Archive for January, 2011

BREAK-UP OF LEBANESE DRUG RING IN BRAZIL

Monday, January 31st, 2011
ID: 05SAOPAULO872
DATE: 2005-07-22 11:11:00
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
ORIGIN: Consulate Sao Paulo
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SAO PAULO 000872

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/BSC, DS, DS/DSS. DS/DSS/IP,DS/IP/WHA,DH/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/CR/CIL, DS/IP/IPO, WHA/PD, INLNSC FOR SUE CRONIN AND ZARATETREASURY FOR OFAC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2015

TAGS: SNAR PTER ASEC PGOV ETTC EFIN SOCI BR

SUBJECT: BREAK-UP OF LEBANESE DRUG RING IN BRAZIL

REF: SAO PAULO 683

Classified By: A/CG DAVID WOLFE FOR REASONS 1.4(D)

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: On June 17, 2005, the Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) broke up a Lebanese-organized drug ring based in Sao Paulo and operating in a number of cites in southern Brazil. 8Operation Tamara,8 (thedate fruit in Portuguese,) involved coordinationwith the German federal police and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration,s (DEA) Regional Office atConsulate General Sao Paulo (SPRO). Press repors on the operation specifically mentioned DEA,s nvolvement in the operation, although no direct inolvement of DEA personnel from Consulate Sao Paulo has yet been made in the press. The press also reported that DPF stated that the drugs seized, some 65 kilos of cocaine worth USD 400,000, came from Paraguay and Bolivia and were destined for Europe and the Middle East. Press reports indicated that in addition to the drug seizures, one goal of the DPF was to identify members of Hezbollah living and operating in Brazil. Post is attempting to ascertain if any of the arrested Lebanese drug traffickers have connections with Hezbollah or any terrorist group.

END SUMMARY PRESS SPOTLIGHTS INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS AND COOPERATION ——————————————— ————-

¶2. (SBU) On Friday, June 17, after eleven months of investigation, Brazilian Federal Police arrested 17 members of a Lebanese-organized drug ring operating in Sao Paulo and southern Brazil. Extensive press reports on the operation highlighted the transnational scope of the drug ring as well as international law enforcement cooperation with the DPF investigating the group. The press reports indicated that authorities believe that the ring, which comprises five Lebanese families, typically sends approximately 120 kilos of cocaine per month from Brazil to Europe and launders the proceeds by purchasing real estate and expensive luxury automobiles in Brazil and Lebanon. (Note: The reports differ on the quantity smuggled each month. End Note) Authorities reportedly believe that the drugs enter Brazil from Bolivia and Paraguay through the border city of Foz do Iguacu in the Brazil-Paraguay-Argentina tri-border region and from Ponta Pora on the border of the southwestern state of Mato Grosso do Sul State and Paraguay. Ring members reportedly transported the drugs to Sao Paulo, where they contracted Brazilian, Dutch, Canadian, Nigerian and South African couriers to smuggle the drugs to Frankfurt, Lisbon and locations in the Middle East, passing through the airports of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, and Recife. Press reports indicate that the authorities first became aware of the drug-smuggling operation in June 2004, when three Americans were arrested on drug charges in Istanbul, after disembarking from a flight from Sao Paulo.

¶3. (U) Press reports indicate that the drug ring is believed to comprise several families of Lebanese descent who, having fled Lebanon during the 1980s, settled in Brazil, Germany and Switzerland. The press reports describe the confiscation of documents written in Arabic and a large, framed picture of the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, in one of the apartments of the ring members. The press indicated that USD 190,000 was found in the apartment of one of the ring members.

¶4. (U) Folha do Sao Paulo, Brazil’s largest circulation daily, reported that in addition to dismantling the drug ring, the DPF,s objective is to identify members of Hezbollah operating in Brazil. The same press article claims that Hezbollah has 140 members in Brazil. According to press statements, documents confiscated during Operation “Tamara” will be passed to international intelligence agencies for evaluation.

POST PERSPECTIVE ON THE OPERATION ———————————

¶5. (S) DEA personnel working with DPF agents note that a possible Hezbollah connection was not a focus during the course of the investigation. It should be noted that the GOB has consistently denied that any Hezbollah agents or agents of any other Middle Eastern terrorist organization operate in Brazil. Operational aspects of the case are being reported through DEA channels. Post DEA reports that the amount seized in the raid was closer to USD 300,000, not USD 190,000, as reported in the press.
¶6. (S) DEA began investigating the ring in cooperation with DPF after the three Americans were arrested in Istanbul, Turkey and one in Sao Paulo in 2004. In addition, two other Americans were arrested in Madrid and Amsterdam in early 2004 with links to this ring. Currently, DEA authorities in Florida are conducting investigations on these Americans and the Lebanese-Brazilian involved.

¶7. (S) COMMENT: DEA notes that one of the outstanding questions from this operation is the final destination for the profits of this lucrative cocaine trade. Past experience has been that Brazilian authorities lack effective tools to track the profits of illicit drug operations; coordination between financial officials and counter-narcotics agents has not been good. While DEA, DPF and German Federal Police were arresting members of the Brazilian drug ring in Operation Tamara, Ecuadorian authorities reportedly arrested seven operatives in a drug smuggling/Hezbollah ring in Quito, Ecuador in Operation Damascus. BBC On-Line indicates that organizers of the Ecuadorian ring were sending seventy percent of profits to Hezbollah.

¶8. (S) Regional Security Office (RSO) Sao Paulo is coordinating with DEA to determine whether any of the documents obtained in these, or other recent arrests include U.S. passports or visas. RSO is investigating any possible repercussions against post or personnel from these recent arrests, or from the press reports identifying DEA,s participation in the investigation. Post is attempting to determine whether any of the arrested Lebanese-Brazilians have connections to Hezbollah, or any other middle-eastern terrorist network. So far we have not found any evidence of such a connection. End Comment.

WOLFE

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2005/07/05SAOPAULO872.html

PROGRESS IN LIBYA-SWISS CASE: ONE BUSINESSMAN CLEARED OF ALL CHARGES

Monday, January 31st, 2011

ID     10TRIPOLI112
SUBJECT
DATE     2010-02-10 00:00:00
CLASSIFICATION     CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGIN     Embassy Tripoli
TEXT     C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 00011

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/10/2020

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CVIS, LY, SZ SUBJECT: PROGRESS IN LIBYA-SWISS CASE: ONE BUSINESSMAN CLEARED OF ALL CHARGES

REF: Tripoli 91

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (C) Summary: Swiss businessman Rachid Hamdani received a “not guilty” verdict from a Libyan tax court on February 7, officially clearing him of all legal charges levied against him by the GOL. The verdict came a day after Max Goeldi, the other Swiss businessman held in Libya since July 2007, was fined 1000 Libyan Dinar (approximately US$801) for tax violations. Now that all charges against Hamdani have been lifted, the Swiss Embassy and Hamdani’s Libyan lawyer are working to determine what other “conditions” must be fulfilled in order for Hamdani to leave the country. Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto said that as soon as the GOL allows the two Swiss businessmen to depart, SWITZERLAND will be ready to begin issuing visas as a first step in “normalizing” the relationship. End Summary.

2.(C) On February 7, a Libyan tax court issued a “not guilty” verdict to Rachid Hamdani, one of two Swiss businessmen detained in Libya since July 2007. Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto confirmed that following Hamdani’s successful January 27 appeal in the Immigration Court (reftel), Hamdani is officially cleared of all legal charges the Libyan government has held against him. The Swiss Embassy and Hamdani’s Libyan lawyer are working to determine what other “conditions” must be fulfilled in order for Hamdani to leave the country, as the GOL is still holding Hamdani’s passport.

3.(C) The Hamdani verdict came a day after the same Libyan tax court fined the other Swiss businessman, Max Goeldi, 1000 Libyan Dinar (approximately US$801) for violating Libyan tax laws. Lazarotto said that Goeldi does not intend to appeal that decision. He reported that Goeldi’s appeals trial before the immigration court, which was postponed for unclear reasons last week, had been rescheduled for this Thursday, February 11.

4.(C) Lazarotto noted that the political track continues to move forward in Bern. According to Lazarotto, the Libyans and Swiss have been in “continuous talks” via Germany over the past few weeks. While they have not yet achieved resolution on all points of disagreement, they are slowly moving toward normalization. One sign of progress is that the Libyans issued the new Swiss Vice Consul a two-year, multiple entry visa and a residency permit. Lazarotto believes that the Libyans want to give SWITZERLAND the capacity to issue visas as soon as normalization is achieved. The first piece of normalization will be the visa policy, and the Swiss are ready to begin issuing Schengen visas as soon as the Swiss businessmen are allowed to leave the country and an agreement is signed. Official and working visas will be their first priority issuances. They expect to begin processing 40 visa applications per day and to gradually increase to the previous average of 70-80 applications per day.

5.(C) Comment: Lazarotto’s latest comments suggest that the Swiss are anxious to end the Swiss businessmen saga and have directly mapped out a solution for the Libyans — release the two Swiss and the visa hold will be lifted. The series of positive court rulings over the last few weeks indicate that the Libyans are willing to work within those parameters. Now that the GOL has no legal reason to keep Hamdani in the country, the coming days will tell whether Libya intends to fulfill its end of the bargain. End Comment.

CRETZ

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XTAGS: XTAGPREL, XTAGPHUM, XTAGCVIS, XTAGLY, XTAGSZ SUBJECT: PROGRESS IN LIBYA-SWISS CASE: ONE BUSINESSMAN CLEARED OF ALL CHARGES
XDEST_10TRIPOLI91
TAGS

ADDED     2011-01-31 21:09:00
STAMP     2011-02-01 02:14:13
VOTE_POINTS     0
VOTE_COUNT     0
VOTE_RATING     0
PRIORITY     OO
TWEETS     0
MANUAL     N
SITELINK

ISNEW     Y
FINGERPRINT1

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION:CRITICAL FOREIGN DEPENDENCIES (CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES LOCATED ABROAD)

Wednesday, January 26th, 2011
ID
09STATE15113
SUBJECT
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION:CRITICAL FOREIGN DEPENDENCIES (CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES LOCATED ABROAD)
DATE
2009-02-18 23:11:00
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET//NOFORN
ORIGIN
Secretary of State
TEXT
S E C R E T STATE 015113 

NOFORN, NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/29/2019
TAG PTER, PGOV, ASEC, EFIN, ENRG, KCIP
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION:CRITICAL FOREIGN DEPENDENCIES (CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES LOCATED ABROAD)

REF: STATE 6461 PLEASE PASS TO RSO, POLOFF, ECON, and MANAGEMENT (GSO and IT). Classified by S/CT DAS, Susan F. Burk, Reason: 1/4 (B), (D), (E), and (G)

¶1. (U//FOUO) This is an action request; see Para. 13.

¶2. (U//FOUO) Under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was written to provide the unifying structure for the integration of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) protection into a single national program. The overarching goal of the NIPP is to build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the nation’s CI/KR to prevent, deter, neutralize or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate or exploit them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster or other emergency.

¶3. (U//FOUO) In addition to a list of critical domestic CI/KR, the NIPP requires compilation and annual update of a comprehensive inventory of CI/KR that are located outside U.S. borders and whose loss could critically impact the public health, economic security, and/or national and homeland security of the United States. DHS in collaboration with State developed the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI)to identify these critical U.S. foreign dependencies — foreign CI/KR that may affect systems within the U.S. directly or indirectly. State is coordinating with DHS to develop the 2009 inventory, and the action request in Para. 13 represents the initial step in this process.

¶4. (U//FOUO) The NIPP does not define CI/KR. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7) references definitions in two separate statutes. In the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195(e)) “critical infrastructure” is defined as systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States the incapacitation or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. In the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(9)) “key resources” are defined as publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government.

¶5. (U//FOUO) The NIPP identifies 18 CI/KR sectors: agriculture and food; defense industrial base; energy; healthcare and public health; national monuments and icons; banking and finance; drinking water and water treatment systems; chemical; commercial facilities; dams; emergency services; commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; information technology; communications; postal and shipping; transportation and systems; government facilities; and critical manufacturing. Obviously some of these sectors are more likely to have international components than other sectors.

¶6. (U//FOUO) Department is surveying posts for their input on critical infrastructure and key resources within their host country which, if destroyed, disrupted or exploited, would likely have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United States. We expect posts, after consultation among all sections and agencies, will in many instances immediately recognize whether such CI/KR exist in their host country. Posts are not/not being asked to consult with host governments with respect to this request.

¶7. (U//FOUO) Building upon the initial survey completed in 2008, Department requests each post reassess and update information about infrastructure and resources in each host country whose loss could immediately affect the public health, economic security, and/or national and homeland security of the United States. This reassessment may include suggestions from posts for removing, modifying, or adding CI/KR to the list developed in 2008 (see the list of CI/KR identified in 2008 in Para. 15 below).

¶8. (U//FOUO) The following three categories should be considered when determining whether critical foreign dependencies exist in the host country: 1) direct physical linkages (e.g., pipelines, undersea telecommunications cables, and assets located in close enough proximity to the U.S. border their destruction could cause cross-border consequences, such as damage to dams and chemical facilities); 2) sole or predominantly foreign/host-country sourced goods and services (e.g., minerals or chemicals critical to U.S. industry, a critical finished product manufactured in one or only a small number of countries, or a telecom hub whose destruction might seriously disrupt global communications); and 3) critical supply chain nodes (e.g., the Strait of Hormuz and Panama Canal, as well as any ports or shipping lanes in the host-country critical to the functioning of the global supply chain).

¶9. (U//FOUO) Although they are important issues, Department is not/not seeking information at this time on second-order effects (e.g., public morale and confidence, and interdependency effects that might cascade from a disruption).

¶10. (U//FOUO) Posts do not need to report government facilities overseas managed by State or war fighting facilities managed by other departments or agencies.

¶11. (U//FOUO) The following general information should be addressed when nominating elements for inclusion, removal, or modification: — (U//FOUO) Name and physical location of the asset, system, or supply chain node. — (U//FOUO) Post’s rationale for including, modifying, or removing an asset, system, or supply chain node. — (U//FOUO) Any information Post has regarding conditions in country causing Post to believe the CI/KR is an active target or especially vulnerable due to natural circumstances. — (U//FOUO) Any information Post has regarding CIP activities in country and who/what agency is responsible for those activities.

¶12. (U//FOUO) Questions can be directed to Sharri R. Clark in S/CT: ClarkSR@state.sgov.gov; ClarkSR@state.gov; 202-647-1514. Alternatively, questions can be directed to S. Gail Robertson in S/CT: RobertsonSG2@state.sgov.gov; RobertsonSG@state.gov, 202-647-3769.

¶13. (U//FOUO) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are requested to report by March 20, 2009 on CI/KR in their host country meeting the criteria outlined above and a brief explanation of why posts believes the asset meets the criteria. Due to the potential sensitivity of assets identified, posts are asked to consider the necessity of classifying their responses appropriately. Please note the list in its entirety is classified S/NF. If post determines there are no such CI/KR in its host country, a negative report is requested. Please send replies to the attention of Sharri R. Clark in S/CT and use the subject line “CI/KR Response for S/CT”.

¶14. (U//FOUO) Posts’ assistance with providing input to the first list created in 2008 was invaluable, and Department appreciates Posts’ continuing cooperation.

¶15. (S//NF) Following is the 2008 Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI) list (CI/KR organized by region): [BEGIN TEXT OF LIST]

AFRICA

Congo (Kinshasa): Cobalt (Mine and Plant)

Gabon: Manganese – Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade Guinea: Bauxite (Mine)

South Africa: BAE Land System OMC, Benoni, South Africa Brown David Gear Industries LTD, Benoni, South Africa Bushveld Complex (chromite mine) Ferrochromium Manganese – Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade Palladium Mine and Plant Platinum Mines Rhodium

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Australia: Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Brookvale, Australia Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Sydney, Australia Manganese – Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade Nickel Mines Maybe Faulding Mulgrave Victoria, Australia: Manufacturing facility for Midazolam injection. Mayne Pharma (fill/finish), Melbourne,Australia: Sole suppliers of Crotalid Polyvalent Antivenin (CroFab).

China: C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Chom Hom Kok, Hong Kong C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing Shanghai, China China-US undersea cable landing, Chongming, China China-US undersea cable landing Shantou, China EAC undersea cable landing Tseung Kwan O, Hong Kong FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Tong Fuk, Hong Kong Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators Fluorspar (Mine) Germanium Mine Graphite Mine Rare Earth Minerals/Elements Tin Mine and Plant Tungsten – Mine and Plant Polypropylene Filter
Material for N-95 Masks Shanghai Port Guangzhou Port Hong Kong Port Ningbo Port Tianjin Port

Fiji: Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Suva, Fiji

Indonesia: Tin Mine and Plant Straits of Malacca

Japan: C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Chikura, Japan C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Shima, Japan China-US undersea cable, Okinawa, Japan EAC undersea cable landing Ajigaura, Japan EAC undersea cable landing Shima, Japan FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Wada, Japan FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Wada, Japan Japan-US undersea cable landing, Maruyama, Japan Japan-US undersea cable landing Kitaibaraki, Japan KJCN undersea cable landing Fukuoka, Japan KJCN undersea cable landing Kita-Kyushu, Japan Pacific
Crossing-1 (PC-1) undersea cable landing Ajigaura, Japan Pacific Crossing-1 (PC-1) undersea cable landing Shima, Japan Tyco Transpacific undersea cable landing, Toyohashi, Japan Tyco Transpacific undersea cable landing Emi, Japan Hitachi,
Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators Port of Chiba Port of Kobe Port of Nagoya Port of Yokohama Iodine Mine Metal Fabrication Machines Titanium Metal (Processed) Biken, Kanonji City, Japan Hitachi Electrical Power Generators and Components Large AC Generators above 40 MVA

Malaysia: Straits of Malacca

New Zealand: Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Whenuapai, New Zealand Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Takapuna, New Zealand

Philippines: C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Batangas, Philippines EAC undersea cable landing Cavite, Philippines

Republic of Korea: C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Pusan, Republic of Korea. EAC undersea cable landing Shindu-Ri, Republic of Korea FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Pusan, Republic of Korea KJCN undersea cable landing Pusan, Republic of Korea Hitachi Large Electric Power Transformers 230 – 500 kV Busan Port

Singapore: C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Changi, Singapore EAC undersea cable landing Changi North, Singapore Port of Singapore Straits of Malacca

Taiwan: C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Fangshan, Taiwan C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Tanshui, Taiwan China-US undersea cable landing Fangshan, Taiwan EAC undersea cable landing Pa Li, Taiwan FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Toucheng, Taiwan Kaohsiung Port

EUROPE AND EURASIA

Europe (Unspecified): Metal Fabrication Machines: Small number of Turkish companies (Durma, Baykal, Ermaksan)

Austria: Baxter AG, Vienna, Austria: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV) Octapharma Pharmazeutika, Vienna, Austria: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV)

Azerbaijan: Sangachal Terminal Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline

Belarus: Druzhba Oil Pipeline

Belgium: Germanium Mine Baxter SA, Lessines, Belgium: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV) Glaxo Smith Kline, Rixensart, Belgium: Acellular Pertussis Vaccine Component GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals SA, Wavre, Belgium: Acellular Pertussis Vaccine Component Port of Antwerp

Denmark: TAT-14 undersea cable landing, Blaabjerg, Denmark Bavarian Nordic (BN), Hejreskovvej, Kvistgard, Denmark: Smallpox Vaccine Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Bagsvaerd, Denmark: Numerous formulations of insulin Novo Nordisk Insulin Manufacturer: Global insulin supplies Statens Serum Institut, Copenhagen, Denmark: DTaP (including D and T components) pediatric version

France: APOLLO undersea cable, Lannion, France FA-1 undersea cable, Plerin, France TAT-14 underseacable landing St. Valery, France Sanofi-Aventis Insulin Manufacturer: Global insulin supplies Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine finishing Alstrom, Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators Alstrom Electrical Power Generators and Components EMD Pharms Semoy, France: Cyanokit Injection GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. Evreux, France: Influenza neurominidase inhibitor RELENZA (Zanamivir) Diagast, Cedex, France: Olympus (impacts blood typing ability) Genzyme Polyclonals SAS (bulk), Lyon, France: Thymoglobulin Sanofi Pasteur SA, Lyon, France: Rabies virus vaccine

Georgia: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline

Germany: TAT-14 undersea cable landing, Nodren, Germany. Atlantic Crossing-1 (AC-1) undersea cable landing Sylt, Germany BASF Ludwigshafen: World\’s largest integrated chemical complex Siemens Erlangen: Essentially irreplaceable production of key chemicals Siemens, GE, Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators Draeger
Safety AG & Co., Luebeck, Germany: Critical to gas detection capability Junghans Feinwerktechnik Schramberg, Germany: Critical to the production of mortars TDW-Gasellschaft Wirksysteme, Schroebenhausen, Germany: Critical to the production of the Patriot Advanced Capability Lethality Enhancement Assembly Siemens, Large Electric Power Transformers 230 – 500 kV Siemens, GE Electrical Power Generators and Components Druzhba Oil Pipeline Sanofi Aventis Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Lantus Injection (insulin) Heyl Chemish-pharmazeutische Fabrik GmbH: Radiogardase (Prussian blue) Hameln Pharmaceuticals, Hameln, Germany: Pentetate Calcium Trisodium (Ca DTPA) and Pentetate Zinc Trisodium (Zn DTPA) for contamination with plutonium, americium, and curium IDT Biologika GmbH, Dessau Rossiau, Germany: BN Small Pox Vaccine. Biotest AG, Dreiech, Germany: Supplier for TANGO (impacts automated blood typing ability), CSL Behring GmbH, Marburg, Germany: Antihemophilic factor/von, Willebrand factor Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics GmbH, Marburg, Germany: Rabies virus vaccine Vetter Pharma Fertigung GmbH & Co KG, Ravensburg, Germany (filling): Rho(D) IGIV Port of Hamburg

Ireland: Hibernia Atlantic undersea cable landing, Dublin Ireland Genzyme Ireland Ltd. (filling), Waterford, Ireland: Thymoglobulin

Italy: Glaxo Smith Kline SpA (fill/finish), Parma, Italy: Digibind (used to treat snake bites) Trans-Med gas pipeline

Netherlands: Atlantic Crossing-1 (AC-1) undersea cable landing Beverwijk, Netherlands TAT-14 undersea cable landing, Katwijk, Netherlands Rotterdam Port

Norway: Cobalt Nickel Mine

Poland: Druzhba Oil Pipeline

Russia: Novorossiysk Export Terminal Primorsk Export Terminal. Nadym Gas Pipeline Junction: The most critical gas facility in the world Uranium Nickel Mine: Used in certain types of stainless steel and superalloys Palladium Mine and Plant Rhodium

Spain: Strait of Gibraltar Instituto Grifols, SA, Barcelona, Spain: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV) Maghreb-Europe (GME) gas pipeline, Algeria

Sweden: Recip AB Sweden: Thyrosafe (potassium iodine)

Switzerland: Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. BASEL, Switzerland: Tamiflu (oseltamivir) Berna Biotech, Berne, Switzerland: Typhoid vaccine CSL Behring AG, Berne, Switzerland: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV)

Turkey: Metal Fabrication Machines: Small number of Turkish companies (Durma, Baykal, Ermaksan) Bosporus Strait Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline

Ukraine: Manganese – Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade

United Kingdom: Goonhilly Teleport, Goonhilly Downs, United Kingdom Madley Teleport, Stone Street, Madley, United Kingdom Martelsham Teleport, Ipswich, United Kingdom APOLLO undersea cable landing Bude, Cornwall Station, United Kingdom Atlantic Crossing-1 (AC-1) undersea cable landing Whitesands Bay FA-1 undersea cable landing Skewjack, Cornwall Station Hibernia Atlantic undersea cable landing, Southport, United Kingdom TAT-14 undersea cable landing Bude, Cornwall Station, United Kingdom Tyco Transatlantic undersea cable landing, Highbridge, United Kingdom Tyco Transatlantic undersea cable landing, Pottington, United Kingdom. Yellow/Atlantic Crossing-2 (AC-2) undersea cable landing Bude, United Kingdom Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine finishing BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd., Presont, Lancashire, United Kingdom: Critical to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter BAE Systems Operations Ltd., Southway, Plymouth Devon, United Kingdom: Critical to
extended range guided munitions BAE Systems RO Defense, Chorley, United Kingdom: Critical to the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) AGM-154C (Unitary Variant) MacTaggart Scott, Loanhead, Edinburgh, Lothian, Scotland, United Kingdom: Critical to the Ship Submersible Nuclear (SSN)

NEAR/MIDDLE EAST

Djibouti: Bab al-Mendeb: Shipping lane is a critical supply chain node

Egypt: \’Ayn Sukhnah-SuMEd Receiving Import Terminal \’Sidi Kurayr-SuMed Offloading Export Terminal Suez Canal

Iran: Strait of Hormuz Khark (Kharg) Island Sea Island Export Terminal Khark Island T-Jetty

Iraq: Al-Basrah Oil Terminal

Israel: Rafael Ordnance Systems Division, Haifa, Israel: Critical to Sensor Fused Weapons (SFW), Wind Corrected Munitions Dispensers (WCMD), Tail Kits, and batteries

Kuwait: Mina\’ al Ahmadi Export Terminal

Morocco: Strait of Gibraltar Maghreb-Europe (GME) gas pipeline, Morocco

Oman: Strait of Hormuz

Qatar: Ras Laffan Industrial Center: By 2012 Qatar will be the largest source of imported LNG to U.S.

Saudi Arabia: Abqaiq Processing Center: Largest crude oil processing and stabilization plant in the world Al Ju\’aymah Export Terminal: Part of the Ras Tanura complex As Saffaniyah Processing Center Qatif Pipeline Junction Ras at Tanaqib Processing Center Ras Tanura Export Terminal Shaybah Central Gas-oil Separation Plant

Tunisia: Trans-Med Gas Pipeline

United Arab Emirates (UAE): Das Island Export Terminal Jabal Zannah Export Terminal Strait of Hormuz

Yemen: Bab al-Mendeb: Shipping lane is a critical supply chain node

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

Kazakhstan: Ferrochromium Khromtau Complex, Kempersai, (Chromite Mine)

India: Orissa (chromite mines) and Karnataka (chromite mines) Generamedix Gujurat, India: Chemotherapy agents, including florouracil and methotrexate

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Argentina: Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine finishing

Bermuda: GlobeNet (formerly Bermuda US-1 (BUS-1) undersea cable landing Devonshire, Bermuda

Brazil: Americas-II undersea cable landing Fortaleza, Brazil GlobeNet undersea cable landing Fortaleza, Brazil GlobeNet undersea cable landing Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Iron Ore from Rio Tinto Mine Manganese – Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic;
chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade Niobium (Columbium), Araxa, Minas Gerais State (mine) Ouvidor and Catalao I, Goias State: Niobium

Chile: Iodine Mine

Canada: Hibernia Atlantic undersea cable landing Halifax , Nova Scotia, Canada James Bay Power Project, Quebec: monumental hydroelectric power development Mica Dam, British Columbia: Failure would impact the Columbia River Basin. Hydro Quebec, Quebec: Critical irreplaceable source of power to portions of Northeast U. S. Robert Moses/Robert H. Saunders Power, Ontario: Part of the St. Lawrence Power Project, between Barnhart Island, New York, and Cornwall, Ontario Seven Mile Dam, British Columbia: Concrete gravity dam between two other hydropower dams along the Pend d\’Oreille River Pickering Nuclear Power Plant, Ontario, Canada Chalk River Nuclear Facility, Ontario: Largest supplier of medical radioisotopes in the world Hydrofluoric Acid Production Facility, Allied Signal, Amherstburg, Ontario Enbridge Pipeline Alliance Pipeline: Natural gas transmission from Canada Maritime and Northeast Pipeline: Natural gas transmission from Canada Transcanada Gas: Natural gas transmission from Canada Alexandria Bay POE, Ontario: Northern border crossing Ambassador Bridge POE, Ontario: Northern border crossing Blaine POE, British Columbia: Northern border crossing Blaine Washington Rail Crossing, British Columbia Blue Water Bridge POE, Ontario: Northern border crossing Champlain POE, Quebec: Northern border crossing CPR Tunnel Rail Crossing, Ontario (Michigan Central Rail Crossing) International Bridge Rail Crossing, Ontario International Railway Bridge Rail Crossing Lewiston-Queenstown POE, Ontario: Northern border crossing Peace Bridge POE, Ontario: Northern border crossing Pembina POE, Manitoba: Northern border crossing North Portal Rail Crossing, Saskatchewan St. Claire Tunnel Rail Crossing, Ontario Waneta Dam, British Columbia: Earthfill/concrete hydropower dam Darlington Nuclear Power Plant, Ontario, Canada. E-ONE Moli Energy, Maple Ridge, Canada: Critical to production of various military application electronics General Dynamics Land Systems – Canada, London Ontario, Canada: Critical to the production of the Stryker/USMC LAV Vehicle Integration Raytheon Systems Canada Ltd. ELCAN Optical Technologies Division, Midland, Ontario, Canada: Critical to the production of the AGM-130 Missile Thales Optronique Canada, Inc., Montreal, Quebec: Critical optical systems for ground combat vehicles Germanium Mine Graphite Mine Iron Ore Mine Nickel Mine Niobec Mine, Quebec, Canada: Niobium Cangene, Winnipeg, Manitoba: Plasma Sanofi Pasteur Ltd., Toronto, Canada: Polio virus vaccine GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals, North America, Quebec, Canada: Pre-pandemic influenza vaccines

French Guiana: Americas-II undersea cable landing Cayenne, French Guiana

Martinique: Americas-II undersea cable landing Le Lamentin, Martinique

Mexico: FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Tijuana, Mexico Pan-American Crossing (PAC) undersea cable landing Mazatlan, Mexico Amistad International Dam: On the Rio Grande near Del Rio, Texas and Ciudad Acuna, Coahuila, Mexico Anzalduas Dam: Diversion dam south of Mission, Texas, operated jointly by the U.S. and Mexico for flood control Falcon International Dam: Upstream of Roma, Texas and Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas, Mexico Retamal Dam: Diversion dam south of Weslaco, Texas, operated jointly by the U.S. and Mexico for flood control GE Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators: Main source for a large portion of larger components Bridge of the Americas: Southern border crossing Brownsville POE: Southern border crossing Calexico East POE: Southern border crossing Columbia Solidarity Bridge: Southern border crossing Kansas City Southern de Mexico (KCSM) Rail Line, (Mexico) Nogales POE: Southern border crossing Laredo Rail Crossing Eagle Pass Rail Crossing Otay Mesa Crossing: Southern border crossing Pharr International Bridge: Southern border crossing World Trade Bridge: Southern border crossing Ysleta Zaragosa Bridge: Southern border crossing Hydrofluoric Acid Production Facility Graphite Mine GE Electrical Power Generators and Components General Electric, Large
Electric Power Transformers 230 – 500 kV

Netherlands Antilles: Americas-II undersea cable landing Willemstad, Netherlands Antilles.

Panama: FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Fort Amador, Panama Panama Canal

Peru: Tin Mine and Plant

Trinidad and Tobago: Americas-II undersea cable landing Port of Spain Atlantic LNG: Provides 70% of U.S. natural gas import needs

Venezuela: Americas-II undersea cable landing Camuri, Venezuela GlobeNet undersea cable landing, Punta Gorda, Venezuela GlobeNet undersea cable landing Catia La Mar, Venezuela GlobeNet undersea cable landing Manonga, Venezuela [END TEXT OF LIST]

¶16. (U//FOUO) Minimize considered.

CLINTON

HEADER
INFO LOG-00 MFA-00 EEB-00 AF-00 AGRE-00 AIT-00 AMAD-00
AOP-00 AEX-00 AS-00 A-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 CIP-00
COME-00 CCOE-00 CPR-00 INL-00 DNI-00 DIM-00 DODE-00
DOEE-00 WHA-00 PERC-00 DS-00 EAP-00 DHSE-00 EUR-00
FBIE-00 VCI-00 FSI-00 OBO-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00
CAC-00 MED-07 MFLO-00 MMP-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 M-00
CDC-00 VCIE-00 NEA-00 DCP-00 NRC-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00
OES-00 OIG-00 NIMA-00 PM-00 P-00 ISNE-00 DOHS-00
FMPC-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 MR-00 TRSE-00 CBP-00
EPAE-00 SCRS-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 G-00
ALM-00 SCA-00 SAS-00 FA-00 PMA-00 SWCI-00 /007R 

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http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09STATE15113.html

Kuhhandel: Bundesrat verbot Aargauer Firma Iran-Deals wegen UBS

Thursday, January 20th, 2011

Der UBS-Steuerskandal hatte direkte Auswirkungen auf die Badener AF-Colenco. US-Aussenministerin Hillary Clinton bearbeitete den Bundesrat, Colencos Iran-Geschäfte zu verbieten. Nach drei Jahren und unter dem Druck der Banken-Pleite gab Bern nach. von Christian Bütikofer

Als sich im März 2009 Bundesrätin Micheline Calmy-Rey und die US-Aussenministerin Hillary Clinton in Genf zum Gespräch trafen, gings unter anderem auch um die Aargauer Firma AF-Colenco. Das zeigt eine neue Wikileaks-Depesche, die von der norwegischen Tageszeitung «Aftenposten» veröffentlicht wurde.

Führend beim Schweizer Nukleartechnik-Programm

Die Nuklear-Experten der Schwedisch-Schweizerischen AF-Colenco geschäfteten schon lange mit dem Iran, seit 2004 besteht dort ein Verbindungsbüro.

AF-Colenco ging aus der Motor-Columbus-Gruppe hervor. Deren Ingenieur-Abteilung war federführend beim Schweizer Kernkraftwerk-Programm in den 60er-Jahren.

Die amerikanische Regierung verdächtigte AF-Colenco, das Iran-Embargo zu unterlaufen, das gegen das Land wegen dessen Urananreicherungs-Plänen verhängt wurde.

Clinton drängte Calmy-Rey, im Falle AF-Colencos endlich aktiv zu werden und der Firma die Iran-Geschäfte zu verbieten. Dazu schickten die Amerikaner Ende Juni 2009 ein weiteres Mal Geheimdiensterkenntnisse über AF-Colencos Aktivitäten.

Diese Informationen waren zentral, zeigt die Wikileaks-Depesche. Denn die damalige Volkswirtschafts-Vorsteherin Doris Leuthard bestätigte später, die US-Angaben über AF-Colenco hätten sich mit jenen der Schweizer Geheimdienste gedeckt.

Am 2. Juli 2009 war Schluss

Der Bundesrat setzte AF-Colenco ein Ultimatum. Die Badener sollten beweisen, dass die Iran-Deals legal waren, doch die Firma konnte die Vorwürfe nicht genügend entkräften. Am 2. Juli 2009 beschied der Bundesrat den Aargauern, ihre Geschäfte mit dem Iran sofort einzustellen.

Das Entgegenkommen des Bundesrates werteten die US-Diplomaten als Versuch, die UBS-Steuerbetrugsaffäre durch Konzessionen auf anderen Gebieten aus der Welt zu schaffen. Auch das zeigt die nun veröffentlichte Wikileaks-Depesche.

AF-Colencos Nuklear-Technologie-Chef Lucien Teunckens traf sich im November 2008 mit Schwedens Sicherheitsinspektor Lars Hildingsson von der Strahlenschutz-Behörde. Er machte Teunckens darauf aufmerksam, dass Schweden Exporte von Nukleartechnologie in den Iran verbiete. Teunckens versicherte, er sei sich dessen bewusst und man würde die Gesetze einhalten.

Schon früher habe er auch das Schweizer Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft SECO kontaktiert, beteuerte Teunckens, das SECO überwache AF-Colenco aufmerksam.

Diese «Kontaktaufnahme» dürfte nicht ganz freiwillig geschehen sein, denn das SECO hatte 2008 eine Untersuchung gegen seine Firma eingeleitet.

Bereits seit 2006 versuchten die USA AF-Colenco über die Regierungen Schwedens und der Schweiz zur Geschäftsaufgabe im Iran zu zwingen.

Bundesrat wehrte sich lange Zeit gegen Verbot

Der Schweizerische Geheimdienst «Dienst für Analyse und Prävention» DAP informierte die amerikanischen Behörden 2007, dass AF-Colenco im Iran am Projekt eines Wasserkraft-Reaktors beteiligt sei – die Abteilung Exportkontrolle des SECO bewilligte den Deal.

Die Amerikaner insistierten 2007, die Gefahr sei gross, dass die Iraner die AF-Colencos Leichtwasser-Technologie für den Bau von Reaktoren mit Schwerem Wasser zweckentfremdeten. Es wird benötigt, um spaltbares Nuklearmaterial zu gewinnen. Das Endprodukt: waffenfähiges Plutonium.

Verdacht: geheime Atomwaffenforschung

Doch der Bundesrat beharrte damals noch – vor dem UBS-Skandal – der AF-Colenco-Deal sei rechtens und verstosse auch nicht gegen UNO-Resolutionen.

Doris Leuthard meinte dazu gegenüber der Presse, das SECO habe seit 2008 ein Verfahren eröffnet und 2009 abgeschlossen. Sie habe über die Entscheidung am 30. Juni 2009 informiert.

AF-Colenco gleiste das Iran-Geschäft auch mit Hilfe von Seyed Hossein Hosseini auf, der im Zusammenhang mit dem Arak-Reaktor eine wichtige Rolle spielte. In Arak betreibt der Iran einen umstrittenen Schwerwasser-Reaktor zu «Forschungszwecken».

40 Millionen Dollar-Deal

Nachdem AF-Colenco das Iran-Geschäft verboten wurde, traf sich Erwin Bollinger, Chef der SECO-Abteilung Exportkontrollen und Sanktionen, Mitte September 2009 mit den Amerikanern. Er erklärte ihnen, unter der damaligen Gesetzeslage für Exporte habe AF-Colenco nicht gestoppt werden können, obwohl der Deal im EU-Raum illegal gewesen sei.

Bollinger berichtete weiter, AF-Colenco habe sich sehr kooperativ gezeigt und tausende Dokumente rausgerückt. Den wirtschaftlichen Schaden für die Firma bezifferte er auf 40 Millionen Dollar.

Die Dokumente hat Bolligers Behörde zur Analyse ans Eidgenössische Nuklearsicherheitsinspektorat ENSI geschickt. Die Experten meinten, das von AF-Colenco in den Iran transferierte Wissen sei in der «Public Domain» zugänglich gewesen.

Mit anderen Worten: Es habe sich um Wissen gehandelt, das auch heute jedem Interessierten ohne Einschränkungen zugänglich sei.

Iranisches Personal in der Schweiz ausgebildet

Das sahen die Amerikaner jedoch anders: Die Grundlagen seien zwar frei zugänglich, die Expertenberatung zu diesem Wissen durch AF-Colenco sei jedoch keineswegs Allgemeingut gewesen. Genau diese Dienstleistung habe der Iran auch erhalten wollen, als das Land AF-Colenco kontaktierte.

Darüber hinaus habe AF-Colenco mindestens eine Akte als «höchst geheim» deklariert. Darin hätten die Aargauer detaillierte Design-Spezifikationen für den Kern eines Reaktors in der Nähe von Darkhovin auf Basis eines niederländischen Computerprogramms geliefert.

Zusätzlich seien in der Schweiz Mitarbeiter der iranischen Firma MASNA ausgebildet worden. Zwischen MASNA und dem iranischen Nuklearprogramm bestehe eine direkte Verbindung.

Hohelied auf Armee- und Wirtschafts-Filz

In der gleichen Sitzung gab Erwin Bollinger seinen Gesprächspartnern eine kleine Geschichtslektion in Sachen Filz zwischen Schweizer Entscheidungsträgern.

Er meinte, früher hätten politische Leader in der Schweiz mit den Wirtschaftsbossen gemeinsam in der Armee gedient und so persönliche Banden geknüpft.

Hohe Regeriungsbeamte hätten dann dieses Netzwerk benutzt, um solche Export-«Probleme» zu «lösen», bevor die Regierung ein Exportverbot aussprach. Bollinger bedauerte, dass dieses Armee-Netzwerk je länger je weniger bestehe.

AF-Colenco-CFO Dominik Heitzmann erklärte gegenüber «az», dass man sich trotz der aktuellen Veröffentlichungen nicht dazu veranlasst sehe, eine Presseerklärung abzugeben.

Gegenüber der Schweizerischen Depeschenagentur SDA bestritt später ein Sprecher der Firma, man sei jemals an einem iranischen Uranaufbereitungsprogramm beteiligt gewesen.

Wikileaks-Depeschen: 09BERN273, 08STOCKHOLM814, 08STOCKHOLM105067, 09STATE101981, 09STOCKHOLM778

© 20.01.2011, Aargauer Zeitung

SWEDES SAY COLENCO NOT EXPORTING OR SUPPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN

Thursday, January 20th, 2011

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 000814

STATE FOR EUR/CE, EUR/PRA AND ISN/RA (JALLEN-CLOSE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 TAGS: MNUC, PARM, IR, SW SUBJECT: SWEDES SAY COLENCO NOT EXPORTING OR SUPPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 743 B. STOCKHOLM 683 C. STATE 105067

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S) Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Inspector Lars Hildingsson told us December 2 that he met with Lucien Teuckens, Head of Nuclear Technology at AF-Colenco Ltd., on November 13. The purpose of the visit was to review Colencos activities with Iran, as well as its contacts with Swiss authorities and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Hildingsson explained to Teuckens that Swedish and EU legislation prohibits the direct or indirect export or support of nuclear equipment or technology from Sweden to Iran. Teuckens assured Hildingsson that he was aware of the legislation and that Colenco was not exporting or providing support to Iran.

2. (S) Teuckens stated that he has contacted the IAEA Safeguards Department, which told him it does not support Colencos activities and that Colenco must comply with all UN resolutions. Hildingsson commented that Colenco has contacted the SECO, Swiss nuclear authority, to ensure that Colencos activities follow Swiss legislation. He added that SECO is closely monitoring Colenco. Post will report any additional information septel.

WOOD

http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3994458.ece

IRAN/SWEDEN/NUCLEAR: COLENCO POWER ENGINEERING LIMITEDS ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN ON DESIGN OF NEW LIGHT WATER REACTOR

Thursday, January 20th, 2011

S E C R E T STATE 105067

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2033 TAGS: IR, MNUC, PARM SUBJECT: IRAN/SWEDEN/NUCLEAR: COLENCO POWER ENGINEERING LIMITEDS ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN ON DESIGN OF NEW LIGHT WATER REACTOR

REF: (A) 06 STATE 194734 (B) 06 BERN 2151 (C) 07 STATE 115392 (D) 07 BERN 783 (E) 07 BERN 913 (F) BERN 464

Classified By: EUR/PRA: Anita Friedt, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 5.

2. (S) OBJECTIVE: To persuade the Swedish Government to take the necessary steps to discourage the Sweden-owned and Switzerland-based firm, Colenco Power Engineering, Ltd., from continuing its relationship with Iran on designing or assisting in the design and construction of light water reactors (LWR).

3. (S//NF) BACKGROUND: Per reftels, in December 2006, the United States demarched the Swiss Government in response to information in our possession indicating ties between Colenco and Novin Energy, an Iranian firm linked to Iran,s nuclear program (Novin had been designated by the United States for proliferation reasons in January 2006 and the UN Security Council (UNSC) designated Novin Energy in UNSC Resolution 1747 in March 2007). At the time, Switzerland pledged to investigate the matter. In March 2007, during an intelligence liaison exchange, the Swiss Internal Security Service (Dienst Fuer Analyze und Praevention, DAP) informed the United States that although it had uncovered no connection between Colenco and Novin, Colenco was engaged in an ongoing business relationship with the AEOI in the design of a new, 360 MW(e) light water power reactor for Iran. The DAP noted that the project had been approved by Swiss export control authorities. In August 2007, the United States again approached Switzerland to register our significant concerns with such a relationship, particularly because such a relationship is inappropriate given Irans failure to resolve concerns regarding the nature of its nuclear program and there is a risk of technology diversion from light water reactors to UNSC-proscribed heavy water research reactors (REF C). Per REF E, Switzerland acknowledged the relationship in diplomatic channels, but maintained that it is permitted cooperation under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747; that similar cooperation on heavy water research reactors was declined by Colenco for fear of contributing to proliferation; and, that the Government of Switzerland would ensure that the risk of technology diversion is appropriately managed. Discussions with Switzerland since that time have resulted in no change their position. (Note: In August 2007, Colenco was purchased by a Swedish firm, AB ANGPANNEFORENINGEN (now called AF AB), though remains Switzerland-based.) In the September 2007 nonpaper, the Swiss reiterated arguments on Colencos dealings with the Iranian nuclear program. Information regarding Colencos dealings with Iran have involved interaction with an individual (Seyed Hossein Hosseini) who was designated in UNSCR 1803 for his involvement at a managerial level in the Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor project, was provided to the Swiss interlocutors (REF F). The Swiss stated that this information was new and took note of the name.

4. (S) BACKGROUND CONT: The United States views involvement in any new nuclear project in Iran, even a LWR-related project, as sending the wrong signal to Tehran at a very sensitive time for international diplomacy. Any relationship with Iran on new nuclear projects risks compromising broad, multilateral efforts to increase the pressure on the Iranian regime to comply fully with its NPT, UNSC, and IAEA obligations. Moreover, the United States continues to believe that the risk of technology diversion to proscribed nuclear activities is significant.

5. (S) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to deliver the points in paragraph 6 to host government interlocutors at the highest possible levels, which include noted IC-cleared language that must be delivered verbatim. Post should stress that the United States takes this issue very seriously, especially in light of Iran,s ongoing defiance of the international community. Post should encourage host government to approach the Swiss Government to encourage it to reconsider its authorization for such cooperation. Post also should request feedback on Host Governments ability to effect change in Swedish-owned companies nonproliferation behavior in foreign nations. Post may leave the points in paragraph 6 with host government interlocutor as a SECRET//REL non-paper, also requesting that an approach to the Swiss Government be scheduled in several weeks thereby allowing it to receive and absorb the information.

6. (S//REL SWEDEN) BEGIN APPROVED LANGUAGE:

— The United States has information that indicates a Sweden-owned and Switzerland-based firm – Colenco Power Engineering Limited (also known as simply Colenco) – is engaged with Iran in the design of a new LWR for Iran. Through this cooperation, the firm is engaging in transactions with the AEOI and through Novin Energy.

— We have information from August 2007 that Colenco was purchased by a Swedish firm AB ANGPANNEFORENINGEN (now called AF AB), though it remains Switzerland-based.

— The United States has engaged with the Government of Switzerland on this issue on several occasions to highlight our concerns that the relationship between Colenco and the AEOI presents a risk of contributing to Irans proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. The Swiss Government has acknowledged Colencos relationship with Iran, but is of the view that since the relationship has — to date — focused on light water power reactors, it is of reduced proliferation concern.

— The Swiss noted further that Colenco declined a previous opportunity to work with Iran on a heavy water research reactor in light of its sensitivity to proliferation concerns.

— While the UNSCRs do not specifically prohibit cooperation on LWRs, we continue to believe that though Colenco may not intend to assist Iran with its proliferation sensitive activities, especially its Arak heavy water research reactor project, any assistance given to Iranian entities that have been designed under UNSCRs carries an inherent risk of contributing to Iranian proliferation, and such nuclear cooperation at this time defeats the spirit of the UN Security Council resolutions.

— This is particularly the case in light of the fact that Colencos dealings with Iran have involved interaction with a UNSC-designated individual, Seyed Hossein Hosseini. This individual was designated in UNSCR 1803 for his involvement at a managerial level in the Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor (HWRR) project. This interaction continued after his designation in March 2008.

— In addition, this activity has involved Novin Energy, which had been designated by the United States for proliferation reasons in January 2006 and the UN Security Council (UNSC) designated Novin Energy in UNSC Resolution 1747 in March 2007.

— We also have information that Iran has suggested creating a new company to create separation between this project and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and associated entities. Such a new corporation would, in Irans view, permit Colenco to operate without restrictions placed upon it by the Swiss Government.

— In doing so, Iran is demonstrating once again its proclivity to create front companies to obscure its involvement in nuclear-related projects.

— The United States continues to have serious concerns regarding Colenco,s relationship with Iran, particularly in light of the fact that it involves cooperation with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.

— Moreover, Colencos involvement in such a nuclear project in Iran sends precisely the wrong signal to Tehran at a very sensitive time for international diplomacy and risks compromising broad, multilateral efforts to increase the pressure on the regime to comply fully with its NPT, UNSC, and IAEA obligations.

— We are providing this information to highlight our concerns that the relationship between Colenco and the AEOI presents a risk of contributing to Iran,s Proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.

— We hope you share our concerns, and urge your government to take whatever measures you can to halt this cooperation. We also urge you to inform the Swiss Government that you are aware of the relationship between Colenco and the AEOI, and that this activity must be stopped. Due to the sensitivity of this information, we request that you not inform the Swiss as to the details we have presented to you today or to disclose the fact of our Governments engagement on this issue.

END APPROVED LANGUAGE

7. (U) Post is requested to relay the Swedish Governments reactions and any substantive replies within one week of receipt of the demarche. Judee Allen-Close (ISN/RA, 202-736-4686, ) is the Department,s POC for this activity. Please slug any replies on this issue to EUR/CE, EUR/PRA, and ISN/RA.

RICE

http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3994459.ece

 

MEETING WITH SWISS HEAD OF EXPORT CONTROL POLICY AND SANCTIONS ERWIN BOLLINGER ON COLENCO

Thursday, January 20th, 2011

S E C R E T STATE 101981

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2034 TAGS: IR, MNUC, PARM SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SWISS HEAD OF EXPORT CONTROL POLICY AND SANCTIONS ERWIN BOLLINGER ON COLENCO

REF: A. BERN 000268 B. BERN 000273 C. STATE 064514

Classified By: EUR/PRA: Kathleen Morenski, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1. (U) Information only, no action.

2. (S) On 15 September 2009, Erwin Bollinger Head of Export Control Policy and Sanctions (SECO) met with Acting ISN DAS Tony Foley to discuss Colenco on the margins of broader export control talks with the United States.

3. (S) Acting DAS Foley began the meeting by delivering the key points of the script containing IC-cleared non-paper (see paragraph 7). The Swiss head of delegation, Erwin Bollinger, responded with a brief recitation of U.S.-Swiss exchanges on Colenco. Bollinger noted the following key points: 1.) Switzerland has been in close contact with Colenco for many years, but did not see any wrongdoing, only received &hints8 that technology provided by Colenco could be misused by the Iranians. 2.) Switzerland could not have accomplished its goals of stopping Colenco under current Swiss export control laws. 3.) The Swiss were contacted by their Swedish colleagues who indicated that the transactions would not be allowed under EU law.

4. (S) Bollinger indicated that Colenco had been very cooperative and provided thousands of pages to the Swiss Government in response to the requests for more information on the contracts. The documents were then sent to the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) for technical evaluation, and the Swiss nuclear safety experts agreed that the information provided to Iran from Colenco was in the public domain. Bollinger further stated that the decision was made to deny the export based on the catch-all clause from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) export control regulations and using U.S.-origin information. The loss of income to Colenco would be approximately 40 million dollars.

5. (S) Bollinger stated that exports to Iran have decreased in recent years, and Switzerland is 4th on the list of countries denying exports to Iran. There is a new revision to the export control law currently in the Upper House of Parliament to allow the Swiss government the ability to deny an export based on the NSG &catch-all8 caveat. Previously, export denials had to be associated with an international sanction or explicitly stated by an international export control regime. In years past, Swiss Government and industrial leaders went through military service together and developed personal relationships. Senior government officials used their network to resolve an export control issue before the Government issued a denial. This personal network between government and industrial officials is becoming decreasingly less prevalent. Legitimate areas of business are suffering and the Swiss Government is having an increasingly difficult time imposing export controls on the industry.

6. (S) Bollinger welcomed our cooperation on this matter and said that the GOS would keep us informed of any further developments, including any requests for additional U.S. information or questions resulting from this latest non-paper.

7. (S//REL SWITZERLAND) BEGIN U.S. NONPAPER (which Embassy Bern is welcome to convey to other Swiss officials if necessary during the course of its ongoing consultations on this issue).

We applaud Switzerlands decision to suspend Colencos support for Irans nuclear program and welcome the opportunity to provide you with additional information regarding the nature of this support.

Specifically, Switzerland has requested the following information:

Details regarding whether Colenco assistance exceeded that which could be credibly considered “public domain”;

The nature and role of Iranian firms MASNA, Ofogh, and ESNICO; and,

“Proof” of diversion from Colencos assistance to the Arak heavy water research reactor.

Public Domain

During our technical experts discussion in Budapest in June 2009, Swiss officials noted that Colenco contends its support did not exceed information available in the public domain. This view was reflected in the non-paper provided to Secretary Clinton on 31 July.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) definition of “public domain” is “technology that has been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination.”

We have information that Colenco provided Iran information which would not be permitted under this definition.

Colenco was contracted by Iran to provide custom design and engineering support for the reactor project at Darkhovin.

To do this, Colenco used published reactor design and probabilistic risk assessment methodologies. Those original, published methodologies would be considered “public domain.”

However, the application of those published methodologies by Colenco through its analysis is not. Further, the results were conveyed to Iran as a commercial, proprietary, and confidential product.

This “value-added” response by Colenco likely constituted the heart of what Iran was intending to purchase when it contracted with Colenco.

As noted previously, Colencos assistance involved primarily design support and at a very detailed level.

At least one of the documents provided by Colenco in this regard was marked “highly confidential data,” indicating assistance above the level of information in the public domain.

This document contained detailed reactor core design specifications derived from output of a Dutch computer code.

Colenco also trained MASNA personnel in Switzerland on probabilistic safety analysis and may have provided technical consultations on specific Darkhovin reactor design issues.

Discussion of specific design issues with the Darkhovin reactor (the design of which is not public) would go well beyond a credible definition of “public domain.”

Nature and role of Iranian firms MASNA, Ofogh, and ESNICO

We have information that links each of these firms to Irans nuclear program, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the Darkhovin reactor project.

Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA)

MASNA was established in 2006 by the AEOI to manage future nuclear power plant construction. It is an AEOI-owned firm.

AEOI is a UNSCR 1737-designated entity.

The firm was tasked to provide engineering work and support in the areas of fuel, dosimetry, and neutronic calculations on the IR-40 Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor (HWRR) and the future nuclear reactor located near Qazvin, which we assess is probably the IR-360 reactor at Darkhovin.

We have information that, as of fall 2008, MASNA was responsible for conceptual planning, design, and project engineering for the Darkhovin reactor.

Ofogh Consulting Engineers (OCE)

We have information that OCE is a subcontractor to MASNA on the Darkhovin reactor that has conducted site selection, design, and building layout services for the reactor.

Ofogh was established during a reorganization of AEOIs Nuclear Power Plant Division in 2000 to provide the AEOI with technical and engineering services.

Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation (ESNICO)

We have information that ESNICO is responsible for procurement for the Darkhovin reactor project.

ESNICO has also been previously affiliated with procurement for MITEC, the firm responsible for the construction of the HWRR.

Proof of diversion

The United States does not have proof of diversion from the Darkhovin reactor to the Arak reactor, nor do we believe that such proof is necessary to demonstrate a proliferation risk.

We have already informed you that we have information that Iran has intentionally concealed work related to its Arak reactor by instead associating it with the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.

Further, as we have demonstrated above, the firms responsible for the Darkhovin reactor project are owned or controlled by the AEOI, which has management responsibilities over both the Arak and Darkhovin reactor projects.

One example of this is the involvement of Seyed Hossein Hosseini, designated in UNSCR 1803 for his involvement at a managerial level in the Arak reactor project, in Colencos dealings with Iran.

We have also demonstrated that assistance that could be useful for Darkhovin could be applied in the Arak reactor. Areas in which such diversion is possible include: design and analysis assistance; balance-of-plant equipment; and, application of computer codes and other computational tools. Colenco could even be mislead by Iran into helping to design sub-systems specifically for the Arak reactor.

AEOIs involvement, as well as the involvement of firms with direct association to both projects, lends credence to our view that it would be impossible for Colenco to put in sufficient protection mechanisms to ensure non-diversion and thereby assistance being provided to proscribed activities in Iran.

Further, the absence of any clear information demonstrating past diversion should not be considered an indicator that such diversion has not taken place or that it will not take place.

Summary

We look forward to continued collaboration on this issue as well as others of mutual, nonproliferation concern.

END U.S. NONPAPER

8. (U) Any substantive questions can be addressed to Richard Nephew (ISN/RA, 202-647-7680, ) or Judee Allen-Close (ISN/RA, 202-647-8366, ).

CLINTON

http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3994457.ece

SWEDISH-IRANIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: BUSINESS AS USUAL, RESISTANCE TO FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

Thursday, January 20th, 2011

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 000778

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019 TAGS: ECON, ETRD, ETTC, PGOV, PREL, IR, SW SUBJECT: SWEDISH-IRANIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: BUSINESS AS USUAL, RESISTANCE TO FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 464 B. 08 STOCKHOLM 717 C. 08 STOCKHOLM 431

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S) Summary: Behind the Swedish governments reluctance to support further sanctions in Iran, especially unilateral European measures, is a dynamic (though still fairly small) trade involving some of Swedens largest and most politically well-connected companies: Volvo, Ericsson and ABB to name three. Embassy Stockholm discusses Iran with Foreign Minister Bildt and his deputies regularly and increasingly.

— On export controls, Sweden has a policy of complying with UN sanctions banning the sale and delivery of technology and equipment that may contribute to nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. However, in repeated demarches on the activities of Swedish companies, for example Mahaco (brokering activities) and Colenco (light water reactor technology), the Swedes were passive and moved very slowly, referring repeatedly to either EU legislation or lack of Swedish legislation that prevents them from acting on Swedish companies (Reftel c).

— On Swedish exports to and investment in Iran more generally, the Swedish Trade Council, a government agency, actively promotes trade with Iran.

— On financial sanctions, Per Saland, Sanctions Coordinator at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs Department for Security Policy, told U.S. Treasury Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing David Cohen in June 2009 that Sweden does not support attempts to scrutinize every transaction with Iran because “legitimate trade exists between Sweden and Iran,” adding that the Swedish mindset on this point “will not change.” (Reftel A). End Summary.

Background ———-

2. (C) The Iranian immigrant community in Sweden, at roughly 100,000, is one of the largest in Europe. In the context of discussions on restricting of financial transfers by Swedish citizens of Iranian origin, Sanctions Coordinator Saland told us that the Swedish government will not take any actions that might restrict their civil liberties.

3. (C) In February 2008, Sweden signed a bilateral investment treaty with Iran. The Swedish government is critical of Iran where human rights are concerned, but advocates maintaining a dialogue with Iran and encourages trade with Iran (see paragraph 9).

Sweden Follows UN Sanctions —————————

4. (S) Sweden does not have any national sanctions against Iran, but Swedish companies are expected to comply with UN sanctions implemented by the EU, which primarily ban the sale and delivery of technology and equipment which may contribute to the development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. However, in repeated demarches on Mahaco (brokering activities) and Colenco (a Swiss company owned by a Swedish company providing light water reactor technology), the Swedes were passive and reluctant to cooperate. Where the Swedish company Mahaco is concerned, the government and the Inspectorate for Strategic Products (ISP) have been passive and very slow to react or take steps, referring repeatedly to either EU legislation or a lack of Swedish legislation that prevents them from acting on the Swedish company (Reftel C).

5. (C) Sanctions Coordinator Saland told us that Sweden does not support implementing tighter financial sanctions on Iran and that more stringent financial standards could hurt Swedish exports (Reftel B). Saland has also said that Sweden cannot do more than it is already doing as Swedish legislation does not allow the government to pressure Swedish banks and companies to stop doing business with Iranian entities (Reftel A). Saland told U.S. Treasury Assistant Secretary David Cohen in June 2009 that Sweden does not support attempts to scrutinize every transaction with Iran because “legitimate trade exists between Sweden and Iran,” adding that the Swedish mindset on this point “will not change.” (Reftel A). Sweden also remains unconvinced that many of the individuals and organizations designated under U.S. domestic legislation are really involved in problematic transactions and would like to see an expanded dialogue between U.S. and Swedish experts on this topic, according to Saland.

Trade with Iran —————

6. (U) The Swedish Trade Council considers Iran to be one of Swedens most important non-European export markets. Up until the 1979 Iranian revolution, Sweden was, in value terms, the 15th largest exporter to Iran. A number of Swedish companies operate their own subsidiaries in Iran, such as telecom giant Ericsson, the engineering companies ABB and Alfa-Laval, the mining companies Atlas-Copco and Svedala and the processing and packaging company Tetra-Pak. The largest Swedish exporter to Iran is Volvo AB, which manufactures trucks, buses and marine engines. Volvo AB is represented by Rena Technical Company, Bahar Rastar and Saipa Diesel Co, all located in Tehran. Volvo Trucks has delivered more than 60,000 Volvo trucks to Iran since 1934, making Volvo the leading heavy truck company in Iran. Iran is Swedens second largest export market in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia. According to a recent report in the German press repeated in the International Herald Tribune on December 1, Volvo has stepped in to fill the gap resulting from a Daimler decision to stop delivery of vehicles with three axles to Iran and is now exporting similar vehicles to Iran.

7. (U) Embassy Stockholm previously reported a significant difference in the information about doing business with Iran available on Swedish-language websites, compared with what was available on the English-language websites of the same organizations (Reftel A). The Swedish government continues to promote trade with Iran despite the fact that our interlocutors have told the USG otherwise. The Swedish Export Credit Guarantee Board 2007 Annual Reports stated there has been a “greater demand for risk cover for deliveries to the Middle East, above all to Iran in 2007.” In 2007, Iran ranked first on the list of top ten countries for which export guarantees were issued for large companies, and fourth on the list for small and medium-sized companies.

8. (U) Swedish exports to Iran are slowly moving in the direction of 2005 levels, which were $1.1 billion, accounting for nearly 1% of total Swedish exports (Reftel B). Sweden doubled its exports to Iran from 2007 to 2008, rising from $313.6 million to $627.3 million. The Swedish Trade Council claims that exports to Iran accounted for 0.20% in 2007 and 0.39% in 2008 of total Swedish exports. The International Monetary Fund, whose statistics might be more accurate or measure exports in a different manner, puts the figures at 0.53% for 2007 and 0.60% for 2008. According to Swedish Trade Council and Statistics Sweden, the share of total Swedish exports to Iran increased from $202.6 million (0.2%) for the period January-June 2008 to $245.5 million (0.4%) for the first six months in 2009. While these figures are small, they indicate that trade is rising, which is not the message that Post has received in meetings with Swedish interlocutors. On July 30, the Swedish embassy in Iran and the Swedish Trade Council canceled until further notice a planned visit to Iran due to what Swedish Ambassador to Iran Magnus Wernstedt called “turbulence in Iran and the uncertainty of the situation following the Iranian elections.” The 15-20 Swedish companies that had planned to participate in the trade delegation included major exporters, such as Ericsson, ABB, Atlas Copco, Alfa Laval, Tetra Pak and SKF. (Note: Ericsson, Atlas Copco and SKF, a company that manufactures rolling bearings, seals, mechatronics and lubrication solutions, are controlled by the Wallenberg family, which owns the majority of voting shares in these companies. End Note).

9. (U) In March 2009, the Swedish Trade Council in the Middle East developed a Swedish language “Iran Fact Pack” Powerpoint presentation to encourage trade between Sweden and Iran. This presentation provides a geographic, demographic and economic overview of Iran, utilizing statistics from 2006 through 2008. According to the presentation, Iran ranked 31 among Swedish export markets and 26 among Swedish import markets in 2006, the most recent figures provided. A graph shows that Swedish exports to Iran declined by 12.6 percent from 2004 to 2007, but does not show any figures for 2008 or 2009. Another slide states that Swedish exports of construction and mining equipment to Iran increased in 2007, and that 112 Swedish companies do business in Iran, some via local partners or distributors. Companies listed include: ABB, Alfa Laval, Atlas-Copco, Ericsson, GAC, Getinge, Scania, SKF, Tetra Pak and Volvo Trucks. One slide also lists the following business opportunities that Iran offers Swedish companies:

– Economic “free zones” where companies can establish an initial presence. – Low costs that make Iran an attractive market for production. – A large pool of well-educated labor. – Up to 100 percent foreign ownership of Iranian companies with the Iranian governments permission. – A bilateral investment protection agreement between Sweden and Iran.

The presentation concludes by mentioning that “The Swedish Trade Council in the Middle East makes it easier for Swedish companies to establish operations or develop business in Iran,” and states that the Swedish Trade Council maintains offices in Dubai, Riyadh and Cairo staffed by 15 consultants.

Swedish exports to Iran decrease, but increase to the UAE ——————————————— ————

10. (U) In examining Swedish-Iranian trade statistics for the first half of 2009, we noticed a trend of decreased exports to Iran and increased exports to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in certain product categories. The following product categories display this relationship (Source: Statistics Sweden).

– Other Inorganic Basic Chemicals: Exports to Iran decreased from $501,444 to $25,419 (94.9%) from 2007 to 2008. Export to UAE increased from $3.9 million to $7.2 million (84.4%) from 2007 to 2008.

– Explosives: Exports to Iran decreased from $255,116 to $0 (100%) from 2007 to 2008. Exports to UAE increased from $80,736 to $222,530 (175.7%) from 2007 to 2008.

– Aluminum Mills: Exports to Iran decreased from $32,993 to $7,582 (77%) from 2007 to 2008. Exports to UAE increased from $578,707 to $2.2 million (286%) from 2007 to 2008.

– Other Metal Mills: Exports to Iran decreased from $2 million to $418,375 (79.5%) from 2007 to 2008. Exports to UAE increased from $3,513 to $143,183 (3,796%) from 2007 to 2008.

– Engines and Turbines (not including aircraft and Cycle engines): Exports to Iran decreased from $39.9 million to $25.6 million (35.9%) from 2007 to 2008. Exports to UAE increased from $36.8 million to $51.1 million (38.8%) from 2007 to 2008.

– Motor Vehicle Bodies, Trailers and Semi-Trailers: Exports to Iran decreased from $582,034 to $76,827 (86.8%) from 2007 to 2008. Exports to UAE increased from $76,125 to $212,223 (178.8%) from 2007 to 2008.

While we cannot say whether Sweden is transshipping goods to Iran via the UAE based on the above-mentioned statistics, these figures could indicate a nascent trend in this direction. Embassy Stockholm discusses Iran with Foreign Minister Bildt and his deputies regularly and increasingly.

11. (C) Comment: It is difficult to get a fully accurate picture of Swedens economic relations with Iran. For example, statistics on Swedens foreign direct investments (FDI) for 2007 (2008 figures are not available) do not list Iran separately, which could indicate that FDI in Iran was an insignificant amount, or could reflect a conscious decision to place Iran under the category: “Other Countries.”

BARZUN

http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3994456.ece

Wirtschafts-«Uni»: in sieben Jahren zweimal völlig blank

Wednesday, January 19th, 2011

Die «City University» in Wettingen stellt 135 Studenten ohne Abschluss vor die Tür. Das Institut war in der Schweiz schon mal auf Visite. Damals gabs Beluga-Kaviar im Luxushotel. Und für Stimmung bei der Presse sorgte PR-Guru Klaus J. Stöhlker. von Christian Bütikofer

Der Schweizer Ableger der privaten Universität «City University of Seattle» (CityU) aus Wettingen ist bankrott. 135 Studenten aus dem Ausland, die zusammen pro Jahr mehrere Millionen Franken für Kurse fragwürdiger Qualität bezahlten, wissen nicht, wie es weiter gehen soll.

Recherchen zeigen: Die amerikanische Universität von der Westküste war in der Schweiz schon einmal zu Besuch.

1986 war sie ein Pionier, die CityU. Den verkalkten staatlichen Schweizer Hochschulen mit ihren jahrelangen Lehrplänen wollten die Amerikaner damals gehörig den Marsch blasen.

Für die PR zum Hotel beim Paradeplatz

Es war die Zeit der ersten privaten «Universitäten» nach US-Vorbild: Wer für 20 Monate berufsbegleitendes Studium 15’000 Franken zahlte, konnte sich danach den prestigeträchtigen Titel «Master of Business Administration» (MBA) um den Hals hängen.

Zur Eröffnung gabs erlesene Häppchen im exklusiven Zürcher Luxushotel «Savoy Baur en Ville», gleich beim Paradeplatz.

Sogar ein Politiker des US-Repräsentantenhauses war zugegen. Als PR-Manager engagierten die CityU-Bosse den selbsternannten PR-Guru Klaus J. Stöhlker.

Nicht ganz so exklusiv war der Unis erster Sitz: Die Studenten mussten an die Militärstrasse 84 im Zürcher Kreis 5 pilgern.

Ein Politiker als Aushängeschild…

Die CityU war der erste Player in diesem Feld. Ihr Erfolg war offenbar überwältigend. Initiator Michael A. Pastore behauptete, kurz nach Gründung hätten bereits über 1300 Personen ihr Interesse bekundet.

Wie heute, startete die Schule auch damals mit einer Firma, der Aktiengesellschaft «Educational Programs of City University of Bellevue, Washington State, USA». Das Kapital betrug 50’000 Franken, der damalige Zürcher FDP-Kantonsrat Hans Hartmann durfte im Beirat Platz nehmen.

… Wirtschaftsgrössen als Garanten für Seriosität

Die CityU versuchte schon damals mit Wirtschaftsgrössen Eindruck zu schinden: Assistiert wurde der FDP-Politiker von IBM-Kadermann Peter Gernert, Peter Graf, Direktor der Badener Nuklearfirma Motor Columbus  (die heute skandalumwitterte AF-Colenco), Gian Andri Vital von Standard Telephon und Radio AG, Max Rüegger der Tasa International sowie Peter Ritter, schillernder Treuhänder der Vaduzer Ritter und Partner Holding sowie Präsidial Anstalt.

Eine Schule mutiert zur Universität

Kurz bevor die Initiatoren der «Universität» aus Seattle die Schweiz als Ziel für ihre MBAs ausmachten, war das Institut in den USA noch als «College» bekannt – ein ganz normales Gymnasium.

Das zur Universität aufgebohrte «City College» verfügte damals gerade mal über sechs vollamtliche Lehrkräfte und 148 nebenamtliche Dozenten. Von den sechs Vollangestellten hatte keiner doktoriert, eine Person besass ein MBA.

Die Universität verfügte weder über eine eigene Bibliothek, noch betrieb sie eigene Forschungen.

«Ehrendoktor» nach Wilhelm Tell-Rede

In Deutschland war CityU früh in eine Politiker-Affäre verwickelt: Rezzo Schlauch, Fraktionschef der Grünen, wurde von der Uni erfolglos auf Unterlassung eingeklagt. Streitwert: 500’000 Deutsche Mark. Er betitelte die CityU 1991 «als Universität getarnte drittklassige Volkshochschule».

Schlauch kam der CityU-Ehrendokturhut des Baden-Württembergischen Wirtschaftsministers Hermann Schaufler verdächtig vor, denn «Dr. h.c.» Schaufler sass auch im Beirat des deutschen CityU-Ablegers.

Sein Ministerium bemühte sich darum, dass das private Institut vom Topf staatlicher Förderhilfe naschen durfte – 300’000 Deutsche Mark standen auf dem Spiel. Schlauch verdächtigte den Minister, er habe sich auf Steuerzahlers Kosten diesen Doktorhut verschafft.

Den Ehrendoktor erarbeite sich der Herr Minister, indem er im Hochschul-Hauptquartier in Seattle einen Festvortrag vor Studenten hielt. Geistiger Höhepunkt: Ein Zitat aus Friedrich Schillers «Wilhelm Tell».

Auch ABB setzte auf die Pseudo-Uni

Die Schweizer Wirtschaft fand offenbar Gefallen an City University of Seattles Schweizer Ableger. Bald schon schafften es die CityU-Verantwortlichen, Firmen wie die ABB ins Boot zu holen.

Der Run aufs «MBA made in USA» währte aber offenbar nicht ewig und die Schweizer Hochschulen sorgten mit massgeschneiderten Kursen dafür, dass die CityU kontinuierlich an Kundschaft verlor.

2003 kam dann das bittere Ende: Die «Universität» ging in Liquidation, das Institut verschwand von der Bildfläche – vorerst.

Das gleiche Muster wie in der Schweiz zeigte sich im Ausland auch bei anderen Ablegern. Etwa in der Slowakei. Dort wurde 1991 ein Institut gegründet, das Mitte 2003 wieder aufgelöst wurde. Mit einer zweiten Firma machten die Amerikaner jedoch weiter.

Heutiger CityU-Boss war schon damals Direktor

In der Schweiz gründete der CityU-Abgänger Cemal Erinmez 2007 mit einer neuen Firma einen erneuten Schweizer Ableger der CityU.

Beim gescheiterten Vorgänger bekleidete er im Jahr 2000 bereits den Posten eines Direktors.

Auch das zweite Abenteuer endete nach drei Jahren für Erinmez unrühmlich. Die Konsequenzen aber tragen vorerst die 135 eingeschriebenen Studenten aus Fernost und Afrika.

© 19.01.2011, Aargauer Zeitung

NETHERLANDS: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT ROTOR BLADE EXPORTS TO IRAN

Wednesday, January 19th, 2011
ID
09THEHAGUE444
SUBJECT
NETHERLANDS: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT ROTOR BLADE
DATE
2009-07-22 15:03:00
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET//NOFORN
ORIGIN
Embassy The Hague
TEXT
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000444

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2019
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL ENRG NL IR
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT ROTOR BLADE EXPORTS TO IRAN

Classified By: ACTING POLECON COUNSELOR SHAWN GRAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The Dutch export control authority hasdenied an export license for power plant turbine bladesdestined for Iran. Dutch officials have formally asked otherEuropean countries with companies that produce similar partsto block their export to Iran. The Dutch have asked usinformally to ensure U.S. firms, such as General Electric(GE), refrain from supplying these turbine blades to Iran.END SUMMARY.

2.(S/NF) Dutch export control officials at the Ministries ofEconomic Affairs (MEA) and Foreign Affairs (MFA) asked tomeet with EconOff June 30. MEA,s Kees Jan Steenhoekdescribed his office,s decision to block Sulzer Eldim BV,s(Dutch subsidiary of Swiss parent company Sulzer Metco)application to export gas-fired electricity turbinereplacement rotor blades to Iran. PolMilOff,s subsequentJuly 9 meeting with MFA,s export control policy officialJosephine Frantzen provided further detail.

¶3. (S/NF) Until 2009, Dutch customs authorities routinelystopped Sulzer Eldim,s Iran-bound shipments, then releasedthem when satisfied the rotor blades were destined forcivilian-use electricity production. However, afterdiscovering in January 2009 the UK had blocked a GBP 45million shipment of similar parts, MEA used a &catch-all8provision requiring Sulzer Eldim to obtain an export licensefor the blades, on the grounds the electricity could bediverted to military or nuclear programs. Sulzer Eldimsubsequently applied for an export license on a EUR 40million order. The Dutch recently denied the application andposted this information on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)Secure Information System as NI-NL-09001.

¶4. (S/NF) The consignee in Iran is a conglomerate thatsupplies the civilian power sector there, but also has tiesto the military. The Dutch review of the case led them tobelieve the electricity produced by the turbines &might notbe used for civilian purposes.8 One of Sulzer Eldim,sdirectors is an Iranian national. MEA estimates blocking thefirm,s exports to Iran could cause it to lose half itsrevenue. Sulzer Eldim has already laid off some of its400-person staff, a controversial decision in theeconomically struggling southern province of Limburg wherethe company is located.

¶5. (S/NF) The Dutch government has demarched other Europeancapitals — including Paris, Berlin, and Rome — where rotorblade manufacturers are located. According to Frantzen, theItalian government had a &positive reaction,8 but theothers have not responded. The Dutch do not intend todemarche Washington at this time. However, GE is capable ofsupplying the blades, and the Dutch hope the USG will notallow GE to export these products to Iran. The Dutch wantother countries to be equally vigilant in denying exportlicenses for these parts so as to maintain cohesion withinthe NSG and not disadvantage Dutch business interests. TheDutch are particularly concerned German company Siemens willcontinue to export the blades to Iran.

GALLAGHER

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ADDED
2011-01-19 20:08:00
STAMP
2011-01-21 22:11:58
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http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/07/09THEHAGUE444.html