement measures in order to meet EU Schengen requirements. As part of this effort, starting March 2010 the government will begin to re-register citizens, which is necessary for the issuance of new identity documents containing biometric data on all Bulgarian nationals.

— F. The government generally has the capabilities to gather data for law enforcement assessment. However, the lack of a systematic approach and modern equipment as well as the poor administrative capacity, especially at local level, are challenges acknowledged by the government. In part to overcome these challenges, the government establishment permanently functioning task forces in 2009, comprised of vetted law enforcement officers and prosecutors. These task forces are already running at full speed and target organized crime in a more systematic manner.


— A. Section IX of Bulgaria’s Criminal Code, which was adopted in 2002, specifically prohibits trafficking for both sexual and labor exploitation. The law covers internal and transnational forms of trafficking. The victims’ consent is not defense to trafficking charges under Bulgarian law, even when the victim is an adult. Amendments adopted in April 2009 increased punishments for traffickers. More specifically the government significantly increased fines for traffickers and increased the minimum time of imprisonment for internal trafficking. The law also increased the maximum prison sentence for international traffickers, repeat offenders, and organized crime group members. Changes to the law introduced specific penalties for the clients of minor prostitutes and for those who use trafficking victims for sexual abuse, forced labor, organ removal or servitude. The Criminal Code also punishes rape, slavery, forced prostitution and activities related to prostitution. Trafficking is among the offenses covered by the 2005 Asset Forfeiture Law, which allows for confiscation of illegally acquired property. Victims of trafficking can also sue for civil damages. The exact text of section IX, article 159 is included below.


Art. 159a.

(1) A person who gathers, transports, hides or receives individuals or groups of people in order to be used for vicious practice, involuntary servitude, seizure of body organs or to be kept under compulsory submission regardless of their consent, shall be punished by imprisonment of two to eight years and a fine from three thousand to twelve thousand levs.

(2) When the act under para 1 is committed:

1. regarding a person under eighteen years of age;

2. by compulsion or by deceiving the person;

3. by kidnapping or illegal deprivation of freedom;

4. by using a state of dependence;

5. by malfeasance;

6. by promising, providing or obtaining benefit,

the punishment shall be imprisonment of three to ten years and a fine from ten thousand to twenty thousand levs.

(3) In case the act under para 1 has been committed with regards to a pregnant woman with the purpose of selling the child, the punishment shall be imprisonment of three to fifteen years and a fine of twenty thousand to fifty thousand levs.


Art. 159b

A person who gathers, transports, hides or receives individuals or groups of people and transfers them through the border of the country with the purpose under art. 159a, para 1 shall be punished by imprisonment of three to twelve years and a fine from ten thousand to twenty thousand levs.

(2) If the act under para 1 is committed under the conditions of art. 159a, para 2 and 3 the punishment shall be imprisonment of five to twelve years and a fine from twenty thousand to fifty thousand levs.


Art. 159c.

Whoever uses a person, victim of traffic of people, for acts of debauchery, for forced labor, for deprivation of corporal organs or to be kept in forced obedience regardless of his consent shall be punished by imprisonment from three to ten years and fine from ten thousand to twenty thousand levs.


Art. 159d.

When the act under art. 159a – 159c represents a dangerous recidivism or it has been committed by an errand or in fulfillment of a decision of an organized criminal group the punishment shall be imprisonment of five to fifteen years and a fine from twenty to one hundred thousand levs, as the court can also rule confiscation of a part or of the entire property of the offender.

— B-C. All forms of human trafficking are equally penalized, regardless of the form of exploitation. The punishment for trafficking in persons is two to eight years in prison and fines up to approximately USD 8,800 (BGN 12,000). If aggravated circumstances exist — e.g., a minor or kidnapping was involved — penalties increase to three to ten years in prison and fines of up to approximately USD 14,700 (BGN 20,000). Penalties for trafficking persons across borders increased to three to 12 years imprisonment and fines of up to approximately USD 14,700 (BGN 20,000). The same increased punishment is provided for trafficking of pregnant women for the purpose of baby selling. If the act of trafficking is carried out in connection with an organized crime group or constituted a serious repeat offense, penalties increase to five to 15 years imprisonment with fines of up to approximately USD 74,000 (BGN 100,000) and the possibility of forfeiture of assets. Labor recruiters and employers who falsely entice workers or forcibly hold them in the destination countries can be punished with up to ten years imprisonment.

— D. Sentences for rape range between two and eight years imprisonment; sentences increase to between three and ten years if the perpetrator is a repeat offender, or if the victim is underage or a close relative. In cases where rape results in serious bodily injury or suicide of the victim, sentences range between ten and 20 years.

— E. In 2009, the prosecution service investigated a total of 226 trafficking cases, 21 of which involved forced labor. Of the 226 cases, 95 were from previous years and 131 were launched in 2009. Of the 131 newly launched investigations, 122 of them concerned trafficking for sexual exploitation and nine dealt with labor exploitation. In 2009, prosecutors filed indictments against two labor traffickers, including one foreigner, and 79 sex traffickers, including 2 foreigners. A total of 97 persons were convicted on trafficking charges. Of the 97, 94 were sentenced for trafficking for sexual exploitation and three for labor exploitation. Fourteen people were convicted based on a new provision which criminalized the use of trafficking victims for sexual abuse. Fifty-one of the traffickers received effective sentences, 45 received suspended sentences and one was sentenced to probation. Thirty-seven traffickers received fines in addition to their sentences. Offenders convicted of trafficking generally served the full sentences mandated by the court. In some of the cases, the prosecutors pressed multiple charges against the perpetrators, and where there was not sufficient evidence to prove the trafficking charges, the perpetrators were prosecuted for enticement into prostitution. In January 2010, the police arrested six people for sexually abusing 12 boys ages 12 to 16 years who were recruited through the Internet. The investigation is ongoing.

— F. The government and NGOs trained law enforcement officers on investigating trafficking and differentiating between trafficking victims and offenders. As part of its regular curriculum, the National Institute of Justice, the government’s magistrates’ training institution, trained 34 judges and 19 prosecutors on organized crime issues, including human trafficking and trans-border crimes. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) trained 60 Bulgarian labor inspectors on issues such as trafficking victim identification, sectors most vulnerable to trafficking exploitation, protection mechanisms, and penalization of violators. IOM also trained 60 law enforcement officers on trafficking victim identification and referral and migration management.

— G. The Bulgarian government cooperated with other governments in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases. The MOI Border Police unit cooperated with counterparts in Poland, Great Britain, Belgium and Greece. The MOI anti-organized crime unit held 17 joint investigations targeting human traffickers with law enforcement from Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Great Britain.

— H. Bulgarian law allows extradition of both foreign nationals and Bulgarian citizens. In 2009, the government initiated 33 extradition cases on trafficking charges. Of them, four were against foreigners and 33 against Bulgarian nationals.

— I. Corruption is by far Bulgaria’s biggest challenge with numerous allegations of government officials providing “no look” protection to organized crime figures, including traffickers. The new government, which won the July 2009 elections on an anti-corruption platform, has made strides against corrupt practices, including launching investigations against four former ministers and several other high-level officials. The new government also replaced 26 of the 28 regional police chiefs and established permanently functioning joint police-prosecutors investigative teams targeting major organized crime figures.

— J. In 2008 police arrested 24 members of an organized crime group involved in human trafficking and money laundering in the coastal city of Varna. Three of the group’s members were elected government officials and served on the city council at the time of their arrest. In June 2009 two of the municipal councilors, a father and a son, plea bargained and received a three-year and one-year effective sentences, which they are currently serving. A total of 19 members of the group plea bargained and received reduced sentences. The trial is ongoing against one municipal councilor and four members of the group, who refused to plea-bargain.

Additionally, nine out of eleven officers of the local anti-organized crime unit in Vratsa were dismissed from office on suspicion of aiding a trafficking group. In February, the government arrested the Head of the Migration unit within the Interior Ministry for reportedly aiding a criminal group in securing Bulgarian identity documents for foreigners smuggled in Bulgaria.

— K. Reporting not applicable to Bulgaria

— L. Bulgaria does not have an identified child sex tourism problem. However, resort areas along the Black sea coast and border towns, especially with Greece, are destination points for internal sexual exploitation. Trafficking victims in these areas are often young girls between 14 and 18, who are considered children under Bulgarian law. The Prosecution service identified 18 children victims of sexual exploitation in 2009. In October 2009 the court sentenced an Australian pedophile to five years and six months imprisonment. The Australian was arrested in November 2008 for performing acts of debauchery with three Bulgarian minors in the coastal city of Varna and videotaping them. A Bulgarian national was also sentenced to nine months imprisonment for aiding the Australian to get in contact with the victims. In March 2009, prosecutors filed in court an indictment against an Italian national accused of pedophilia. The trial against him is ongoing. In September 2009, police arrested a German pensioner who was videotaping naked Bulgarian minors of Roma origin who were between four and eight years old for an Internet pedophile forum. The investigation against the German is ongoing as is the investigation against national of Great Britain who was arrested on charges of pedophilia in December 2009. Bulgarian Criminal Code has extraterritorial coverage and Bulgarian nationals are punishable for child abuse abroad.


— A. The government provides victims with shelter, counseling, medical, and legal assistance, consistent with its laws.

— B-C. Bulgaria has six state-run children’s shelters and one adults’ shelter which are accessible to victims of trafficking. Additionally several NGO’s, including Animus (Sofia), Samaritans (Stara Zagora), SOS Families at Risk (Varna), Diva (Plovdiv), Open Door (Pleven), and Demetra (Burgas) have care facilities and offer legal, medical and psychological service to victims of trafficking.

The Government rents facilities to NGOs, at below market rates and provides police protection for NGO-operated safe houses. Several local governments, including in Varna and Pazardzhik, outsource provision of social services to NGOs by allocating them premises and funding. Each of the six children’s shelters offers psychological and medical assistance to  victims and has the capacity to shelter ten kids between ages six and 18 years for a period of up to six months. The government provides an annual state allowance of 7,750 ($5,000) BGN/year per child. NGOs and government agencies do not distinguish between foreign and Bulgarian citizens in providing assistance to trafficking victims. The Commission is finalizing standards for minimum care that all facilities should offer to trafficking victims.

— D. The 2003 Anti-Trafficking Act created a special immigration status for foreign trafficking victims who cooperate in trafficking investigations. The status provides for full residency and employment rights until the end of criminal proceedings. For foreign citizen victims who choose not to cooperate in trafficking investigations, the GOB provides ten days plus one month for recovery before they are returned to their country of origin. The recovery period for foreign citizen child victims is ten days plus two months.

— E. The government shelters children victims of trafficking for a period of up to six months. The shelter’s social workers seek to ensure the safe return of the children to their biological families after this period expires and, whenever necessary, to find them accommodation in a specialized institution or a foster family.

— F. The government has an institutionalized referral process for children victims of trafficking and law enforcement routinely referred children victims to the six state-run shelters. Law enforcement referred adult victims to NGOs. In 2009, the Commission continued to work with NGOs in a multinational project funded by the Dutch government to develop a transnational referral mechanism. The Commission is currently finalizing a set of standard operative procedures under this mechanism.

— G. In 2009, the government identified 289 victims of trafficking, of which 44 were minors. Of the children victims, 40 were sexually exploited and four were labor exploited. All children victims received government-funded assistance. Of the adult victims, 213 were women and 32 were male. Of the 32 men, 28 were victims of labor exploitation and five men were sexually exploited. 202 women were victims of sexual exploitation and 11 were labor exploited. In 2009, IOM assisted 47 victims of trafficking, two of whom were foreign nationals. Forty of the assisted were victims of sexual exploitation and seven were victims of labor exploitation. Animus NGO assisted 45 adult victims referred by law enforcement or their sister organizations throughout Europe.

— H. Bulgarian law enforcement, particularly border police, have been trained on victim identification and have a system for screening potential victims. Prostitution is not specifically legalized in Bulgaria.

— I. NGOs reported that victims’ rights were respected, according to international norms. Victims were generally not detained, fined, or prosecuted for minor offenses with one notable exception involving two Moldovan women who received a six month suspended sentence for illegal border crossing. The two were meanwhile referred to IOM for assistance but the charges against them were not dropped.

— J. The government encourages victims to assist in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases and provides special status for foreign citizen victims who cooperate. Victims can also file civil suits for material and moral damages suffered and generally victims have unimpeded access to such redress. Victim witnesses are permitted to obtain other employment or leave the country pending trial proceedings. Trafficking victims who have not been compensated through judicial process can seek redress for material damages from a special government fund. The fund is operated by a National Council under the Ministry of Justice which allocates compensations from BGN 250 (approximately USD 170) to BGN 5,000 (approximately USD 3,520) to victims of a specified list of crimes, including trafficking.

— K. The government provides training for government officials on identifying and assisting trafficking victims. In 2009, experts of the Commission made presentations to Border police, school teachers, and social workers at the children shelters. The Police Academy under the Ministry of Interior has included human trafficking course in its standard curriculum for police officers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Institute includes a module on trafficking in its courses for junior diplomats and consular officers as well as officers from the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and the Military Academy. The officers posted to Bulgarian embassies and consulates are taught how to recognize trafficking victims and how to refer victims to NGOs for legal, medical and psychological assistance. In 2009, the IOM helped repatriate and provided social assistance to three adults and three children who were victims of labor exploitation in Spain. All of the victims were referred to IOM by the Bulgarian embassy in Madrid.

— L. The Government provides medical aid, shelter, psychological, and reintegration assistance, as well as education to children victims of trafficking. It refers repatriated adult trafficking victims to NGOs for legal, medical and psychological aid. The Anti-Trafficking Act provides for repatriated Bulgarian trafficking victims to receive the same assistance and care as trafficking victims identified within the country.

— M. The IOM and NGOs, including Animus, Nadia Center Foundation, Samaritans, Diva, and SOS Families at Risk provided medical, legal, psychological and reintegration assistance to trafficking victims. IOM and NGOs report strong cooperation with Government officials, on a national and local level. The government supported and protected organization conducting awareness/prevention campaigns.


— A. In 2009, the government organized and/or supported numerous public awareness programs on national and local level. In October 2009, the Commission launched an Open Door campaign by opening its office to students every Friday. In 2009, the Commission hosted 350 students who received information brochures and participated in video screenings and discussions. The Commission also organized a student contest for trafficking awareness presenting 50 awards for anti-trafficking illustrations and 30 awards for best essays. The local commission in Varna, in partnership with an employment agency and local universities, organized a prevention campaign against labor exploitation titled “Where are you travelling?”. Experts at the local commission in Burgas held discussions with students. The local commission in Sliven held a charity concert under the slogan “There is always a choice” and organized in partnership with the local theater a prevention campaign for the visitors of the autumn theater festival. The government also opened three information centers under the local commissions in Varna, Burgas and Pazardzhik.

— B. The National Border Police actively monitors airports and land border crossings for evidence of trafficking in persons. However, effective monitoring of immigration and emigration patterns is hampered by visa-free travel between Bulgaria and its neighbors.

— C. The Commission is a multi-agency body specifically tasked with coordinating Bulgaria’s anti-trafficking efforts. The Commission’s secretariat ensures effective communication between the various agencies represented on the Commission and serves as the main point of contact for international and local partners on trafficking issues. Under the leadership of the Commission’s secretariat, an expert advisory group, with representatives from all member agencies, meets regularly to address operational issues. The Commission’s secretariat also hosts quarterly meetings of a coordination group, comprised of international donors and NGO representatives, to advance anti-trafficking efforts.

— D. The government adopts annually a plan of action for combating human trafficking. The 2009 plan was approved by the Council of Ministers in April 2009. It was developed in consultation with all relevant government agencies, as well as NGOs and the IOM.

— E-F. In April 2009, the government introduced penalties for the clients of children prostitutes and also criminalized the use of trafficking victims for sexual abuse. The government sentenced six persons under these new provisions. As described above, Bulgarian Criminal Code has extraterritorial coverage and applies to Bulgarian clients of minor prostitutes abroad.


— A. In 2009, the Bulgarian government cooperated with the Norwegian government under a joint police cooperation project aimed at increasing police capacity to handle trafficking cases. The government also implemented a bilateral police project with the Dutch government.

— B. Bulgaria is one of four source countries, along with Albania, Macedonia and Romania, which implements a project aimed at developing a transnational referral mechanism for trafficking victims. The project also promotes sharing of best practices among the eight cooperating countries.




DE RUEHSF #0123/01 0531526


P 221526Z FEB 10











ADDED 2011-06-29 12:00:00

STAMP 2011-06-29 20:39:13










Der Ifpi-Chef Beat Högger tritt zurück

Tuesday, June 28th, 2011

Beat Högger, der Geschäftsführer des mächtigen Schweizer Produzentenverbandes Ifpi Schweiz, ist zurückgetreten. Grund ist eine Affäre, die eine Recherche der «Aargauer Zeitung» anfang April publik machte.

Beat Högger, der Geschäftsführer des mächtigen Schweizer Produzentenverbandes Ifpi Schweiz, ist zurückgetreten. Högger und die Ifpi sind in den letzten Wochen vor allem wegen des Vorwurfs der Manipulation der Schweizer Hitparade und einer Weko-Untersuchung in die Schlagzeilen geraten.

Das hat aber nicht zu seiner Demission geführt. Wie der Verband mitteilte, hat sich Högger «aufgrund aktueller Diskussionen um eine Nebentätigkeit in einer privaten Unternehmung entschlossen, sein Amt als Geschäftsführer der Ifpi niederzulegen».

Die az hat diese Affäre am 2. April publik gemacht.

Bei der privaten Unternehmung handelt es sich um die Zürcher Firma IPGate, die das geistige Eigentum einer deutschen Erfinderfamilie verwertet. Statthalter in Zürich ist Högger. Um in den Genuss eines sechsstelligen Steuerabzuges zu kommen, musste die Firma nachweisen, dass sie aktiv, also keine Briefkastenfirma, ist. Dazu liess sich Högger etwas einfallen: Er liess zwei Ifpi-Angestellte über IPGate entlöhnen, der Ifpi-Vorstand akzeptierte dies.

Der Trick funktionierte: Das Bundeszentralamt für Steuern in Bonn überwies der IPGate die geforderten 316500 Euro. Die Dokumente liegen der az vor.

Diese Fakten erregten in Deutschland Misstrauen, und Steuerbeamte begannen, zu ermitteln. Die az hatte die Ifpi mit den Vorwürfen konfrontiert. Sie wollte zu konkreten Fragen aber keine Stellung nehmen. (cbk)

© az Aargauer Zeitung, 28.06.2011

«Wie im Wilden Westen»: Fiat-Bank lässt Privat-Schnüffler von der Leine

Saturday, June 25th, 2011

Die Leasing-Pleite von SAR Premium Cars eskaliert. Deren Finanzierungspartner Fidis Finance hetzte Kunden Privatdetektive auf den Hals. Mit seltsamen Methoden fahndeten die Schlapphüte nach Luxusautos, die Fidis abhanden kamen. von Pascal Meier und Christian Bütikofer

Kurz vor Pfingsten bekommt Franziska Müller* Besuch der anderen Art. Als sie zufällig aus dem Fenster aufs Gelände ihres Grundstücks schaut, sieht sie einen wildfremden Mann über ihr Auto gebeugt. Der fotografiert selenruhig die Fahrgestellnummer, die unter der Windschutzscheibe steckt. Als sie ihm aus dem Fenster zuruft, was er da tue, will er sich aus dem Staub machen.

Doch er hat die Rechnung ohne einen geistesgegenwärtigen Handwerker gemacht. Dieser eilt Franziska Müller zu Hilfe und stoppt den Unbekannten noch auf dem Anwesen am Eingangstor.

Es kommt zu einem kurzen Handgemenge, dem Unbekannten fällt eine Pistole aus der Tasche. Doch er kann entkommen, hechtet in einen bereitstehenden Jeep mit getönten Scheiben und braust davon. Wie er sich Zutritt aufs Anwesen verschaffen konnte, ist Franziska Müller nicht klar.

Der Unbekannte hat einen Namen: Maurizio C., Boss der EVO Security Group. Deren Kundenversprechen: «Operative Sicherheitsdienstleistungen» und «absolute Diskretion». Jetzt hat er eine Anzeige wegen Hausfriedensbruchs am Hals.

Chaotische Zustände

Recherchen dieser Zeitung zeigen: EVO handelte im Auftrag der Fidis Finance, der Finanzierungsbank der Fiat-Gruppe. Es scheint, als herrsche in deren Büros am Firmensitz in Schlieren seit Wochen das pure Chaos.

Dutzende Mitarbeiter suchen in der ganzen Schweiz nach Leasing-Fahrzeugen, die Fidis Finance in Zusammenarbeit mit der Aargauer Garage SAR Premium Cars vorfinanziert hatte. Dabei geht es um Millionenbeträge. Denn die Garage in Dintikon war eine der besten Adressen für Oberklasse- und Luxus-Autos. Deren Besitzer Riccardo Santoro konnte jahrelang Ferraris, Maseratis und Benleys zu konkurrenzlos günstigen Konditionen anbieten.

Während immer mehr Personen aus Wirtschaft, Politik und Sport bei Santoros Garage ein- und ausgingen, zerbrach sich die Konkurrenz den Kopf, wie dieses Leasingsystem rentieren kann.

Gerechnet hat es sich offenbar nicht, denn Santoro tauchte Ende Mai plötzlich unter und seine SAR ist offenbar pleite. Nun liegen bei Fidis Finance die Nerven blank. Anders ist es nicht zu erklären, dass weitere Schlapphüte auch einem SAR-Kunden in der Ostschweiz nachstellten.

Dessen Kind entdeckte eines Abends einen Mann, der ums Haus schlich. Der alarmierten Polizei gab er sich als Privatdetektiv zu erkennen. Er sollte für die Fidis prüfen, ob die Zielperson ein bestimmtes Fahrzeug besitze.

Pikant: Unter den Privatdetektiven befindet sich Personal, das bereits selbst mit Konkursen und Betreibungen einschlägige Erfahrungen sammeln konnte.

«Es wird alles mitgenommen!»

Offensichtlich hat Fidis in vielen Fällen keine Ahnung, wo ihre Fahrzeuge sind und welche Verträge mit wem bestehen. Dies zeigte der 25. Mai exemplarisch, als Fidis in einer Nacht-und-Nebel-Aktion 17 Sattelschlepper zu Santoro nach Dintikon schickte und Fahrzeuge bei der SAR im Dutzend abholte.

Männer in Anzügen stiegen aus Limousinen und rannten mit Listen zwischen den Fahrzeugen hin und her. Es herrschte eine aufgeladene Stimmung: «Es wird alles mitgenommen!», brüllte einer über den Platz. Darauf wurden immer mehr Fahrzeuge auf die Sattelschlepper gehoben – darunter auch Autos, bei denen fraglich ist, ob sie Fidis gehörten. «Ein Mann hat herumgeschrien und andere versuchten ihre Fahrzeuge zu blockieren», erinnert sich ein Beteiligter.

Aufgeladen wurde auch der Oldtimer von Peter Christen*. Der Unternehmer hatte ihn von Riccardo Santoro gekauft und über 200’000 Franken bezahlt. Jetzt ist das Fahrzeug weg. «Mir wurde nur gesagt, dass die Fidis kein kleiner Fisch sei und deshalb alles mitgenommen werde», sagte Christen. Vertröstet wurde er mit den Worten, dass später alles zurückgegeben werde, was nicht der Fidis gehöre. «Das war wie im Wilden Westen», meinte Christen.

Das grosse Schweigen

Gegenüber Santoros Kunden markieren Fidis-Verantwortliche den starken Mann. Auf sämtliche Anfragen dieser Zeitung aber zogen es Fidis und ihr langjähriger Manager Kurt Meier vor, nicht zu antworten.

Auch die Fiat-Pressestelle in Turin bleibt stumm wie ein Fisch. Nicht einmal «Kein Kommentar» brachten die Italiener über die Lippen.

Da ist der diskrete Privatermittler Maurizio C. schon deutlich kommunikativer: Nach gefühlten zehn Sekunden Gesprächszeit hängt er einfach das Telefon auf.

*Namen der Redaktion bekannt

© az Aargauer Zeitung, 25.06.2011

North Corea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank and Lloyds TSB Bank-Geneva

Thursday, June 9th, 2011
2009-05-12 23:23:00
Secretary of State
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 048525 



REFS: A) 06 STATE 055463 B) 08 ABU DHABI 000325 C) 08 STATE 30247 D) 08 SEOUL 650 E) 08 SEOUL 1207 F) 06 STATE 180512 G) 07 STATE 064579 H) 07 ABU DHABI 873 I) 07 STATE 162279 J) 09 STATE 19783 K) 08 STATE 123035 L) 06 STATE 43354 M) 06 SINGAPORE 3187 N) 06 MOSCOW 12396 O) 06 BERLIN 1285

Classified by: ISN Acting A/S C.S. Eliot Kang for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.


¶2. (SBU) In response to the April 5, 2009 launch of a Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) ballistic missile by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), the UN Security Council issued a Presidential Statement (PRST) on April 13, 2009. The PRST stated that the TD-2 launch was in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 and indicated the Security Councils agreement to adjust the sanctions measures imposed by paragraph 8 of the resolution through the designation of entities and goods. If the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee did not act by April 24, the PRST indicated that the Security Council itself would do so by April 30. On April 24, the Sanctions Committee designated three DPRK entities to be subject to the asset freeze provisions in paragraph 8 (d) of UNSCR 1718. These entities are: Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (Ryonbong), and Tanchon Commercial Bank. The United States wants to provide background and identifier information to all States on the newly designated entities and their affiliates, and urge States to implement immediately the asset freeze obligations of UNSCR 1718 to prevent further proliferation-related activities by the DPRK. Under paragraph 8(d) of UNSCR 1718, the asset freeze provisions also apply to funds, financial assets, and economic resources that are owned or controlled directly or indirectly by designated entities, and to persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of the designated entities.


¶3. (S/NF) All posts are requested to deliver the nonpaper in paragraph 4 to relevant host government officials in the foreign affairs and finance ministries. Embassies Abu Dhabi, Berlin, Bern, Cairo, Copenhagen, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Sanaa, Seoul, Singapore, and Stockholm are requested to deliver additional classified points in paragraph 5 as appropriate. Embassies Beijing, Kuala Lumpur, and Consulate Hong Kong are requested not to deliver this demarche. Washington is preparing a targeted demarche to these three posts with additional classified information that will be provided at a later date. The text of UNSCR 1718 can be found at under S/RES/1718 (2006). The text of the Presidential Statement (PRST) can be found at under S/PRST/2009/7 of 13 April 2009. The text of the Security Council determination of items and entities subject to measures imposed in Resolution 1718 can be found at: tm. Posts should pursue the following objectives:

— Note the new designations of Tanchon Commercial Bank, KOMID, and Ryonbong and provide host governments with
background and identifier information on these entities and their affiliates.

— Urge host government officials to investigate whether these entities have a presence in their jurisdiction and, if so, request that they immediately freeze the assets of the three designees, as well as any funds, other financial assets or economic resources that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the designated entities and those of persons or entities acting on the behalf of or at the direction of designated entities, per UNSCR 1718.

— Recommend host government officials also take steps to prevent their nationals or persons or entities within their territories from engaging in transactions with those designated entities, per UNSCR 1718.

FOR Embassies Abu Dhabi, Berlin, Bern, Cairo, Copenhagen, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Seoul, Singapore, and Stockholm:

— Urge host government officials to investigate whether financial institutions within their jurisdiction maintain correspondent relationships with Tanchon Commercial Bank, and ensure that any Tanchon correspondent accounts are frozen.

For Embassies Abu Dhabi and Sanaa:

— Request host governments to refrain from engaging in any cooperation with KOMID.


— In response to the April 5, 2009 launch of a Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), the UN Security Council issued a Presidential Statement (PRST) on April 13, 2009. The PRST stated that the TD-2 launch was in contravention of UNSCR 1718 and indicated the Security Councils agreement to adjust the sanctions measures imposed by that resolution. If the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee did not act by April 24, the Security Council indicated that it would do so itself. On April 24, the Sanctions Committee designated three DPRK entities to be subject to the asset freeze provisions in paragraph 8 (d) of UNSCR 1718. These entities are: Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (Ryonbong), and Tanchon Commercial Bank.


— The United States is urging immediate enforcement of the sanctions in paragraph 8(d) of UNSCR 1718 against the newly designated entities. Paragraph 8(d) of UNSCR 1718 instructs Member States to “freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the persons or entities designated by the Committee or by the Security Council… or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction.” Member States must also “ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available [to the designated entities] by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities.”

— With the designation of these three DPRK entities pursuant to UNSCR 1718, it is each States responsibility to ensure that the requirements of paragraph 8(d) are implemented immediately with respect to these entities and persons and entities acting on their behalf or at their direction.

— We urge you to investigate whether there are any assets belonging to these entities in your jurisdiction, and ensure that they are immediately frozen.

— We also urge you to take steps to prevent nationals or persons or entities within your territory from engaging in transactions with those designated entities unless approved as an allowable exemption.

— We specifically request that you investigate whether
financial institutions in your jurisdiction maintain correspondent relationships with Tanchon Commercial Bank, and ensure that any Tanchon correspondent accounts are frozen.

— The newly designated North Korean entities are vital to the progress of the DPRKs ballistic missile and other weapons programs.

— In addition to implementing the asset freeze pursuant to Resolution 1718, we ask you remain vigilant and ensure that no North Korean proliferation-related activities and transactions whatsoever take place in your jurisdiction.

— We look forward to working with your government to ensure full implementation of UNSCR 1718, as well as the additional measures described above.

——————————————— ——-
——————————————— ——-

— The Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) is North Koreas primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. KOMID offices are located in multiple countries and facilitate weapons sales while seeking new customers. The United States has repeatedly applied sanctions to the KOMID organization over the past ten years for trading in missile technology.

— In June 2005, KOMID was designated by the President in the Annex to U.S. Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” for material contributions to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery.

— E.O. 13382, issued on June 28, 2005, blocks the assets under U.S. jurisdiction of foreign persons and entities named in the Executive Order or subsequently designated by the U.S. Departments of Treasury or State for materially contributing to (or for posing a risk of materially contributing to) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; for providing or attempting to provide financial or other support to such proliferation activities; or for being owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, another designee. In addition to the asset freeze, E.O. 13382 prohibits all transactions between any U.S. person and the designated persons and entities.

— Identifier information for KOMID is as follows: a.k.a. Changgwang Sinyong Corporation; a.k.a External Technology Trading Corporation; a.k.a. North Korean Mining Development Trading Corporation; a.k.a. KOMID, Central District, Pyongyang, North Korea.

— In October 2005, two KOMID subsidiaries, Hesong Trading Corporation and Tosong Technology Trading Corporation, were also designated under E.O. 13382. Both Hesong and Tosong are located in Pyongyang, North Korea.


— Tanchon Commercial Bank, headquartered in Pyongyang, assumed from Korea Changgwang Credit Bank Corporation (KCCBC) the role as the main DPRK financial agent for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Since the late 1980s, Tanchon Commercial Bank and its predecessor, KCCBC, have collected revenue from weapons-related sales that were concentrated in a handful of countries mainly located in the Middle East and several African states. These revenues provide the DPRK with a significant portion of its export earnings and financially aid the DPRKs own development of nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction- related, and ballistic missile-related programs and arms-related purchases.

— Tanchon has been involved in financing ballistic missile sales from KOMID to Irans Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). SHIG is the Iranian organization charged with developing Irans liquid- fueled ballistic missile program and is designated under UNSCR 1737 for an asset freeze similar to that in UNSCR 1718.

— Since 2005, Tanchon has maintained an active relationship with Irans Bank Sepah, which is linked to the provision of extensive financial services to Irans ballistic missile program and was also designated by the UN Security Council in the annex of UNSCR 1747 for an asset freeze.

— Tanchon was also designated by the President of the United States in the annex to E.O. 13382.

— Identifier information for Tanchon Commercial Bank is as follows: f.k.a. Changgwang Credit Bank; f.k.a. Korea Changgwang Credit Bank, Saemul 1-Dong Pyonchon District, Pyongyang, North Korea.


— The DPRK defense conglomerate Korea Ryonbong General Corporation specializes in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support to that countrys military- related sales. An English-language DPRK trade journal (Foreign Trade of the DPRK) has carried advertisements from International Chemical, a subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong General Trading Corporation, offering ammonium diuranate (ADU), a processed form of yellowcake, for sale on the international market.

— Identifier information for Korea Ryonbong General Trading Corporation is as follows: a.k.a. Korea Yonbong General Corporation; f.k.a. Lyongaksan General Trading Corporation, Potonggang District, Pyongyang, North Korea; Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, North Korea.

— Korea Ryonbong General Trading Corporation was also designated by the President in the annex to E.O. 13382. On October 21, 2005, six DPRK entities that are subsidiaries of Korea Ryonbong, were were also designated under E.O. 13382. These entities are:

– Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company. a.k.a. Chosun International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; a.k.a. International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation; a.k.a. Choson International Chemicals Joint Operation Company, Hamhung, South Hangyong Province, North Korea; Mangyongdae-kuyok, Pyongyang, North Korea; Mangyungdae-gu, Pyongyang, North Korea. Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company is a subsidiary company of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation.

– Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation. a.k.a. Korea Ryenha Machinery J/V Corporation; a.k.a. Chosun Yunha Machinery Joint Operation Company; a.k.a. Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation), Central District, Pyongyang,North Korea; Mangungdae-gu, Pyongyang, North Korea; Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, North Korea. Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation is a subsidiary company of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation.

– Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation, Rakwon- dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, North Korea. Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation is a subsidiary company of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation.

– Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation, Rakwon-dong, Porhonggang District, Pyongyang, North Korea. Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation is a subsidiary company of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation.

– Korea Pugang Trading Corporation, Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, North Korea. Korea Pugang Trading Corporation is a subsidiary company of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation.

– Korea Ryongwang Trading Corporation. a.k.a. Korea Ryengwang Trading Corporation), Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, North Korea. Korea Ryongwang Trading Corporation is a subsidiary company of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation.




FOR UAE, SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN, EGYPT, DENMARK, UNITED KINGDOM, RUSSIA, INDIA, SOUTH KOREA, SINGAPORE: — In 2006 (REF A, L), we noted our concern that Tanchon maintained one or more correspondent accounts in your jurisdiction.

— Given the continuation of DPRK proliferation activities and the designation of these three entities to be subject to the measures in paragraph 8(d) of UNSCR 1718, we strongly reiterate our request that you use the following information to take action to close such an account, in order to prevent North Korea from using your jurisdiction to facilitate proliferation-related financial transactions.

FOR DENMARK ONLY: — We previously raised with you in March 2006 our concern (REF L) that Tanchon Commercial Bank maintained a correspondent account with Den Danske Bank AS- Copenhagen. According to April 2009 Bankers Almanac information, Tanchon still maintains that account.

FOR SWEDEN ONLY: — We previously raised with you in March 2006 our concern (REF L) that Tanchon Commercial Bank maintained a correspondent account with Nordea Bank Sweden- Stockholm, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken-Stockholm, and Svenska Handelsbanken-Stockholm. According to April 2009 Bankers Almanac information, Tanchon still maintains all three accounts.

FOR SWITZERLAND ONLY: — We previously raised with you in March 2006 our concern (REF L) that Tanchon Commercial Bank maintained a correspondent account with Lloyds TSB Bank-Geneva. According to April 2009 Bankers Almanac information, Tanchon still maintains that account.

FOR UNITED KINGDOM ONLY: — We previously raised with you in March 2006 our concern (REF L) that Tanchon Commercial Bank has correspondent accounts with Bank of China International- London, British Arab Commercial Bank-London, Havin Bank- London, HSBC Bank Plc.-London, Lloyds TSB Bank-London, Moscow Narodny Bank-London, and National Bank of Egypt International-London. According to April 2009 Bankers Almanac information, Tanchon still maintains those accounts.

FOR EGYPT ONLY: — We previously raised with you in April 2006 our concern (REF A) that Tanchon Commercial Bank maintains a correspondent account with National Bank of Egypt; Cairo, Egypt. According to April 2009 Bankers Almanac information, Tanchon still maintains that account.

— We strongly urge Egypt to refrain from engaging in any cooperation with KOMID, particularly in light of this UN designation under UNSCR 1718.

FOR INDIA ONLY: — We previously raised with you in April 2006 our concern (REF A) that Tanchon Commercial Bank maintains a correspondent account with State Bank of India; Mumbai, India. According to April 2009 Bankers Almanac information, Tanchon still maintains that account.

FOR SINGAPORE ONLY: — We previously raised with you in 2006 our concern that Tanchon Commercial Bank maintains correspondent accounts with Deutsche Bank AG; Singapore (REF A) and United Overseas Bank Limited; Singapore (REF M). You reported to us (Ref M) that the Tanchon account at UOB had been closed, but according to April 2009 Bankers Almanac information, Tanchon still maintains accounts at Overseas Bank Limited and Deutsche Bank.

— We are requesting confirmation that this account remains closed, and request that you ensure that any Tanchon correspondent accounts in your jurisdiction are frozen.

FOR GERMANY ONLY: — We previously raised with you in April 2006 our concern (REF A) that Tanchon Commercial Bank maintains a correspondent banking account with Deutsche Bank AG- Singapore branch. You informed us in May 2006 that that account had been closed (REF O), but the April 2009 Bankers Almanac information indicates that Tanchon still maintains that account.

— We are requesting confirmation that this account remains closed, and request that you ensure that any Tanchon correspondent accounts in your jurisdiction are frozen.

FOR UAE ONLY: — In March 2008 (REF B, G, H, I), you told us that Tanchon Commercial Bank was not licensed to operate in the UAE and that the Central Bank had frozen its accounts in the UAE based on a U.S. request. We want to ensure that this is still the case and that Tanchon has not tried to renew its presence in UAE jurisdiction.

— We also have recently raised with you our concerns regarding recent KOMID activities in the UAE and urge you to refrain from engaging in any cooperation with KOMID, particularly in light of KOMIDs UNSC designation (REF K) under UNSCR 1718.

FOR YEMEN ONLY: — We have recently raised with you our concerns regarding information that KOMID may be involved in a Scud missile-related project in Yemen. We strongly urge the ROYG to refrain from engaging in any cooperation with KOMID, particularly in light of KOMIDs UNSC designation (REF J) under UNSCR 1718.

FOR ROK ONLY: — We have on numerous occasions discussed (REF C, D, E) the proliferation activities of Bank Mellat Seoul with you. We wish to highlight a point we previously raised (REF C), specifically that Hong Kong Electronics, almost certainly a front company for Tanchon Commercial Bank, has been involved in proliferation-related transactions with Bank Mellat Seoul.

— We note that the ROKs obligations under Resolution 1718 require it to freeze the assets of entities acting on the behalf of or at the direction of designated entities. We believe Hong Kong Electronics meets this criterion based on its demonstrated link to Tanchon, and we urge you to extend the asset freeze requirements of UNSCR 1718 to both Hong Kong Electronics and Bank Mellat Seoul.

FOR RUSSIA ONLY: — We previously raised with you in April 2006 our concern (REF A) that Tanchon Commercial Bank maintains a correspondent banking relationship with Bank for Foreign Trade (Vneshtorgbank) and Moscow Narodny bank-Singapore branch.

— You reported to us (REF N) that the Tanchon correspondent account at VTB had been closed and we are requesting confirmation that this account remains closed, and that any Tanchon correspondent accounts in your jurisdiction are blocked.



¶6. (U) Post should report results within seven business days of receipt of this cable. Please slug replies for ISN, T, EAP, and TREASURY. Please use the caption SIPDIS in all replies.

DE RUEHC #8525/01 1322338
O 122323Z MAY 09


2011-06-08 00:00:00
2011-06-09 13:27:19

EU’s Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)

Thursday, June 9th, 2011
2009-10-22 15:40:00
Embassy Berlin
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001324 



REF: A. BERLIN 1319 B. BERLIN 1207 C. BRUSSELS 1153 D. BERLIN 655 E. BERLIN 430 F. BERLIN 429 G. 08 BERLIN 899 H. 08 BERLIN 897 I. 08 BERLIN 264 J. 08 BERLIN 243

Classified By: Acting Global Affairs Unit Chief David L. Fisher for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Berry Smutny, the CEO of Germanys top satellite manufacturer, OHB-System, called the EUs Galileo global navigation satellite system (GNSS) “a waste of EU tax payers money championed by French interests.” Nevertheless, Smutny said his company would gladly accept contracts to build the satellites. Smutny anticipates the EU Commission (EC) will award his company a contract this December to build a significant portion of the Galileo satellites. According to a recent media report, the EC is scaling back the Galileo project by about 25 percent off the previously planned 30 satellites ($1.24 billion) due to budget overruns.

¶2. (C) On October 2, EconOffs met with OHB-System CEO, Mr. Berry Smutny for general consultations. Smutny became CEO of OHB-System in June of this year and was previously the CEO of Tesat Spacecom, a German subsidiary of the European Aeronautical Defense and Space Company (EADS). When Smutny arrived at the Berlin Embassy on October 2, he had just finished a high-level meeting with the German Transportation Ministry for Transportation, Building and Urban Development (BMVBS) to discuss OHB-systems bid on the Galileo satellite build contract. Smutny said the meeting went “very well” and his expectation is that OHB will be awarded 40-60 percent of the satellite build. END SUMMARY

——————————————— ———-

¶3. (C) Smutny stated frankly, “I think Galileo is a stupid idea that primarily serves French interests” given that GPS already supplies all of Europes position, navigation and timing (PNT) needs. He claimed the EU desire to develop a redundant but alternative to GPS was spearheaded by the French after an incident during the Kosovo Conflict when the US military “manipulated” GPS to support military operations (NFI). Since this time, he said France has aggressively corralled EU support to invest in Galileo development — something Smutny said France wants to ensure their missile guidance systems are free of any GPS reliance. Smutny added, the irony for German investment in Galileo is that some of Frances nuclear missiles are aimed at Berlin.

——————————————— ——–

¶4. (U) Space News reported that at an October 15-16 conference on European space policy, the EC announced they will reduce the number of Galileo satellites to be built from 28-30 to a maximum of 22 satellites due to cost overruns elsewhere in the program. In addition to soliciting a quote for the entire satellite build, the EC asked both OHB-System and Astrium-Satellites to quote blocks of eight and 16 satellites in the event that the contract is divided. Best-and-final offers are due in November and a final decision on the contract is expected in late December.

¶5. (C) Smutny said the EC is steadfast that the entire Galileo system stay within the allotted 3.4 billion euro budget. In Smutnys opinion, the EU has grossly underestimated the complexity of the complete Galileo system and additional cost overruns and schedule slips are likely. He said industry experts estimate the final Galileo cost to be about 6.5 billion euros (assuming the previously desired 32 satellite constellation), but in his opinion the finalcost will balloon to around 10 billion euro.


¶6. (C) Smutny said no matter how much the French would like Galileo to be built International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR)-free, this is highly unlikely given that there are not sufficient replacements for some radiation-hardened US ITAR-controlled components that Galileo will need. Smutny pointed out that the EU already strayed from the concept of a completely indigenous EU system when they procured the Galileo clock – the heart and soul of the system – from the SWISS. Smutny said he recommended early on that Galileo try an procure an US-origin clock, but this idea was immediately rejected by Galileo decision makers (NFI).

¶7. (C) Smutny feels that the Galileo program, as it currently looks, is either doomed for failure or will have to undergo drastic scalebacks for survival. He said OHB-System is serious about their bid and will deliver contracted product “on time, within budget, and per requirements” (something OHB-System has a good track record of), but his company is preparing for the possibility that the contracts will be canceled if the EC can no longer stomach the ballooning costs.



DE RUEHRL #1324/01 2951540
P 221540Z OCT 09


2011-06-09 02:00:00
2011-06-09 12:58:11


Ertönt Musik, klingeln die Kassen

Wednesday, June 8th, 2011

Aus aktuellem Anlass ein älterer Artikel zur CH-Musikszene und dem Urheberrecht, insbesondere die CH-Verwertungsgesellschaften. Die IFPI kommt da erst am Rande vor…

Wie Verwertungsgesellschaften vom Format einer Suisa ticken, ist vielen Leuten unbekannt. Die erhältlichen Zahlen zeigen, um welche Dimensionen es geht – und wer massgeblich profitiert.

Von Christian Bütikofer

Ob wir bei iTunes Lieder kaufen, im Internet Webradios hören, in Klubs abtanzen oder Klingeltöne fürs Handy herunterladen: Unsichtbar mit von der Partie sind immer auch die Verwertungsgesellschaften (VG, siehe eingerückter Teil am Artikelende.) .

Eine dieser VGs ist die Suisa (Suisse Auteurs). Sie ist die bekannteste schweizerische Verwertungsgesellschaft und schon über 80 Jahre alt. Die Musiklobby Suisa ist eine private Genossenschaft mit über 20 000 Mitgliedern. «Sie ist die Selbsthilfeorganisation der Schweizer Komponisten, Autoren und Musikverlage», sagt Suisa-Direktor Andreas Wegelin.

Die Genossenschaft ist auch fürs Image ihrer Mitglieder besorgt. Zwischen 1998 und 2005 gab sie 5,1 Millionen Franken für «Öffentlichkeitsarbeit» – also PR – aus.

Staatlich beaufsichtigte Monopole

Für viele Kunstgattungen gibt es in der Schweiz eine eigene Verwertungsgesellschaft, also eine Lobby für die Schriftsteller oder auch eine für die Filmautoren. Für jede Gattung gibt es nur eine VG – sie besitzt jeweils das Monopol.

Trotzdem können Verwertungsgesellschaften wie die Suisa nicht einfach nach Gutdünken bestimmen, wer wie viel für die Nutzung zahlen muss. So prüft und genehmigt die Eidgenössische Schiedskommission die Tarife, welche die VGs mit den Nutzerverbänden (z. B. dem Verband der Radiostationen oder der Lobbyorganisation der Tonträgerindustrie, IFPI) aushandeln.

Die VGs sind auch dem Eidgenössischen Institut für Geistiges Eigentum (IGE) Rechenschaft schuldig – die IGE überprüft die Geschäftsführung und erteilt den VGs die Bewilligung für ihre Arbeit.

Die Suisa ist ein Schwergewicht unter den VGs, beschäftigt rund 200 Mitarbeiter, die in der aktuellen Bilanz mit beinahe 20 Millionen Personalkosten etwa zwei Drittel des jährlichen Aufwands ausmachen. Ungefähr 20 Prozent der Einnahmen pro Jahr werden für die Verwaltung benötigt – «ein Wert, der sich durchaus im Rahmen des Üblichen befindet», wie Emanuel Meyer vom IGE meint. «Für uns sind 25 Prozent Verwaltungsaufwand und mehr die Alarmgrenze», sagt er. Weiter gibt Emanuel Meyer zu bedenken, dass letztlich die Mitglieder der Suisa jederzeit bestimmen können, wie viel Aufwand gerechtfertigt ist.

Zusätzlich zu den Schweizer Künstlern vertritt die Suisa auch das so genannte Weltrepertoire der Musik. Die Suisa schaut also darauf, dass Madonna zu ihrem Geld kommt, falls ihre Songs hier gespielt werden. Das ist möglich, weil die Suisa mit allen anderen Musik-VGs auf der ganzen Welt Verträge geschlossen hat, die es ihr erlauben, die Rechte dieser VGs in der Schweiz wahrzunehmen – im Gegenzug nehmen die anderen VGs die Interessen der Suisa in ihren Ländern wahr.

Dank diesen Verträgen verwaltete die Suisa im Jahr 2000 etwa 8 Millionen Musikwerke. Von diesen wurden jedoch nur 3,75 Prozent, nämlich etwa 300 000 Werke in Rechnung gestellt – mit anderen Worten: Viele Werke liegen brach, sie werden nicht genutzt.

Schweiz kein Musikexportland

Zwischen 1998 und 2005 leitete die Suisa dank der Vertretung des Weltrepertoires 347 Millionen Franken in andere Länder weiter – der Löwenanteil ging nach Europa und Amerika. Von allen ausländischen Musik-VGs flossen in dieser Zeit nur 117 Millionen in die Schweiz. Einer der Gründe dafür: «Die Schweiz ist kein Musikexportland, es gibt nur wenige international bekannte Künstler», sagt Andreas Wegelin.

Vor allem der Geldaustausch zwischen den USA und der Schweiz ist einseitig: Während im Jahr 2005 aus den USA nur 381 000 Franken zur Suisa flossen, musste sie 9 Millionen überweisen – dieses Verhältnis ist seit Jahren relativ stabil. In Europa wechseln neben England die Nachbarländer Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien und Österreich die grössten Beträge mit der Suisa aus – auch hier muss die Suisa weit mehr abliefern, als sie erhält.

Wichtiger als das Auslandsgeschäft ist jedoch der Markt in der Schweiz und Liechtenstein. Trotz einem kleinen Heimmarkt muss sich die Suisa nicht hinter ihren weltweiten Schwestergesellschaften verstecken. Seit 1998 beträgt der jährliche Gesamtumsatz durchschnittlich 134 Millionen Franken; damit belegt die Suisa Rang 15 oder 16 aller Musik-VGs – weltweit. Zwischen 1998 und 2005 wurden im Heimmarkt 906 Millionen Franken eingenommen. Schon seit Jahren ist die SRG die wichtigste Zahlerin; seit 2000 steuert sie jährlich 26 Millionen Franken bei.

Gleich danach kommen die Einnahmen aus der Tonträgerproduktion, also dem CD-Verkauf, Onlineverkauf und den Klingeltönen für Handys. Dieses Jahr waren es insgesamt 21 Millionen Franken. Allein die Einnahmen der unscheinbaren Klingeltöne steuerten im Jahr 2005 870 000 Franken bei – eine neue Einnahmequelle, mit der noch vor kurzem niemand rechnete.

«Geissel der Onlinepiraterie»

Zwischen 2002 und 2004 verzeichnete die Suisa einen beträchtlichen Einnahmeneinbruch; betroffen waren vor allem die Vergütungen aus CD-Verkäufen. Im Jahresbericht 2003 führte dies die Suisa auch auf die «Geissel der Onlinepiraterie» zurück. Andreas Wegelin sagt aber auch: «Ich glaube nicht, dass die Ursache für diesen markanten Rückgang nur in den Tauschbörsen zu suchen ist.»

Neben der Piraterie machen der Suisa auch Auseinandersetzungen mit Nutzerverbänden zu schaffen. Im Suisa-Jahresbericht von 1999 wurde geklagt, dass sie «einmal mehr versuchten, die Urheberrechtsvergütungen zu senken». Federführend war dabei die IFPI Schweiz, die Lobby der Tonträgerindustrie. In jenem Konflikt konnte sich die Suisa durchsetzen. Heute sind vor allem die Tarife für Vergütungen im Onlinebereich aktuell; auch hier bestehen laut Andreas Wegelin Differenzen zwischen Suisa und IFPI.


Seit 2004 veröffentlicht die Suisa einen Verteilschlüssel, wo anonymisiert ersichtlich ist, wer wie viel erhält. Von insgesamt 10 781 Urhebern erhielten im Jahr 2005 7663 nicht mehr als 500 Franken. Nur vier Urheber erhielten Auszahlungen von über 500’000 Franken.

Ähnlich sieht es bei den Verlegern aus. Sie erhielten durchschnittlich mehr, weil ihr Repertoire grösser ist als das eines Urhebers. Auch hier sieht man, dass von 1174 Verlegern 496 nicht mehr als 500 Franken erhielten und 13 Verlage zu den Topverdienern mit Auszahlungen über 500 000 Franken gehören.

Urheber, Inhaber, Verwerter

Jeder Künstler, ob Musiker, Filmer oder Schriftsteller, hat ein Recht auf seinen Song, seinen Film, sein Buch; er hat ein Recht auf sein geistiges Eigentum. Ohne sein Einverständnis darf nichts gedruckt, gespielt oder aufgeführt werden. Er kann das Recht per Vertrag an einen Produzenten oder Verlag abtreten – im Gegenzug erhält er einen Anteil vom Verkaufserlös oder einen regelmässigen Lohn. Der Musikverlag kauft also vom Urheber ein Recht, das Werk zu verwerten und wird dadurch zum Werkinhaber. Die Inhaber wiederum erteilen Nutzern – bei Musik z. B. den Radiostationen oder den Plattenproduzenten -, das Recht, die Werke zu benutzen, also zu senden oder als CD auf den Markt zu bringen.

Da die Radiostationen und Plattenproduzenten die Nutzer dieser Werke sind, müssen sie den Rechteinhabern (Musikverlag, Künstler) für jedes gesendete / auf CD gepresste Lied etwas bezahlen. Die Verwertungsgesellschaften (VGs) übernehmen nun für alle ihre Mitglieder – die Werkurheber und die Werkinhaber -, die Arbeit zu prüfen, welcher Nutzer ihnen wofür wie viel bezahlen muss.

Diese VGs gibts in der Schweiz:

Suisa: zuständig für musikalische, nicht theatralische Werke.

Suissimage: zuständig für audiovisuelle Werke (bewegtes Bild: Spiel-, Dokumentar- oder Trickfilme).

Pro Litteris: zuständig für Literatur, Fotografie (stehendes Bild), literarische Werke (z. B. Buch) sowie Werke der bildenden Kunst (Gemälde, Skulpturen).

SSA – Société Suisse des Auteurs: zuständig für wort- und musikdramatische sowie audiovisuelle Werke.

Swissperform: zuständig für verwandte Schutzrechte (so genannte Zweitnutzungsrechte): Wer im Handel eine CD kauft, hat zwar das Recht, sie privat anzuhören. Damit ist aber eine Zweitnutzung wie z. B. das Erstellen einer privaten Kopie auf eine leere CD noch nicht vergütet. (chb)

© Tages-Anzeiger; 18.09.2006


Friday, June 3rd, 2011
2007-01-26 18:36:00
Embassy Lima




E.O. 12958: N/A

REF: 06 STATE 178303

The following is Part 1 of Embassy Lima’s submission of the 2007 Investment Climate Statement for Peru.

Openness to Foreign Investment

The Peruvian government seeks to attract investment — bothforeign and domestic — in nearly all sectors of theeconomy. The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA),pending approval by the U.S. Congress, would enable Peru toattract additional investment by clarifying rules forinvestors, increasing transparency, reducing barriers totrade, establishing faster customs procedures, andimproving the dispute settlement process. Peru does nothave a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) or tax treaty withthe United States, but these provisions are contained inthe PTPA. The U.S. Congress extended unilateral tradepreferences under the Andean Trade Preferences Act(modified by the Andean Trade Preferences and DrugEradication Act, or ATPDEA) to Peru, Colombia, Bolivia andEcuador through June 2007. The U.S. Government recognizedPeru’s progress in economic policy and other issues byselecting Peru for the Millennium Challenge Account’sThreshold Program for fiscal year 2007.

During the early 1990s, the Peruvian government promotedeconomic stabilization and liberalization policies bylowering trade barriers, lifting restrictions on capitalflows and opening the economy to foreign investors. Peruexperienced marked growth in foreign investment from 1993-1998. Economic reform and privatization slowed in the late1990s however, leading to a discernible drop in direct andindirect foreign investment flows. Investment remainedstagnant following the collapse of President AlbertoFujimori’s government in November 2000, and through theperiod of an interim government and the election ofPresident Alejandro Toledo in 2001.

During his tenure, President Toledo implemented severalpro-investment policies. In April 2002, the governmentestablished ProInversion, building on the foundation ofCOPRI, the privatization agency created in 1991.ProInversion seeks to be a “one-stop shop” for current andpotential investors, and has successfully completed bothconcessions and privatizations of state-owned enterprisesand natural resources. In 2004, Las Bambas, a copperdeposit, was concessioned to Xstrata TLC, a SWISS company,for USD 121 million plus 19 percent VAT. In 2005, Bayovar,a state-owned phosphate rock deposit, was concessioned to aBrazilian company for a 3 percent royalty, and ProInversiongranted British-owned Rio Tinto a concession for the LaGranja copper deposit for USD 22 million. Additionally,from January-November 2006, the oil and gas leasing agencyPetroperu granted 15 exploration concessions to foreign oilcompanies, including 8 to 5 U.S. companies, along thenorthern coast and in the jungle.

In addition to the 1993 Constitution (enacted January 1,1994), major laws concerning foreign direct investment inPeru include the Foreign Investment Promotion Law(Legislative Decree (DL) 662 of September 1991) and theFramework Law for Private Investment Growth (DL 757 ofNovember 1991). The two 1991 laws were implemented bySupreme Decree 162-92-EF (October 1992). Two otherimportant laws are the Private Investment in State-OwnedEnterprises Promotion Law (DL 674) and the PrivateInvestment in Public Services Infrastructure Promotion Law(DL 758).

The 1993 Constitution guarantees national treatment forforeign investors and permits foreign investment in almostall economic sectors. Prior approval is only required inthe banking (for regulatory reasons, also applies todomestic investment) and defense-related sectors. Foreigninvestors are advised to register with ProInversion toobtain the guarantee that they will be able to repatriatecapital, profits and royalties. Foreigners are legallyforbidden from owning a majority interest in radio andtelevision stations in Peru; nevertheless, foreigners havein practice owned controlling interests in such companies.Under the Constitution, foreign interests cannot “acquireor possess under any title, mines, lands, forests, waters,or fuel or energy sources” within 50 kilometers of Peru’sinternational borders. However, foreigners can obtainconcessions and rights within the restricted areas with theauthorization of a supreme resolution approved by theCabinet and the Joint Command of the Armed Forces. Allinvestors — domestic and foreign — need prior approvalbefore investing in weapons manufacturing industries.

In 1991, the Peruvian government began an extensiveprivatization program, encouraging foreign investors toparticipate. From 1991 through September 2005,privatization revenues totaled USD 9.4 billion, of whichforeign investors were responsible for the vast majority.Over three-quarters of these transactions took place from1994 to 1997. Through September 2005, privatization andconcessions proceeds totaled USD 35.1 million, andgenerated investment commitments of USD 1.3 billion. Thegovernment has made only limited progress on privatizationssince then, and prospects for future direct privatizationsare not encouraging. The government has consequentlyshifted to a strategy of promoting multi-year concessionsas a means of attracting investment into major projects.In 2000, the Lima airport was concessioned to a privategroup (Lima Airport Partners), and in August 2006, nine ofPeru’s northern airports were concessioned for 25 years toSWISSport. Peru’s other airports, as well as variouselectricity, water, sewage, and oil (Petroperu) companiesremain state-owned and operated. In June 2006, theContainer Terminal-South Pier of the important seaport ofCallao was concessioned for 30 years to a consortium of Pand O Dover (U.K.) and Uniport (Spain).

In June 2004, the Congress passed a law to exclude thestate-owned oil company Petroperu from privatization andauthorized Petroperu to conduct exploration and productionactivities. This modified the government’s policy sincethe early 1990s, when it sold all of Petroperu’sexploration and production units and a major oil refinery.Under this new law, the government still has an option ofgranting concessions on remaining Petroperu assets,including one pipeline and several refineries. In July2006, Congress defeated an executive veto of a bill to”strengthen and modernize” Petroperu. Under the new law,Petroperu can resume exploration, production and relatedactivities, including petrochemicals; is freed fromcontracting approval by CONSUCODE, the state procurementsupervision agency; is exempted from the approval of itsinvestment projects by the Government Projects Office(SNIP); and will have a worker on its board of directors.Petroperu has a strategic alliance with Brazil’s Petrobras.

Under the 1993 Constitution, foreign investors have thesame rights as national investors to benefit from anyinvestment incentives, such as tax exemptions.

Conversion and Transfer Policies

Under Article 64 of the 1993 Constitution, the Peruviangovernment guarantees the freedom to hold and dispose offoreign currency; hence, there are no foreign exchangecontrols in Peru. All restrictions on remittances ofprofits, dividends, royalties, and capital have beeneliminated, although foreign investors are advised toregister their investments with ProInversion (as notedabove) to ensure these guarantees. Exporters and importersare not required to channel foreign exchange transactionsthrough the Central Reserve Bank of Peru, and can conducttransactions freely on the open market. Anyone may openand maintain foreign currency accounts in Peruviancommercial banks. U.S. firms have reported no problems ordelays in transferring funds or remitting capital,earnings, loan repayments or lease payments since Peru’seconomic reforms of the early 1990s.

The 1993 Constitution guarantees free convertibility ofcurrency. There is, however, a legal limit on the amountthat private pension fund managers can invest in foreignsecurities. In May 2004, the Central Reserve Bank of Peru(BCR) increased this limit from 9 percent to 10.5 percent.The low limit has created local market distortions,trapping liquidity in Peru that is diverted into localequities and bonds, driving up their prices to artificiallyhigh levels. The BCR’s new board, appointed by the GarciaAdministration, intends to gradually raise this limit, beginning with an increase to 12 percent.

The BCR is an independent institution, free to managemonetary policy to maintain financial stability. The BCR’sprimary goal is to maintain price stability, via inflationtargeting. Inflation in Peru was 1.6 percent in 2005 and 2percent in 2006. The government has also implemented policies to de-dollarize the economy, and deposits in thelocal currency (nuevo sol) now account for about 36percent.

Expropriation and Compensation

According to the Constitution, the Peruvian government canonly expropriate private property on public interestgrounds (such as for public works projects) or for nationalsecurity. Any expropriation requires the Congress to passa specific act. The Government of Peru has expressed itsintention to comply with international standards concerningexpropriations.

Dispute Settlement

Dispute settlement continues to be problematic in Peru,although the GOP took steps in 2005 to improve the disputesettlement process. From December 2004 through 2006, the GOP established 24 commercial courts to rule on investmentdisputes, including two courts of appeal. All of thesecourts are located in Lima. The commercial courts havesubstantially improved the process for commercial disputes.Prior to the existence of the commercial courts, it took anaverage of two years to resolve a commercial case throughthe civil court system. These new courts, which havespecialized judges, have reduced the amount of time toresolve a case to two months. Additionally, theenforcement of court decisions has been reduced from 36months to 3-6 months. While about 40 percent of decisionsare appealed, most of these are resolved at the appealslevel; very few are appealed to the Supreme Court.

The criminal and civil courts f first instance and appealare located in the provinces and in Lima. The SupremeCourt is located in Lima. In principle, secured interestsin property, both chattel and real, are recognized.However, the judicial system is often extremely slow tohear cases and to issue decisions. In addition, courtrulings and the degree of enforcement have been difficultto predict. The capabilities of individual judges varysubstantially, and allegations of corruption and outsideinterference in the judicial system are common. ThePeruvian appeals process also tends to delay finaldecisions. As a result, foreign investors, among others,have found that contracts are often difficult to enforce inPeru. The exposure in 2000 of a network of corrupt judgescontrolled by Fujimori advisor Vladimiro Montesinos led topromises by subsequent governments to address corruptionand reform the judiciary, but progress has been slow.

Under the 1997 Law of Conciliation (DL 26872), which wentinto effect on January 1, 2000, disputants in many types ofcivil and commercial matters are required to considerconciliation before a judge can accept a dispute to belitigated. Private parties often stipulate arbitration toresolve business disputes, as a way to avoid involvement injudicial processes.
Peru’s commercial and bankruptcy laws have proven difficultto enforce through the courts. There is an administrativebankruptcy procedure under INDECOPI (the National Institutefor the Defense of Free Competition and the Protection ofIntellectual Property), but it has proven to be slow andsubject to judicial intervention. The creditor hierarchyis similar to that established under U.S. bankruptcy law,and monetary judgments are usually made in the currencystipulated in the contract.

International arbitration of disputes between foreigninvestors and the government or state-controlled firms isincluded in the 1993 Constitution. Although Perutheoretically accepts binding arbitration, on a fewoccasions over the past three years, parastatal companiesand Government Ministries disregarded unfavorablejudgments. Previously, the Government of Peru turned thesearbitration cases over to the judiciary, where they werebureaucratically delayed until the companies conceded thecases. However, effective July 2005, the Supreme Courtruled that all arbitration findings and awards are finaland not subject to appeal.

Peru is a party to the Convention on the Recognition andEnforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New YorkConvention of 1958), and to the International Center forthe Settlement of Investment Disputes (the WashingtonConvention of 1965). Disputes between foreign investorsand the Government of Peru regarding pre-existing contractsmust still be submitted to national courts. However,investors who conclude a juridical stability agreement foradditional investments may submit disputes with thegovernment to national or international arbitration ifstipulated in the agreement. In 2005, the governmentresolved a high-level dispute by upholding the decision ofan arbitration panel and making payment.

Several private organizations — including the UniversidadCatolica, the Lima Chamber of Commerce and the AmericanChamber of Commerce — operate private arbitration centers.The quality of these centers varies, however, and investorsshould choose a venue for arbitration carefully.The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, currently pendingapproval by the U.S. Congress, includes a chapter ondispute settlement and, upon implementation, should furtherclarify the resolution process in Peru.

Performance Requirements and Incentives

Peru offers both foreign and national investors legal andtax stability agreements to stimulate private investment.These agreements guarantee that the statutes on incometaxes, remittances, export promotion regimes (such asdrawback), administrative procedures, and labor hiringregimes in effect at the time of the investment contractwill remain unchanged for that investment for 10 years. Toqualify, an investment must exceed USD 10 million in themining and hydrocarbons sectors or USD 5 million in othersectors within two years. An agreement to acquire morethan 50 percent of a company’s shares in the privatizationprocess may also qualify an investor for a juridicalstability agreement, provided that the infusion will expandthe installed capacity of the company or enhance itstechnological development.
There are no performance requirements that applyexclusively to foreign investors. Legal stabilityagreements are subject to Peruvian civil law, which meansthey cannot be altered unilaterally by the government.Investors are also offered protection from liability foracquiring state-owned enterprises.

Laws specific to the petroleum and mining sectors alsoprovide assurances to investors. However, in 2000, thegovernment modified the General Mining Law, substantiallyreducing benefits to investors in that sector. Among thechanges were: a reduction in the term concessionaires aregranted to achieve the minimum annual production; anincrease in fees for holding non-productive concessions; anincrease in fines for not achieving minimum productionwithin the allotted time; a reduction in the maximumallowable annual accelerated depreciation; and revocationof the income tax exemption for reinvested profits. In2004, Congress approved a bill charging a 1 to 3 percentroyalty on mining companies’ sales. The changes do notaffect those investors who have signed legal stabilityagreements with the government.
In December 2006, after increased social demands for ashare of mining profits, the Garcia Administration andmining companies agreed to a “voluntary contribution”system whereby mining companies will invest in communityinfrastructure projects. This agreement averted adoptionof a more restrictive mining law, allows mining companiesto control where they invest their contributions, andceases to apply if the prices of mined products drop.
Parties may freely negotiate contractual conditions relatedto licensing arrangements and other aspects of technologytransfer without prior authorization. Registry of atechnology transfer agreement is required for a payment ofroyalties to be counted against taxes. Such registrationis automatic upon submission to ProInversion.

Current laws limit foreign employees to no more than 20percent of the total number of employees in a local company(whether owned by foreign or national interests), andrestricts their combined salaries to no more than 30percent of the total company payroll. However, DL 689(November 1991) provides a variety of exceptions to theselimits. For example, a foreigner is not counted against acompany’s total if he or she holds an immigrant visa, has acertain amount invested in the company (currently about USD4,000) or is a national of a country that has a reciprocallabor or dual nationality agreement with Peru. Foreignbanks and service companies, and internationaltransportation companies are also exempt from these hiringlimits, as are all firms located in free trade zones.Furthermore, companies may apply for exemption from thelimitations for managerial or technical personnel.

Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Foreign and domestic entities are generally permitted theright to establish and own business enterprises and toengage in most forms of remunerative activity. Subject tothe restrictions listed earlier in this document, bothforeign and domestic entities may invest in any legaleconomic activity — including foreign direct investment,portfolio investment, and investment in real property.Private entities may generally freely establish, acquire,and dispose of interests in business enterprises. In thecase of some privatized companies deemed important by thegovernment, privatization agency ProInversion has includeda so-called “golden share” clause in the sales contract,which allows the government to veto a potential futurepurchaser of the privatized assets.

Protection of Property Rights

As noted in the Dispute Settlement section, in principle,secured interests in property (both chattel and real) arerecognized. However, the Peruvian judicial system is oftenvery slow to hear cases and to issue decisions, outcomeshave been difficult to predict and enforce, and corruptionis frequently alleged. The Peruvian appeals process alsodelays final outcomes of cases. Thus, foreign investors,among others, have found that contracts are often difficultto enforce in Peru. Improving the judicial system is astated priority of the Peruvian Government.
Protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) in Peruhas improved over the past decade, but still falls short ofU.S. and international standards in several areas. Peruremains on USTR’s Special 301 “Watch List” due to concernsabout continued high rates of copyright piracy, a lack ofprotection for confidential test data submitted for themarketing approval of pharmaceutical and agrochemicalproducts, and inadequate enforcement of IPR laws,particularly with respect to the relatively weak penaltiesthat have been imposed on IPR violators.

The Peruvian government agency charged with promoting anddefending intellectual property rights is the Institute forthe Defense of Competition and Protection of IntellectualProperty (INDECOPI,, established in¶1992. Legislative Decree 822 of 1996 and Andean CommunityDecisions 344 and 486 protect patents, trademarks, andindustrial designs. Copyrights are protected byLegislative Decree No. 822 of 1996 and by Andean Community Decision 351.

Peru belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and theWorld Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It isalso a signatory to the Paris Convention on IndustrialProperty, Geneva Convention for the Protection of SoundRecordings, Bern Convention for the Protection of Literaryand Artistic Works, Brussels Convention on the Distributionof Satellite Signals, Phonograms Convention, SatellitesConvention, Universal Copyright Convention, the WorldCopyright Treaty, and the World Performances andPhonographs Treaty and the Film Register Treaty. InDecember 1994, the Peruvian Congress ratified the WorldTrade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property (TRIPs).
Peru’s legal framework provides for easy registration oftrademarks, and inventors have been able to patent theirinventions since 1994. Peru’s 1996 Industrial PropertyRights Law provides an effective term of protection forpatents and prohibits devices that decode encryptedsatellite signals, along with other improvements. Peruvianlaw does not provide pipeline protection for patents orprotection from parallel imports. Although Peruvian lawprovides for effective trademark protection, counterfeitingof trademarks, copyrighted products, and imports of piratedmerchandise are widespread. The International IntellectualProperty Alliance estimates that the piracy level in Perufor recorded music was 98 percent in 2004-2005, with damageto U.S. industry estimated at USD 100 million. IIPAestimates motion picture piracy accounts for 60 percent ofthe market for a loss of USD 5.5 million. Indecopiconsiders that software piracy levels remained the same as2004 levels, at 56 percent.

Peru’s Copyright Law is generally consistent with the TRIPsAgreement. However, textbooks, books on technicalsubjects, audiocassettes, motion picture videos andsoftware are widely pirated. While the government, incoordination with the private sector, has conductednumerous raids over the last few years on large-scaledistributors and users of pirated goods, and has increasedother types of enforcement, piracy continues to be asignificant problem for legitimate owners of copyrights inPeru.

Despite increased enforcement actions by INDECOPI, thejudicial branch has failed to impose sentences thatadequately deter future IPR violations. The Peruviangovernment in July 2004 increased the minimum penalty forpiracy to four years imprisonment, although there have yetto be any convictions under the new law. Peru now has sixprosecutors (two fiscalias) dedicated full-time tointellectual property cases. In a major breakthrough, inNovember 2006, four special courts of first instance andone special appeals court in Lima were assigned IPR duties,effective 2007.

An IPR Toolkit for Peru can be found on the Embassy andCommercial Service Lima’s websites. Besides being a guideto registering and protecting IP, it contains a list oflawyers and other organizations that can provide support onan on-going basis.



DE RUEHPE #0221/01 0261836
P 261836Z JAN 07


2011-06-03 00:00:00
2011-06-03 15:31:03



Thursday, June 2nd, 2011
2006-10-12 12:30:00
Embassy Kingston
C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 002021 




E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016


Classified By: Ambassador Brenda L. Johnson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


¶1. (SBU) The six-month old administration of People’s National Party (PNP) Prime Minister Portia Simpson Miller faces embarrassing and intense scrutiny over its acceptance of JMD 31 million (approximately USD 475,000) from a Dutch-based oil trading firm. The firm, Trafigura Beheer BV, holds the contract to lift, market, and trade oil that Jamaica receives from Nigeria under a concessionary financing arrangement. The powerful Minister for Information and Development, Colin Campbell, already has resigned, and opposition leader Bruce Golding has called for the entire government to follow suit and allow general elections to be held as soon as possible. Simpson Miller has admitted meeting recently with Trafigura executives in New York, but claims to have known nothing of any transfer of funds. If the Prime Minister herself becomes more deeply implicated, there could in fact be a dissolution of Parliament and snap elections; if not, the scandal seems more likely to push back the timetable for elections until later next year – ironically, something the Opposition Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) admits privately it can ill afford. End summary.

———- Background ———-

¶2. (SBU) The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) has had concessionary oil deals with Nigeria since the 1970s. The quotas have varied as the agreements are renegotiated, but have always been in the range of 20-30,000 bpd. The GOJ claimed, however, that the PetroJam refinery in Kingston (ref. A) cannot process the type of crude that is sourced from Nigeria. Over the ensuing years, the GOJ has contracted with various oil traders to lift, market, and trade the oil. In October, 2000, the GOJ signed an agreement a Dutch oil trading company named Trafigura Beheer BV (headquartered in SWITZERLAND) for this purpose.

¶3. (SBU) The proceeds from the sale of the Nigerian oil were intended to be used to purchase finished petroleum products that would be received to and distributed from the PetroJam refinery. Therefore, the profits were routed to the Petroleum Corporation of Jamaica (PCJ). In April, 2005, however, Finance Minister Omar Davies directed that the funds be deposited directly into the National Treasury, under the GOJ’s “Consolidated Fund.” It is unclear how this money was then spent.

The JLP on the offensive

¶4. (SBU) On October 4, Opposition Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) leader Bruce Golding announced in Parliament that his party had uncovered “shady dealings” between the ruling People’s National Party (PNP) and Trafigura Beheer BV. Golding alleged that Trafigura had paid the PNP JMD 31 million (approximately USD 475,000) through accounts belonging to Minister of Information and Development ) and PNP General Secretary – Colin Campbell. These monies, he continued, were used to fund the lavish PNP National Convention (ref. B) held September 21-24.

¶5. (SBU) Golding called for the resignation of prominent PNP officials, and for immediate elections. Private sector organizations also have criticized the PNP’s acceptance of the money. On October 5, PNP Minister of Housing, Transport, Water and Works (and PNP Party Chairman) Robert Pickersgill stated that the money was a campaign “donation,” and as such there was no impropriety (Note: It was Pickersgill, in his capacity as Minister of Mining and Energy, who renegotiated the deal in 1999-2000. End note). On October 6, however, Trafigura stated that it was not a campaign contribution at all, and that the company’s dealings in Jamaica are “strictly commercial.”

¶6. (C) The campaign by Golding has been partially successful thus far. On October 9, Colin Campbell resigned his positions as Minister of Information and Development and as General Secretary of the Party, although he retains his Senate seat, to the irritation of some (Senators are appointed, and thus some feel that he should resign from that position, as well). Other prominent JLP targets are the Minister of Industry, Technology, Energy and Commerce (MITEC), Phillip Paulwell, Attorney General A.J. Nicholson, and Minister Pickersgill.

A Political Mistake?

¶7. (C) As post will report septel, PolEconCouns, PolOff and EconOff met with JLP MP James Robertson on October 10. Robertson indicated that he thought the JLP leadership had made a mistake in bringing the issue into the public domain too soon. He argued that the revelations have only served to ensure that the ruling PNP will not call elections this year, as many (particularly the JLP) had hoped. He opined that the JLP’s party machinery “does not have a sixth gear,” and worried that they would sputter due to lack of funds if the PNP waited that long.

Who Leaked and Why Now?

¶8. (SBU) At issue is also the question of how the Opposition came to uncover the scandal. Rumor and speculation abound, but it is clear that the official of First Caribbean Bank, Sonia Christie, who discovered the unusual money transfers is the wife of JLP Deputy Mayor of Falmouth, Fitz Christie. While JLP contacts maintain that, by virtue of her position at the bank, she was duty-bound to report the suspicious transfers of amounts over USD 10,000, PNP supporters clearly see this as a partisan attack and a crime against privacy laws, for which Christie should be prosecuted. First Caribbean has put Christie on leave while it investigates the matter.

¶9. (C) Others, reflecting the Jamaican penchant for conspiracy theories, perceive the hand of Minister of National Security Peter Phillips at work. Phillips was defeated in a close and sometimes rancorous internal party election for the leadership by Simpson Miller (ref. D), and it is an open secret that the two are not working well together, despite public appearances suggesting PNP internal unity. There have been rumors that Phillips and his supporters in the PNP are willing to “throw” this election in order to oust Simpson Miller, and the current scandal only abets this claim.


¶10. (C) If Simpson Miller can weather this storm without too many more disastrous leaks, she will likely wait some time before calling general elections, as Robertson predicts. However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that she herself will become deeply implicated, perhaps thus forcing her resignation. In such a scenario, her likely successor, Phillips, also would prefer to wait to call elections, but the clamor of public opinion might well be too great to ignore.



DE RUEHKG #2021/01 2851230
P 121230Z OCT 06


2011-06-02 09:30:00
2011-06-03 15:29:59

100 Millionen ergaunert und in Genf versteckt, jetzt von Interpol gesucht

Thursday, June 2nd, 2011

Bei der Bank Merrill Lynch in Genf versteckte ein US-Grossbetrüger 15 Millionen Dollar. Die Gelder sind zurück, er aber wird international gesucht. Mit gefälschten Antivirus-Programmen haute seine Bande eine Million Computer-Benutzer übers Ohr. von Christian Bütikofer

Die Medienmitteilung des Bundesamtes für Justiz (BJ) vom 1. Juni tönt unspektakulär: «Gestützt auf ein US-Rechtshilfeersuchen […] wurde die Herausgabe von rund 15 Mio. US-Dollar angeordnet. Die Vermögenswerte […] werden den Geschädigten einer gross angelegten Betrügerei mit gefälschter Software zurückerstattet.»

Was amtlich nüchtern daherkommt, ist Teil einer internationalen Betrugsgeschichte, die 2002 ihren Lauf nahm und in der neben Softwarepiraterie auch die millionenfache Täuschung von Internet-Benutzern durch falsche Antivirus- und Sicherheitssoftware von zentraler Bedeutung war. Dies zeigen über tausend Seiten Untersuchungsakten, die az vorliegen.

Hauptfiguren sind der Amerikaner Shaileshkumar Jain (41), genannt Sam Jain, der Schwede Björn Daniel Sundin (32) und der kanadische Jurist Marc Gerard D’Souza. Die ersten zwei stehen auf der Fahndungsliste von Interpol.

Gefälschte Software «Made in China»

Jain sorgte bereits in der ersten Internet-Blase in den 90ern für Furore. Danach wollte er selbständig durchstarten und liess dazu die Firma Inventive Marketing, Inc. im mittelamerikanischen Staat Belize gründen. Mit aggressivem Marketing im Web lockte er Kunden auf Webseiten, die gefälschte Antiviren-Software von Symantec anbot, die er in China besorgte. Nicht lange und der Software-Gigant reichte gegen Jain Klage ein.

Bereits 1991 wegen Betrugs verurteilt

Probleme mit der Justiz waren sich Jain und Sundin gewöhnt. Bereits 1991 wurde Jain in Kalifornien wegen Betrugs rechtskräftig verurteilt. Sundin musste sich 2000 in Arzizona wegen Erregung öffentlichen Ärgernisses vor dem Richter verantworten.

Während Jain die Symantec-Klage am Hals hatte, seilte er sich in die brasilianische Stadt Rio de Janeiro ab. Von dort koordinierte er mit seinen Kumpanen den nächsten Coup: Anstatt gefälschte Antiviren-Software zu verkaufen, programmierten sie die Programme gleich selber.

Gefälschte Windows-Meldungen

Ihre Produkte, die sie mit Namen wie «Winfixer» tauften, hatten im Unterschied zur Konkurrenz aber einen kleinen Unterschied: Sie erkannten auf den Computer der Getäuschten keine Viren, es handelte sich allesamt um Falschmeldungen.

Richtig ausgeklügelt war die Methode, wie die Internet-Nutzer überhaupt aufs nutzlose Produkt aufmerksam gemacht wurden: Mit Gefahren-Meldungen die als so genannte Pop-Ups (sich beim Surfen auf eine Website selbstständig öffnende Browserfenster) wurde den Benutzern vorgetäuscht, ihre Computer seien mit Viren infiziert. Um das Problem zu beheben, müssten sie nur eine spezielle Software wie «Winfixer» kaufen und installieren.

Angst einjagen und abkassieren: Mit vorgeblicher Sicherheits-Software wird weltweit viel Geld ergaunert

Angst einjagen und abkassieren: Mit vorgeblicher Sicherheits… (PDF)

Spam und Computer-Einbrüche

Neben dieser Methode wandten die Betrüger auch Massen-E-Mail-Versand (Spam) an. Daneben platzierten sie durch illegale Hackermethoden so genannte Ad-Ware auf den Rechnern von Privatpersonen. Das hatte zur Folge, dass auf den so infizierten Rechnern plötzlich ein Werbefenster mit den bekannten falschen Viren-Alarmen auftauchte.

Solche Methoden werden von Computer-Sicherheits-Experten als «Scareware» (Angstmacher-Ware) genannt. Praktisch jeder seriöse Antiviren-Hersteller listet solch falsche Anti-Virus-Tools als Schädlinge in seiner Datenbank und entfernt sie bei einem Viren-Check.

Kreditkartendaten offen im Web

Der deutsche Antiviren-Experten Dirk Kollberg von McAfee konnte die Aktivitäten der Bande dank einer Sicherheitslücke während längerer Zeit detailliert mitprotokollieren und wurde von den Behörden später dazu in Frankfurt am Main vernommen.

Mit der Sicherheit hatte die Bande auch sonst so ihre Probleme: Während geraumer Zeit lagen tausende Kreditkartendaten ihrer Opfer offen im Internet.

Eine grosse Herausforderung für die Betrügerbande war, wie sie das Problem der Zahlung lösten. Die Software wurde von den Opfern immer per Kreditkarte bezahlt. Als die merkten, was für einen Schrott sie da gekauft hatten, wollte viele ihre Kreditkartenbuchung rückgängig machen.

Obwohl dies noch lange nicht alle taten, generierten sie damit jeweils tausende von Stornierungen, was den Betrügern bei den Zahlungsabwicklern jeweils grossen Ärger brachte. Als sie in den USA nicht mehr salonfähig waren, behalfen sie sich mit Dienstleistern in Bahrain, Dubai, Singapur und versuchten es auch in Holland.

Die FTC nimmt sich dem Fall an

Die Masche mit den gefälschten Anti-Viren-Programmen führte dazu, dass tausende Reklamationen bei der amerikanischen Federal Trade Commission (FTC) eingingen. Nicht lange, und die Beamten nahmen sich den Brüdern an. Während ihrer Ermittlung sammelten die Beamten mehr als 21’000 Seiten Beweismaterial und kommen zum Schluss, dass die Bande mit ihren Aktivitäten mindestens 100 Millionen Dollar generierte.

Die FTC-Beamten stiessen während ihren Ermittlungen auf ein unglaubliches Firmen- und Bankkonten-Netz, verteilt auf die ganze Welt (siehe Box).

Um ihre richtige Identität vor Geschäftspartnern zu verbergen, nutzten die Täter mehrere Pseudonyme und agierten durch verschiedene Firmen, die zum Teil nicht existieren.

Merrill Lynch-Banker halfen wissentlich beim Betrug

Fälschungen standen auch am Anfang der Schweizer-Spur. Um die Gelder der amerikanischen Opfer (60 Prozent der Kunden stammten aus USA/Kanada, 40 aus dem Rest der Welt) in sichere Geldhafen zu transferieren, wurde das Geld über mehrere Transfers zu Merrill Lynch nach Uruguay verschoben. Dort gründete Sam Jain dank der geklauten Unterschrift und weiteren persönlichen Daten eines seiner früheren Angestellten die Société Financiera Volturno SA sowie die Rivonal Corporation SA.

Dabei arbeiteten ihm mehrere Merrill Lynch-Banker zu, die über die gefälschten Daten bestens Bescheid wussten. Während der FTC-Ermittlungen wurden sie vom Institut gefeuert. In Uruguay nahm Jain die Hilfe von Anwalt Federico Ponce de León sowie dessen Vater Walter Ponce de León in Anspruch und ein Konto bei Merrill Lynch in Genf wurde eröffnet. Mit der Zeit sammelten sich dort zwischen 15 und 18 Millionen Dollar an.

Die guten Dienste der Schweizer Anwälte

2008 blockierte die Schweiz wegen Verdachts auf Geldwäscherei das Konto und entsprach einem Rechtshilfegesuch der USA. Doch das wollte Jain nicht einfach so auf sich sitzen lassen. Die Genfer Rechtsanwälte Saverio Lembo und Anne Valérie Julen Berthod von Bär & Karrer versuchten die Rücküberweisung der Millionen in die Vereinigten Staaten während Jahren zu verhindern. In dieser Zeit befand sich Sam Jain schon lange auf der Flucht: Als er 2009 vor einem US-Gericht hätte erscheinen sollen, liess er sich nie mehr blicken.

Die Behörden vermuten ihn in der Ukraine. Sein Kumpel Sundin hält sich gemäss den Behörden in Schweden auf. Marc Gerard D’Souza hat sich mit der FTC verglichen: Er zahlte über 8 Millionen Dollar Wiedergutmachung.

Entscheid Bundesstrafgericht: RR.2009.159

Das Firmen- und Konten-Geflecht

Firmen gründeten die Täter unter anderem in Anguilla, Panama, Belize, USA, Uruguay, Niederlande, Bahrain, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate, Philippinen, Kanada, Britische Jungferninseln, Ukraine, Argentinien, Indien, Grossbritannien, Brasilien.

Konten unterhielten die Gauner etwa bei Merrill Lynch, HSBC Bahrain, ABN Amro, Standard Chartered Bank, Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait BSC, Bahrami Saudi Bank BSC, Emirates Bank, United Overseas Bank Singapore, Citibank, DBS Bank Ltd., HSBC Jersey, UBS Schweiz (Zürich Höngg, Bankkonti 836.360.60W, 836.360.L1 G bei Berater Thomas M.), Chinatrust (Philis) Commercial Banking Corp., Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., ING Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, TD Canada Trust, HSBC Kanada, Fleet Bank.

© az Aargauer Zeitung 2011; 02.06.2011


Wednesday, June 1st, 2011
2007-09-28 23:33:00
Embassy Managua




E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017

Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, Reason: E.O. 12958 1.4 (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Eight months into Daniel Ortega’s term as president, his socialist rhetoric continues to worry potential and current investors in Nicaragua. Beginning on the day of his inauguration, Ortega launched into anti-capitalist, anti-neoliberal, and increasingly anti-American rhetoric, implying that what had transpired in Nicaragua during the past sixteen years was all wrong. A consistent economic theme has been the need for Nicaragua to reduce its dependency on the United States and international financial institutions. Ortega believes that this theme provides him with the political cover he needs to forge closer economic relations with the likes of Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, Libya, and North Korea. When it comes to private sector investment, Ortega seems to be of two minds. He acknowledges the fundamental role that the private sector plays in creating jobs, generating growth, and improving social well-being, but in practice never really accepts that this is true. One of Ortega’s most palatable messages is that capital investment in Nicaragua needs to incorporate some social component. End summary.

¶2. (C) Eight months into Daniel Ortega’s term as President, his socialist rhetoric continues to worry current and potential investors in Nicaragua. Ortega rarely misses an opportunity to denounce “imperialism” and “savage capitalism,” although his tone and presentation often varies with his audience. A review of Ortega’s public discourse since his inauguration on January 10, 2007, reveals a worldview adorned with disdain for what he terms “global capitalism” and its imperialist champion, the United States. Ortega borrows heavily from Marx to explain the success of capitalism, which he views as being fundamentally opposed to the welfare of poor people throughout the world. Recently, he has been focusing more on historical inequities, drawing a causal relationship between the wealth of developed countries and the poverty of underdeveloped countries.

¶3. (C) Ortega has avoided criticizing specific individuals or businesses in Nicaragua, with a few exceptions in the energy sector. He has forcefully criticized electricity distributor Union Fenosa (Spain), liquid fuels importer and distributor Glencore (SWITZERLAND), geothermal power producer Polaris (Canada), power producer Geosa (Nicaragua), and through his tax and customs directors general and other party stalwarts, refiner and liquid fuels distributor Esso (United States). Every company that Ortega has criticized publicly has become the object of state-led legal and tax challenges.

Out of the Starting Gate

¶4. (C) Beginning on the day of his inauguration attended by Venezuelan and Bolivian Presidents Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales, Ortega and his Communications Coordinator (wife Rosario Murillo) launched a propaganda campaign to reestablish socialist values in Nicaragua. The campaign contrasts greatly with his election campaign, also managed by Murillo, both in tone and content. Ortega’s election campaign was little more than the repeated play of a Nicaraguan version of John Lennon’s “Give Peace a Chance” as a silent candidate waived to the masses from a slowly driven vehicle. Ortega now makes great use of the bully pulpit to constantly assert that Nicaragua’s “neoliberal” experiment in “global capitalism” the last sixteen years has failed.

¶5. (C) The day after his inauguration, Ortega signed onto the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), since heralded as the centerpiece of Nicaragua’s foreign economic relations and the alternative to the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Ortega has consistently trumpeted economic relations with ALBA countries (Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia) at the expense of his relations with Central American countries and as a substitute to economic relations with the United States. His socialist fire only dimmed for his first press conference in January, to calm nervous investors. By May, his anti-capitalist, anti-neoliberal, and anti-American rhetoric picked up another head of steam. This culminated in 20-minute inflammatory speech at the United Nations on September 25 2007, in which Ortega railed against the United States as the imperial power (septel).

America Is Bad

¶6. (C) An underlying theme for Ortega’s speeches has been the need for Nicaragua to reduce its political and economic dependence on the United States, developed country donors, and international financial institutions, which he believes “are controlled by the United States.” He argues that global capitalism has enslaved the world by helping the rich get richer at the expense of the poor, and exploiting natural resources and polluting the world’s environment. Further, he argues that international financial institutions are the tools of “yankee imperialism,” that neoliberalism is a modern version of imperialism, and that privatization and neoliberalism in Nicaragua have failed to lift Nicaragua out of poverty.

¶7. (C) A corollary to these arguments is that CAFTA should never have been negotiated because of inherent and insurmountable economic asymmetries between poor, small Central American countries and the United States. Ortega asserts that if such a trade agreement had to be negotiated, then Central American countries should have negotiated it as a single, unified entity to strike a more balanced deal. Because this did not happen, CAFTA surely favors the United States. Ortega further asserts that by definition small agricultural producers cannot compete with large U.S. producers who, he laments, receive state subsidies. Therefore, he concludes, CAFTA is inherently unfair.

¶8. (C) Ortega often deploys this logic as political justification for forging closer economic relations with Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Iran, Libya, and even North Korea. For more political cover, he will elaborate on the historical and lasting evil of “imperialism,” “global capitalism,” and “the empire,” all euphemisms for the United States. (Note: In his speech before the United Nations on September 25 2007, Ortega clearly tied the United States to these euphemisms). Ortega compares these evils to honest and well-meaning foreign assistance and commerce from and with ALBA countries and Iran.

¶9. (C) Ortega’s anti-American rhetoric often varies with the occasion. He never used the word “empire,” for example, to refer to the United States in his public meeting with World Bank Vice President Pamela Cox on February 1. However, during his July 21 address to the Sao Paulo Forum, a conference composed of leftist and nationalist political parties and social movements in Latin America and the Caribbean, Ortega bandied the term an astounding twenty-one times. Left to his own resources, Ortega will almost always weave in a few minutes of anti-American epithets into one of his patented 100-minute speeches to loyal followers. The rhetoric flows especially freely during visits from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.

Capitalism Is Bad; Some Investment Might Be Good
——————————————— —

¶10. (C) Ortega seems to be of two minds when it comes to capital investment. He claims to welcome capital investment on the one hand, but on the other decries the evils of “global capitalism.” He asserts that privatization has failed in Nicaragua, that “neoliberalism” has corrupted government to serve selfish interests “of those with family names we all know,” but claims to be open to dialogue with business. He accepts the need to negotiate a new Poverty Reduction Growth Facility with the IMF, but issues a blanket condemnation of all international financial institutions as being “the mere tools of capitalism.” He acknowledges the fundamental role that capital investment plays in creating jobs, generating growth, and improving social wellbeing, but never really accepts the notion that capitalism works. He equates “global capitalism” with imperialism, vilifies the United States as chief imperialist, and equates “original capital” to original sin -) since, according to his accounting of history, “original capital” was derived from slavery and colonialism.

¶11. (C) Ortega repeatedly quotes Pope John Paul II to draw a distinction between “savage capitalism” and presumably “not-so-savage capitalism.” This gives Ortega the pretext to support some forms of capital investment, e.g., that which “serves the interests of the people,” especially the poor. Clearly, Ortega feels better about an investment if there is some form of social contribution included. He has repeatedly referred to Cone Denim’s $100 million investment in a textile manufacturing plant near Managua as an example of the kind of long-term, “non-maquila” investment that he welcomes. Cone Denim (United States) makes some social contributions. However, Cone Denim is a free trade zone investment like all other Nicaraguan “maquilas,” and will, in fact, employ fewer people than most maquilas. The difference is that Cone Denim will manufacture cloth rather than finished goods.

The A to (almost) Z of Ortega’s Rhetoric

¶12. (SBU) Below are unofficial translations of statements made by Ortega during his first eight months in office. They identify the range of his economic thinking, and not just the anti-American quality of his rhetoric.

a. “Every time that I speak about this issue with the same representatives from the IMF, the World Bank, the European Union, and representatives of the North American Government, I say to them, ‘What are the results of these policies that His Holiness the Pope John Paul II called savage capitalism?’ That is what His Holiness called it! I ask them, and I say to those who continue insisting that the neoliberal model is the only way that our people can progress, I say to them, ‘I am going to put it to the test here in Nicaragua!'” (Presidential Inauguration, January 10, 2007).

b. “This treaty with the United States, CAFTA, that was approved a few years and months ago …we said that, in all clarity, this treaty was not thought out, not considered as to the condition of a country like the United States with great and enormous resources and economic subsidies versus the economies of our countries. They had to understand this (inequity) to negotiate. Finally they signed a treaty that brings some benefits to some sectors, but not to others. We have talked with North American representatives and told them about the problem, that they have not taken into account economic asymmetry with these countries. How can a small Nicaraguan producer compete with a North American producer who is subsidized?” (Presidential Inauguration, January 10, 2007).

c. “There does not exist, in these times, a situation that signifies that economic activity in our country is paralyzed or is decreasing. To the contrary, we feel that economic activity is being maintained …the year is beginning. There have been the normal movements for the start of a year and a dialogue has continued with the national businesses through INCAE (the Central American Institute for Business Administration). Vice President Jaime Morales is in charge of working with them, that already is the commitment…. It was a grave error to have negotiated CAFTA in bilateral form; it put us in a weak situation.” (Press Conference, January 22, 2007)

d. “This is a new government. We have a conception, a philosophy that is very different from the governments that preceded us. We are interested in developing, establishing, consolidating good relationships with (international) organizations, with the (World) Bank as well as with the
(International Monetary) Fund.” (Meeting with World Bank Vice President Pamela Cox, February 1, 2007).

e. “We are meeting many businessmen, many investors, capitalists who are ready, and in addition to their (financial) investments, to make social investments. But there are others in the minority, in the case of Nicaragua, who bring an entirely selfish attitude, who want to accumulate more riches each day and to whom it does not matter if the people are in poverty, in misery.” Sixteen years of neoliberalism has passed in Nicaragua. And what do we have? We have economic growth. Of course, we have economic growth, but with whom does this wealth reside? Where does wealth stop?” Celebration of the 29th Anniversary of the Sandinista Insurrection in Monimbo February 24, 2007)

f. “What is the root of the problem (speaking of power outages throughout the country)? It is in the deed of having privatized. This was the original sin. Who privatized? The democrats, those who say they are democrats. They privatized the power plants, giving concessions (to the electricity distributor). Thank God they did not sell it, because all this involves corruption, selling (the power plants) for pennies — but what they did was to rent it.” (Celebration of the 29th Anniversary of the Sandinista Insurrection in Monimbo February 24, 2007)

g. “We will have a world filled with justice, where all families live in dignity, where hearts are filled with the feeling of love, and where we will have buried forever feelings of hatred, of selfishness, of individualism, of ‘savage capitalism’ that His Holiness Pope John Paul II called by name ) ‘savage capitalism’…. We are not fighting with the Yankees. They are the ones who have been fighting with the world. This is the history of the imperialists.” (Ortega with Hugo Chavez in Leon, March 11, 2007)

h. “We are against polluting the environment, a result that must be viewed in the (context of) policies of consumption, imposed by the capitalist model and that will not stop for anything.” (Ortega with members of his Cabinet, April 3, 2007)

i. “At the height of neoliberalism, with all the support that is possible in terms of policies and capitalist material wellbeing, capitalist countries, with all the support that the Government of the United States had offered to previous governments…. How much would it mean for the United States to donate (a power plant) to Nicaragua? They did not donate it … It is neoliberal political nature to forget about the people, about the poor, and simply do things every day to become richer.” (Inauguration of the Venezuelan Hugo Chavez Power Plant at Las Brisas, Managua, April 17, 2007)

j. “During these sixteen years in which neoliberalism was imposed on Nicaragua, what was considered the most important was to maintain structural reforms — the privatizations, privatizing education, health — all at a cost of greater poverty for the Nicaraguan people.” (Meeting with a Russian Delegation, April 25, 2007)

k. “Never as today, has the world been so divided between the minority that possess wealth and the immense majority (living) in poverty. This has occurred at both the national and international level. Here in Nicaragua, where the scheme of world capitalist domination is replicated by the ‘land imperialists,’ as our General Sandino called them, a few with wealth and the majority in poverty…. Who is the imperialist bourgeois? The one who is of ‘savage capitalism,’ the imperialist who tries to break, to conquer our people.” (Labor Day, May 1, 2007)

l. “We have to liberate ourselves from this dependency on external resources because of all the problems they bring, the conditions that they put on us.” (Cabinet Meeting on the National Infrastructure Plan, May 3, 2007)

m. “Neoliberalism not only has meant denying education, health, and work to the people, denying financing to the farmers, but also it has meant the destruction of the environment, of the forests…. This is where it is clear that what the world is questioning is the model. There has to be questioning, from all sides, of the model that savage capitalism has imposed on the world and which is leading to the destruction of the environment.” Cabinet meeting on the National Environment Plan, May 8, 2007)

n. “The greatest acts of violence, of barbarism, have been committed by rich, developed countries. Violent crimes of all kinds — not for hunger, not for poverty, not for unemployment. Simply put, what has provoked this kind of situation has been the deformity, the destruction of the human spirit by savage capitalism.” (Appointment of Cardenal Obando y Bravo as Chair of the Reconciliation Commission, May 9, 2007)

o. “In our attempt to generate quick employment, we can be killing ourselves. This is the great problem: as we say, bread for today, hunger for tomorrow. We cannot run that risk… We want investment with a sense of respect, to the workers and to the environment — an investment that is accompanied with social sense.” (Institute of Social Security Presentation, May 22, 2007)

p. “Our country, throughout its history, has suffered wars imposed by the politics of imperial North America…. This is what permits us to break with unipolar politics to establish a new equilibrium in the world, where we transform in a profound way the current world order, as much in the areas of economics and commerce between counties as in the area of law. What we will really achieve is to democratize relations between people, between nations, by putting an end to the dictatorship of the global capitalism of the empire. And then we can ensure a world of peace, of justice, of liberty…. And in the dialogue that we hold with the United States, we have been clear to demonstrate our position against imperialist policies, against the dictatorship of global capitalism….” (Greeting Iranian President Ahmadinejad, June 10, 2007)

q. “This is the greatest battle that escapes human history — the concept that development policy has been in the hands of global capitalism which sets the norms, imposes its economic policy through blood and fire, and for which certain periods and eras a conquered Africa, Asia, and American continent submitted to colonization, responding to a development model that was determined in the European metropolis, simply trying to grow, but in these moments, the world population, technological development, and pollution that was generated in the form of epic exploitation, was brutal. It turned into an economic policy that practiced systematic genocide in order to steal natural resources.” (Closing Remarks to the Natural Resources and Environment Conference of Central American Ministers, June 18, 2007)

r. “These gentlemen that today are the owners of the world economy, who impose upon us schemes such as neoliberalism, who wish to obligate us to accept the conditions of the International Monetary Fund, they accumulated their wealth in the most abject manner, the most brutal, shameful manner that human history could have ever known.” (Celebration of the 71st Anniversary of the Birth of Carlos Fonseca, founder of the FSLN, June 23, 2007)

s. “The recent meeting of the Group of Seven plus one, in Europe, once again provides evidence of the inflexibility of those who continue defending an exhausted model ) a developmentalist, consumerist (one) that goes against the most vital interests of humanity. And the opposition, the voice that raises concern, from countries belonging to the same exhausted global capitalist scheme, (is against) global capitalism that has imposed its rules throughout the years, that has established norms, and that talks of democracy without practicing democracy.” (Inauguration of the Regional
Conference on UN Coherence, June 25, 2007)

t. “I think that the moment has arrived that, above all the countries of global capitalism, the empire (is the one who) controls the (International Monetary) Fund. Really, the poor (workers at) the Fund are no more than an instrument, because we say here that the Fund is evil. No. What is evil is world economic order imposed by the countries of global capitalism, of the empire, which accumulate their capital at the cost of enslaving Africans for more than 300 years (and) exterminating indigenous people in Latin America. This is the origin of their capital.” (Ortega’s arrival at the airport on a state visit to Mexico, June 27, 2007)

u. “In the sixteen years that they governed quietly, the model they imposed was global capitalism, the imperialist model. What were the results? They said (that) the country achieved take-off because a few became richer. Because of this, they achieved take-off. Those that became richer took off, but the immense majority of the people did not have any take off. What they had was privatization of health care, education, the democratization of hunger, of unemployment. This is what they had. This is the reason why we have (electricity) rationing )- our inheritance from neoliberalism. To put it into simple language, the inheritance of ‘savage capitalism.’ This is our inheritance.” (Inauguration of the Zero Hunger Initiative in Estelli, July 7, 2007)

v. “This is what the Europeans did. All the Europeans who today present themselves as saviors of the world, this is what they did. The primary capital for capitalism has its origins in these forms of exploitation, of theft, of plunder, of corruption, that they established throughout the African and American continent, and also in Asia. They were accumulating this wealth which they later converted into power.” (Closing of the 15th Congress of the Nicaraguan Student Union, July 18, 2007)

w. “The situation is very simple. Those that accumulated this capital, this wealth, with the plunder, the extermination, concentration camps, more than 300 years of slavery of the African population, they are very united, and they are searching a way to keep all of us divided, in order to dominate us, to better oppress us. They practice this policy throughout the world: to divide people, nations, (and) governments. And, each time governments make an effort to become closer, listening to the will of the people, the threats come with sanctions and everything that we already know. But the world lives in a new time. True that global capitalism, headed by the yankee empire, has enormous strength…. Global capitalism threatens destruction, not of the small people because it has already destroyed them, but rather of medium and large producers….” (Celebration of the 28th Anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution, July 19, 2007)


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2011-06-02 12:31:41